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OF 1812

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tlXKELEY

LIBRARY

UNIVERSITY Of
CAUfOfcNIA

UNDERGMD.
L1BRAIT

The
Naval War of 1812

or the

History of the United States Navy during
the Last War with Great Britain

to which is appended an account of

The Battle of New Orleans

Theodore Roosevelt

Author of " American Ideals," ll The Wilderness Hunter,"
u Hunting Trips of a Ranchman," etc.

Part I.

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York and London

1900

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

h. 34>o
K?o o

UNDERGRAO.

PREFACE. UBRARY

The history of the naval events of the War
of 1812 has been repeatedly presented both
to the American and the English reader.
Historical writers have treated it either in
connection with a general account of the con-
test on land and sea, or as forming a part of
the complete record of the navies of the two
nations. A few monographs, which confine
themselves strictly to the naval occurrences,
have also appeared. But none of these works
can be regarded as giving a satisfactorily full
or impartial account of the war — some of them
being of the " popular " and loosely-con-
structed order, while others treat it from a
purely partisan standpoint. No single book
can be quoted which would be accepted by
the modern reader as doing justice to both
sides, or, indeed, as telling the whole story.
Any one specially interested in the subject
must read all ; and then it will seem almost a
hopeless task to reconcile the many and widely
contradictory statements he will meet with.

There appear to be three works which,
taken in combination, give the best satisfac-
tion on the subject. First, in James' " Naval
History of Great Britain " (which supplies both
the material and the opinions of almost every

4 PREFACE.

subsequent English or Canadian historian)
can be found the British view of the case. It
is an invaluable work, written with fulness
and care ; on the other hand it is also a piece
of special pleading by a bitter and not over-
scrupulous partisan. This, in the second
place, can be partially supplemented by Feni-
more Cooper's " Naval History of the United
States." The latter gives the American view
of the cruises and battles ; but it is much less
of an authority than James', both because it
is written without great regard for exactness,
and because all figures for the American side
need to be supplied from Lieutenant (now
Admiral) George E. Emmons' statistical " His-
tory of the United States Navy," which is the
third of the works in question.

But even after comparing these three
authors, many contradictions remain unex-
plained, and the truth can only be reached in
such cases by a careful examination of the
navy " Records," the London " Naval Chron-
icle," "Niles' Register," and other similar
documentary publications. Almost the only
good criticisms on the actions are those inci-
dentally given in standard works on other sub-
jects, such as Lord Howard Douglass' " Naval
Gunnery," and Admiral Jurien de la Graviere's
" Guerres Maritimes." Much of the material
in our Navy Department has never been
touched at all. In short, no full, accurate,
and unprejudiced history of the war has ever
been written.

The subject merits a closer scrutiny than it
has received. At present people are begin-
ning to realize that it is folly for the great

PREFACE. 5

English-speaking Republic to rely for defence
upon a navy composed partly of antiquated
hulks, and partly of new vessels rather more
worthless than the old. It is worth while
to study with some care that period of
our history* during which our navy stood
at the highest pitch of its fame ; and to
learn anything from the past it is necessary
to know, as near as may be, the exact truth.
Accordingly the work should be written im-
partially, if only from the narrowest motives.
Without abating a jot from one's devotion to
his country and flag, I think a history can be
made just enough to warrant its being received
as an authority equally among Americans and
Englishmen. I have endeavored to supply
such a work. It is impossible that errors,
both of fact and opinion, should not have
crept into it ; and although I have sought to
make it in character as non-partisan as pos-
sible, these errors will probably be in favor of
the American side.

As my only object is to give an accurate
narrative of events, I shall esteem it a par-
ticular favor if any one will furnish me with
the means of rectifying such mistakes ; and if
I have done injustice to any commander, or
officer of any grade, whether American or
British, I shall consider myself under great
obligations to those who will set me right.

I have been unable to get access to the
original reports of the British commanders,
the logs of the British ships, or their muster-
rolls, and so have been obliged to take them
at second hand from the " Gazette," or " Naval
Chronicle," or some standard history. The

6 PREFACE.

American official letters, log-books, original
contracts, muster-rolls, etc., however, being
preserved in the Archives at Washington, I
have been able, thanks to the courtesy of the
Hon. Wm. H. Hunt, Secretary of the Navy,
to look them over. The set of' letters from
the officers is very complete, in three series,
— " Captains' Letters," " Masters' Comman-
dant Letters," and " Officers' Letters," there
being several volumes for each year. The
books of contracts contain valuable informa-
tion as to the size and build of some of the
vessels. The log-books are rather exasperat-
ing, often being very incomplete. Thus when
I turned from Decatur's extremely vague
official letter describing the capture of the
Macedonian to the log-book of the Frigate
United States, not a fact about the fight could
be gleaned. The last entry in the log on the
day of the fight is " strange sail discovered to
be a frigate under English colors," and the
next entry (on the following day) relates to
the removal of the prisoners. The log of the
Enterprise is very full indeed, for most of the
time, but is a perfect blank for the period dur-
ing which she was commanded by Lieutenant
Burrows, and in which one fought the Boxer.
I have not been able to find the Peacock's log
at all, though there is a very full set of letters
from her commander. Probably the fire of
1837 destroyed a great deal of valuable ma-
terial. Whenever it was possible I have re-
ferred to printed matter in preference to man-
uscript, and my authorities can thus, in most
cases, be easily consulted.

In conclusion I desire to express my sin-

PREFACE. 7

cerest thanks to Captain James D. Bulloch,
formerly of the United States Navy, and
Commander Adolf Mensing, formerly of the
German Navy, without whose advice and
sympathy this work would probably never
have been written or even begun.

New York City, 1882.

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

I originally intended to write a com-
panion volume to this, which should deal with
the operations on land. But a short exami-
nation showed that these operations were
hardly worth serious study. They teach
nothing new ; it is the" old, old lesson, that a
miserly economy in preparation may in the
end involve a lavish outlay of men and money,
which, after all, conies too late to more than
partially offset the evils produced by the
original short-sighted parsimony. This might
be a lesson worth dwelling on did it have any
practical bearing on the issues of the present
day ; but it has none, as far as the army is
concerned. It was criminal folly for Jeffer-
son, and his follower Madison, to neglect to
give us a force either of regulars or of well-
trained volunteers during the twelve years
they had in which to prepare for the struggle
that any one might see was inevitable ; but
there is now far less need of an army than
there was then. Circumstances have altered
widely since 1812. Instead of the decaying
might of Spain on our southern frontier, we
have the still weaker power of Mexico. In-
stead of the great Indian nations of the in-
terior, able to keep civilization at bay, to hold
in check strong armies, to ravage large

io PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

stretches of territory, and needing formidable
military expeditions to overcome them, there
are now only left broken and scattered bands
which are sources of annoyance merely.
To the north we are still hemmed in by the
Canadian possessions of Great Britain ; but
since 1812 our strength has increased so pro-
digiously, both absolutely and relatively, while
England's military power has remained almost
stationary, that we need now be under no ap-
prehensions from her land-forces ; for, even if
checked in the beginning, we could not help
conquering in the end by sheer weight of
numbers, if by nothing'else. So that there is
now no cause for our keeping up a large army ;
while, on the contrary, the necessity for an
efficient navy is so evident that only our almost
incredible short-sightedness prevents our at
once preparing one.

Not only do the events of the war on land
teacli very little to the statesman who studies
history in order to avoid in the present the
mistakes of the past, but besides this, the
battles and campaigns are of very little in-
terest to the student of military matters. The
British regulars, trained in many wars, thrashed
the raw troops opposed to them whenever they
had any thing like a fair chance ; but this is
not to be wondered at, for the same thing has
always happened the world over under similar
conditions. Our defeats were exactly such
as any man might have foreseen, and there is
nothing to be learned from the follies com-
mitted by incompetent commanders and un-
trained troops when in the presence of skilled
officers having under them disciplined soldiers.

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION. n

The humiliating surrenders, abortive attacks,
and panic routs of our armies can all be paral-
leled in the campaigns waged by Napoleon's
marshals against the Spaniards and Portu-
guese in the years immediately preceding the
outbreak of our own war. The Peninsular
troops were as little able to withstand the
French veterans as were our militia to hold
their own against the British regulars. But
it must always be remembered, to our credit,
that while seven years of fighting failed to
make the Spaniards able to face the French,1
two years of warfare gave us soldiers who
could stand against the best men of Britain.
On the northern frontier we never developed
a great general, — Brown's claim to the title
rests only on his not having committed the
phenomenal follies of his predecessors, — but
by 1814 our soldiers had become seasoned,
and we had acquired some good brigade com-
manders, notably Scott, so that in that year we
played on even terms with the British. But the
battles, though marked by as bloody and obsti-
nate fighting as ever took place, were waged be-
tween small bodies of men, and were not distin-
guished by any feats of generalship, so that
they are not of any special interest to the his-
torian. In fact, the only really noteworthy
feat of arms of the war took place at New
Orleans, and the only military genius that the

1 At the closing battle of Toulouse, fought between
the allies and the French, the flight of the Spaniards
was so rapid and universal as to draw from the Duke
of Wellington the bitter observation, that " though he
had seen a good many remarkable things in the course
of his life, yet this was the first time he had ever seen
ten thousand men running a race."

1 2 PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

struggle developed was Andrew Jackson.
His deeds are worthy of all praise, and the
battle he won was in many ways so peculiar
as to make it well worth a much closer study
than it has yet received. It was by far the
most prominent event of the war ; it was a
victory which reflected high honor on the
general and soldiers who won it, and it was
in its way as remarkable as any of the great
battles that took place about the same time
in Europe. Such being the case, I have de-
voted a chapter to its consideration at the
conclusion of the chapters devoted to the naval
operations.

As before said, the other campaigns on land
do not deserve very minute attention ; but, for
the sake of rendering the account of the battle
of New Orleans more intelligible, I will give
a hasty sketch of the principal engagements
that took place elsewhere.

The war opened in mid-summer of 1812, by
the campaign of General Hull on the Michigan
frontier. With two or three thousand raw
troops he invaded Canada. About the same
time Fort Mackinaw was surrendered by its
garrison of 60 Americans to a British and In-
dian force of 600. Hull's campaign was un-
fortunate from the beginning. Near Browns-
town the American Colonel Van Home, with
some 200 men, was ambushed and routed
by Tecumseh and his Indians. In revenge
Col. Miller, with 600 Americans, at Ma-
guaga attacked 150 British and Canadians
under Capt. Muir, and 250 Indians under
Tecumseh, and whipped them, — Tecumseh's

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION. 13

Indians standing their ground longest. The
Americans lost 75, their foes 180 men. At
Chicago the small force of 66 Americans was
surprised and massacred by the Indians.
Meanwhile, General Brock, the British com-
mander, advanced against Hull with a
rapidity and decision that seemed to paralyze
his senile and irresolute opponent. The lat-
ter retreated to Detroit, where, without strik-
ing a blow, he surrendered 1,400 men to
Brock's nearly equal force, which consisted
nearly one half of Indians under Tecumseh.
On the Niagara frontier, an estimable and
honest old gentleman and worthy citizen,
who knew nothing of military matters, Gen.
Van Rensselaer, tried to cross over and attack
the British at Queenstown ; 1,100 Americans
got across and were almost all killed or capt-
ured by an equal number of British, Cana-
dians and Indians, while on the opposite side
a larger number of their countrymen looked
on, and with abject cowardice refused to cross
to their assistance. The command of the
army was then handed over to a ridiculous
personage named Smythe, who issued procla-
mations so bombastic that they really must
have come from an unsound mind, and then
made a ludicrously abortive effort at inva-
sion, which failed almost of its own accord.
A British and Canadian force of less than 400
men was foiled in an assault on Ogdensburg,
after a slight skirmish, by about 1,000 Ameri-
cans under Brown ; and with this trifling suc-
cess the military operations of the year came
to an end.

Early in 18 13, Ogdensburg was again at-

14 PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

tacked, this time by between 500 and 600
British, who took it after a brisk resistance
from some 300 militia ; the British lost 60 and
the Americans 20, in killed and wounded.
General Harrison, meanwhile, had begun the
campaign in the Northwest. At Frenchtown,
on the river Raisin, Winchester's command of
about 900 Western troops was surprised by a
force of 1,100 men, half of them Indians,
under the British Colonel Proctor. The right
division, taken by surprise, gave up at once ;
the left division, mainly Kentucky riflemen,
and strongly posted in houses and stockaded
enclosures, made a stout resistance, and only
surrendered after a bloody fight, in which 180
British and about half as many Indians were
killed or wounded. Over 300 Americans were
slain, some in the battle, but most in the
bloody massacre that followed. After this,
General Harrison went into camp at Fort
Meigs, where, with about 1,100 men, he was
besieged by 1,000 British and Canadians
under Proctor and 1,200 Indians under Te-
cumseh. A force of 1,200 Kentucky militia
advanced to his relief and tried to cut its way
into the fort while the garrison made a sortie.
The sortie was fairly successful, but the Ken-
tuckians were scattered like chaff by the
British regulars in the open, and when broken
were cut to pieces by the Indians in the
woods. Nearly two-thirds of the relieving
troops were killed or captured ; about 400 got
into the fort. Soon afterward Proctor aban-
doned the siege. Fort Stephenson, garri-
soned by Major Croghan and 160 men, was
attacked by a force of 391 British regulars,

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION. 15

who tried to carry it by assault, and were re-
pulsed with the loss of a fourth of their num-
ber. Some four thousand Indians joined
Proctor, but most of them left him after
Perry's victory on Lake Erie. Then Harrison,
having received large reinforcements, invaded
Canada. At the River Thames his army of
3,500 men encountered and routed between
600 and 700 British under Proctor, and about
1,000 Indians under Tecumseh. The battle
was decided at once by a charge of the Ken-
tucky mounted riflemen, who broke through
the regulars, took them in rear, and captured
them, and then dismounting attacked the
flank of the Indians, who were also assailed
by the infantry. Proctor escaped by the skin
of his teeth and Tecumseh died fighting, like
the hero that he was. This battle ended the
campaign in the Northwest. In this quarter
it must be remembered that the war was, on
the part of the Americans, mainly one against
Indians ; the latter always forming over half
of the British forces. Many of the remainder
were French Canadians, and the others were
regulars. The American armies, on the con-
trary, were composed of the armed settlers of
Kentucky and Ohio, native Americans, of
English speech and blood, who were battling
for lands that were to form the heritage of
their children. In the West the war was only
the closing act of the struggle that for many
years had been waged by the hardy and rest-
less pioneers of our race, as with rifle and axe
they carved out the mighty empire that we
their children inherit ; it was but the final ef-
fort with which they wrested from the Indian

1 6 PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

lords of the soil the wide and fair domain that
now forms the heart of our great Republic.
It was the breaking down of the last barrier
that stayed the flood of our civilization ; it
settled, once and forever, that henceforth the
law, the tongue, and the blood of the land
should be neither Indian, nor yet French, but
English. The few French of the West were
fighting against a race that was to leave as
little trace of them as of the doomed Indian
peoples with whom they made common cause.
The presence of the British mercenaries did
not alter the character of the contest; it
merely served to show the bitter and narrow
hatred with which the Mother-Island regarded
her greater daughter, predestined as the latter
was to be queen of the lands that lay beyond
the Atlantic.

Meanwhile, on Lake Ontario, the Americans
made successful descents on York and Fort
George, scattering or capturing their compar-
atively small garrisons ; while a counter de-
scent by the British on Sackett's Harbor failed,
the attacking force being too small. After the
capture of Fort George, the Americans invaded
Canada; but their advance guard, 1,400 strong,
under Generals Chandler and Winder, was
surprised in the night by 800 British, who,
advancing with the bayonet, broke up the camp,
capturing both the generals and half the artil-
lery. Though the assailants, who lost 220 of
their small number, suffered much more than
the Americans, yet the latter were completely
demoralized, and at once retreated to Fort
George. Soon afterward, Col. Boerstler with
about 600 men surrendered with shamefully

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION. 17

brief resistance to a somewhat smaller force
of British and Indians. Then about 300 Brit-
ish crossed the Niagara to attack Black Rock
which they took, but were afterward driven off
by a large body of militia with the loss of 40
men. Later in the season the American Gen-
eral McClure wantonly burned the village of
Newark, and then retreated in panic flight
across the Niagara. In retaliation the British
in turn crossed the river ; 600 regulars sur-
prised and captured in the night Fort Niagara,
with its garrison of 400 men ; two thousand
troopers attacked Black Rock, and, after los-
ing over a hundred men in a smart engagement
with somewhat over 1,500 militia whom they
easily dispersed, captured and burned both
it and Buffalo. Before these last events took
place another invasion of Canada had been
been attempted, this time under General Wil-
kinson, " an unprincipled imbecile," as Scott
very properly styled him. It was mismanaged
in every possible way, and was a total failure ;
it was attended with but one battle, that of
Chrystler's Farm, in which 1,000 British, with
the loss of less than 200 men, beat back double
their number of Americans, who lost nearly
500 men and also one piece of artillery. The
American army near Lake Champlain had
done nothing, its commander, General Wade
Hampton, being, if possible, even more in-
competent than Wilkinson. He remained sta-
tionary while a small force of British plundered
Plattsburg and Burlington ; then, with 5,000
men he crossed into Canada, but returned
almost immediately, after a small skirmish at
Chauteaugay between his advance guard and

1 8 PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

some 500 Canadians, in which the former lost
41 and the latter 22 men. This affair, in which
hardly a tenth of the American force was en-
gaged, has been, absurdly enough, designated
a "battle" by most British and Canadian
historians. In reality it was the incompetency
of their general and not the valor of their foes
that caused the retreat of the Americans. The
same comment, by the way, applies to the so-
called " Battle " of Plattsburg, in the following
year, which may have been lost by Sir George
Prevost, but was certainly not won by the
Americans. And, again, a similar criticism
should be passed on General Wilkinson's at-
tack on La Colle Mill, near the head of the
same lake. Neither one of the three affairs
was a stand-up fight ; in each a greatly su-
perior force, led by an utterly incapable gen-
eral, retreated after a slight skirmish with an
enemy whose rout would have been a matter
of certainty had the engagement been per-
mitted to grow serious.

In the early spring of 18 14 a small force of
160 American regulars, under Captain Holmes,
fighting from behind felled logs, routed 200
British with a loss of 65 men, they themselves
losing but 8. On Lake Ontario the British
made a descent on Oswego and took it by fair
assault ; and afterward lost 180 men who tried
to cut out some American transports, and were
killed or captured to a man. All through
the spring and early summer the army on the
Niagara frontier was carefully drilled by Brown,
and more especially by Scott, and the results of
this drilling were seen in the immensely im-
proved effectiveness of the soldiers in the

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION. 19

campaign that opened in July. Fort Erie was
captured with little resistance, and on the 4th
of July, at the river Chippeway, Brown, with
two brigades of regulars, each about 1,200
strong, under Scott and Ripley, and a brigade
of 800 militia and Indians under Porter, mak-
ing a total of about 3,200 men, won a stand-
up fight against the British General Riall, who
had nearly 2,500 men, 1,800 of them regulars.
Porter's brigade opened by driving in the
Canadian militia and the Indians ; but was
itself checked by the British light-troops. Rip-
ley's brigade took very little part in the battle,
three of the regiments not being engaged at
all, and the fourth so slightly as to lose but five
men. The entire brunt of the action was borne
by Scott's brigade, which was fiercely attacked
by the bulk of the British regulars under Riall.
The latter advanced with great bravery, but
were terribly cut up by the fire of Scott's reg-
ulars ; and when they had come nearly up
to him, Scott charged with the bayonet and
drove them clean off the field. The American
loss was 322, including 23 Indians ; the British
loss was 515, excluding that of the Indians.
The number of Americans actually engaged
did not exceed that of the British ; and Scott's
brigade, in fair fight, closed by a bayonet
charge, defeated an equal force of British reg-
ulars.

On July 25th occurred the Battle of Niagara,
or Lundy's Lane, fought between General
Brown with 3,100 ■ Americans and General

1 As near as can be found out ; most American
authorities make it much less ; Lossing, for example,
says, only 2,400.

20 PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

Drummond with 3,500 * British. It was
brought on by accident in the evening, and
was waged with obstinate courage and savage
slaughter till midnight. On both sides the
forces straggled into action by detachments.
The Americans formed the attacking party.
As before, Scott's brigade bore the brunt
of the fight, and over half of his men
were killed or wounded; he himself was
disabled and borne from the field. The
struggle was of the most desperate character,
the combatants showing a stubborn courage
that could not be surpassed.2 Charge after
charge was made with the bayonet, and the
artillery was taken and retaken once and
again. The loss was nearly equal : on the
side of the Americans, 854 men (including
Generals Brown and Scott, wounded) and
two guns ; on that of the British, 878 men
(including General Ri'all captured) and one
gun. Each side claimed it as a victory over
superior numbers. The truth is beyond
question that the British had the advantage

1 General Drummond in his official letter makes
it but 2,800; James, who gives the details, makes
it 3,000 rank and file ; adding 13 per cent, for
the officers, sergeants, and drummers, brings it up
to 3,400 ; and we still have to count in the artillery
drivers, etc.

2 General Drummond writes : " In so determined a
manner were their attacks directed against our guns
that our artillerymen were bayoneted while in the act
of loading, and the muzzle of the enemy's guns were
advanced within a few yards of ours." Even James
says : " Upon the whole, however, the American
troops fought bravely ; and the conduct of many of the
officers, of the artillery corps especially, would have
done honor to any service."

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION. 21

in numbers, and a still greater advantage in
position ; while it is equally beyond question
that it was a defeat and not a victory for the
Americans. They left the field and retired
in perfect order to Fort Erie, while the British
held the field and the next day pursued their
foes.

Having received some reinforcements
General Drummond, now with about 3,600
men, pushed forward to besiege Fort Erie, in
which was the American army, some 2,400
strong, under General Gaines. Col. Tucker
with 500 British regulars was sent across the
Niagara to destroy the batteries at Black
Rock, but was defeated by 300 American reg-
ulars under Major Morgan, fighting from be-
hind a strong breastwork of felled trees, with
a creek in front. On the night of the 15th of
August, the British in three columns advanced
to storm the American works, but after
making a most determined assault were
beaten off. The assailants lost 900 men, the
assailed about 80. After this nothing was
done till Sept. 17th, when General Brown,
who had resumed command of the American
forces, determined upon and executed a sortie.
Each side had received reinforcements ; the
Americans numbered over 3,000, the British
nearly 4,000. The fighting was severe, the
Americans losing 500 men ; but their op-
ponents lost 600 men, and most of their
batteries were destroyed. Each side, as usual,
claimed the victory ; but, exactly as Lundy's
Lane must be accounted an American defeat,
as our forces retreated from the ground, so
this must be considered an American victory,

2 2 PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

for after it the British broke up camp and
drew off to Chippeway. Nothing more was
done, and on November 5th the American
army recrossed the Niagara. Though marked
by some brilliant feats of arms this four
months' invasion of Canada, like those that
had preceded it, thus came to nothing. But
at the same time a British invasion of the
United States was repulsed far more dis-
gracefully. Sir George Prevost, with an
army of 13,000 veteran troops, marched
south along the shores of Lake Champlain
to Plattsburg, which was held by General
Macomb with 2,000 regulars, and perhaps
double that number of nearly worthless
militia ; — a force that the British could have
scattered to the winds, though, as they were
strongly posted, not without severe loss.
But the British fleet was captured by Com-
modore MacDonough in the fight on the
lake ; and then Sir George, after some heavy
skirmishing between the outposts of the armies,
in which the Americans had the advantage,
fled precipitately back to Canada.

All through the war the sea-coasts of the
United States had been harried by small pred-
atory excursions ; a part of what is now the
State of Maine was conquered with little re-
sistance, and kept until the close of hostilities ;
and some of the towns on the shores of
Chesapeake Bay had been plundered or
burnt. In August, 1814, a more serious in-
vasion was planned, and some 5,000 troops —
regulars, sailors, and marines — were landed,
under the command of General Ross. So
utterly helpless was the Democratic Adminis-

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

tration at Washington, that during the two
years of warfare hardly any steps had been
taken to protect the Capitol, or the country
round about ; what little was done was done
entirely too late, and bungled badly in addi-
tion. History has not yet done justice to the
ludicrous and painful folly and stupidity of
which the government founded by Jefferson,
and carried on by Madison, was guilty, both in
its preparations for, and in its way of carrying
on, this war ; nor is it yet realized that the men
just mentioned, and their associates, are
primarily responsible for the loss we suffered
in it, and the bitter humiliation some of its in-
cidents caused us. The small British army
marched at will through Virginia and Mary-
land, burned Washington, and finally re-
treated from before Baltimore and re-embarked
to take part in the expedition against New
Orleans. Twice, at Bladensburg and North
Point, it came in contact with superior num-
bers of militia in fairly good position. In
each case the result was the same. After
sone preliminary skirmishing, manoeuvring,
and volley firing, the British charged with the
bayonet. The rawest regiments among the
American militia then broke at once ; the
others kept pretty steady, pouring in quite a
destructive fire, until the regulars had come up
close to them, when they also fled. The
British regulars were too heavily loaded to
pursue, and, owing to their mode of attack,
and the rapidity with which their opponents
ran away, the loss of the latter was in each
case very slight. At North Point, however,
the militia, being more experienced, behaved

24 PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

better than at Bladensburg. In neither case
were the British put to any trouble to win
their victory.

The above is a brief sketch of the cam-
paigns of the war. It is not cheerful reading
for an American, nor yet of interest to a
military student ; and its lessons have been
taught so often by similar occurrences in
other lands under like circumstances, and
moreover, teach such self-evident truths, that
they scarcely need to be brought to the notice
of an historian. But the crowning event of
the war was the Battle of New Orleans ; re-
markable in its military aspect, and a source
of pride to every American. It is well worth
a more careful study, and to it I have devoted
the last chapter of this work.

New York City, 1883.

PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO.
(see also in alphabetical place in index.)

American State Papers.

Brenton, E. P. Naval History of Great Britain,
1783 to 1836. 2 vols., octavo. London, 1837.

Broke, Adm., Memoir of, by Rev. J. G. Brighton.
Octavo. London, 1866.

" Captains' Letters " in Archives at Washington.

Codrington, Adm. Sir E. Memoirs, edited by his
daughter. 2 vols., octavo. London, 1873.

Coggeshall, George. History of American Priva-
teers. New York, 1876.

Cooper, J. F. Naval History of the United States.
New York, 1856.

Dundonald, Earl. Autobiography of a Seaman.
London, i860.

Douglass, Lord Howard. Naval Gunnery. Octavo.
London, i860.

Emmons, Lieut. G. E. Statistical History of United
States Navy, 1853.

Farragut, Adm. D. G., Life of, by his son, Loyall
Farragut. Octavo. New York, 1878.

Graviere, Adm., J. de la. Guerres Maritimes. 2
vols., octavo. Paris, 1881.

James, William. Naval History of Great Britain.
6 vols., octavo, London, 1837.

James, William. Naval Occurrences with the
Americans. Octavo, London, 18 17.

Lossing, Benson J. Field-book of the War of 181 2.
Octavo, New York, 1869.

Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 161 3 to
1863. 2 vols., octavo. London, 1877.

London Naval Chronicle.

Marshall. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols., octa-
vo. London, 1825.

" Masters-Commandant Letters " in the Archives at
Washington.

26 AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO.

Morris, Com. Charles. Autobiography. Anna-
polis, 1880.

Naval Archives at Washington.

Niles. Weekly Register.

Pielat, B. La Vie et les Actions Memorables du
St. Michel de Ruyter. Amsterdam, 1677.

Riviere, Lieut. H. La Marine Francaise sous le
Regime de Louis XV. Paris, 1859.

Tatnall, Commod., Life, by C. C. Jones, Jr. Sa-
vannah, 1878.

Toussard, L. de. American Artillerists' Companion.
Phila. 181 1.

Troude, O. Batailles Navales de la France. Paris,
1868.

Ward, Com. J. H. Manual of Naval Tactics. 1859.

Yonge, Charles Duke. History of the British
Navy. 3 vols., octavo. London, 1866.

CONTENTS.

Preface.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

Causes of the war of 1812 — Conflicting views of
America and Britain as regards neutral rights — Those
of the former power right — Impossibility of avoiding
hostilities — Declaration of war June 18, 181 2 — Slight
preparations made — General features of the contest —
Race identity of combatants — The treaty of peace
nominally leaves the situation unchanged — But practi-
cally settles the dispute in our favor in respect to mari-
time rights — The British navy and its reputation prior
to 181 2 — Comparison with other European navies —
British and American authorities consulted in the pres-
ent work : 31

CHAPTER II.

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when
America declared war against her — Race identity of
the combatants — American navy at the beginning of
the war — Officers well trained — Causes tending to make
our seamen especially efficient — Close similarity be-
tween British and American sailors — Our ships manned
chiefly by native Americans, many of whom had for-
merly been impressed into the British navy — Quotas of
seamen contributed by the different States — Navy
yards — lists of officers and men — List of vessels — Ton-
nage— Different ways of estimating it in Britain and
America — Ratings — American ships properly rated—

28 CONTENTS.

Armaments of the frigates and corvettes — Three styles
of guns used — Difference between long guns and car-
ronades — Short weight of American shot — Comparison
of British frigates rating 38 and American frigates rat-
ing 44 guns — Compared with a 74 54

CHAPTER III.
1812!

ON THE OCEAN.

Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase
of the Belvidera — Engagement between Belvidera and
President — Hornet captures a privateer — Cruise of the
Essex — Captain Hull's cruise and escape from the
squadron of Commodore Broke — Constihition captures
Guerriere — Marked superiority shown by the Ameri-
cans— Wasp captures Frolic — Disproportionate loss on
British side — Both afterward captured by Poictiers —
Second unsuccessful cruise of Commodore Rodgers —
United States captures Macedonian — Constitution cap-
tures Jav a — Cruise of Essex — Summary 109

CHAPTER IV.

1812.

ON THE LAKES.

Preliminary. — The combatants starting nearly on
an equality — Difficulties of creating a naval force —
Difficulty of comparing the force of the rival squad-
rons— Meagreness of the published accounts — Unreli-
ability of authorities, especially James. — Ontario — Ex-
traordinary nature of the American squadron — Cana-
dian squadron a kind of water militia — Sackett's Har-
bor feebly attacked by Commodore Earle — Commo-
dore Chauncy attacks the Royal George — And bom-
bards York. — Erie — Lieutenant Elliott captures the
Detroit and Caledonia — Lieutenant Angus' unsuccess-
ful attack on Red House barracks ....,.,,,,,,,. 181

CONTENTS. 29

CHAPTER V.
1813.

ON THE OCEAN.

Blockade of the American coast — Commodore Por-
ter's campaign with the Essex in the South Pacific —
Hornet blockades Bonne Citoyenne — Hornet captures
Resolution — Hornet captures Peacock — Generous treat-
ment shown to the conquered — Viper captured by Nar-
cissus— American privateers cut out by British boats —
Third cruise of Commodore Rodgers — United States,
Macedonian, and Wasp blockaded in New London —
Broke's challenge to Lawrence — The Chesapeake cap-
tured by the Shannon — Comments and criticisms by
various authorities — Surveyor captured by boats of
Narcissus — Futile gunboat actions — British attack on
Craney Island repulsed — Cutting out expeditions — The
Argus captured by the Pelican — The Enterprise cap-
tures the Boxer — Ocean warfare of 18 13 in favor of
British — Summary i 204

CHAPTER VI.
1813.

ON THE LAKES.

Ontario— Comparison of the rival squadrons —
Chauncy's superior in strength — Chauncy takes York
and Fort George — Yeo is repulsed at Sackett's Harbor,
but keeps command of the lake — The Lady of the Lake
captures Lady Afurray — Hamilton and Scourge founder
in a squall — Yeo's partial victory off Niagara — Indeci-
sive action off the Genesee — Chauncy's partial victory
off Burlington, which gives him the command of the
lake — Yeo and Chauncy compared — Reasons for
American success. — Erie — Perry's success in creating
a fleet — His victory — " Glory " of it overestimated —
Cause of his success. — Champlain — The Growler and
Eagle captured by gunboats — Summary of year's cam-
paign .,,,..., MfM.im.i-n. 269

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

Causes of the War of 1812 — Conflicting views of
America and Britain as regards neutral rights — Those
of the former power right — Impossibility of avoiding
hostilities — Declaration of war — General features of
the contest — Racial identity of the contestants — The
treaty of peace nominally leaves the situation un-
changed— But practically settles the dispute in our fa-
vor in respect to maritime rights — The British navy
and its reputation prior to 181 2 — Comparison with
other European navies — British and American author-
ities consulted in the present work.

THE view professed by Great Britain in
18 1 2 respecting the rights of belligerents
and neutrals was diametrically opposite to
that held by the United States. "Between
England and the United States of America,"
writes a British author, " a spirit of animosity,
caused chiefly by the impressment of British
seamen, or of seamen asserted to be such,
from on board of American merchant vessels,
had unhappily subsisted for a long time"
prior to the war. " It is, we believe," he con-
tinues, "an acknowledged maxim of public

32 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

law, as well that no nation but the one he be-
longs to can release a subject from his natural
allegiance, as that, provided the jurisdiction
of another independent state be not infringed,
every nation has a right to enforce the serv-
ices of her subjects wherever they may be
found. Nor has any neutral nation such a
jurisdiction over her merchant vessels upon
the high seas as to exclude a belligerent na-
tion from the right of searching them for con-
traband of war or for the property or persons
of her enemies. And if, in the exercise of
that right, the belligerent should discover on
board of the neutral vessel a subject who has
withdrawn himself from his lawful allegiance,
the neutral can have no fair ground for re-
fusing to deliver him up ; more especially if
that subject is proved to be a deserter from
the sea or land service of the former." 1

Great Britain's doctrine was " once a sub-
ject always a subject." On the other hand,
the United States maintained that any foreign-
er, after five years' residence within her terri-
tory, and after having complied with certain
forms, became one of her citizens as com-
pletely as if he was native born. Great
Britain contended that her war ships possessed
the right of searching all neutral vessels for
the property and persons of her foes. The
United States, resisting this claim, asserted
that " free bottoms made free goods," and
that consequently her ships when on the high
seas should not be molested on any pretext

1 " The Naval History of Great Britain," by William
James, vol. iv, p. 324. ~ (New edition by Captain Cha-
mier, R. N., London, 1837.)

INTRODUCTION. 33

whatever. Finally, Great Britain's system of
impressment,1 by which men could be forcibly
seized and made to serve in her navy, no mat-
ter at what cost to themselves, was repugnant
to every American idea.

Such wide differences in the views of the
two nations produced endless difficulties. To
escape the press-gang, or for other reasons,
many British seamen took service under the
American flag ; and if they were demanded
back, it is not likely that they or their Amer-
ican shipmates had much hesitation in swear-
ing either that they were not British at all, or
else that they had been naturalized as Amer-
icans. Equally probable is it that the Amer-
ican blockade-runners were guilty of a great
deal of fraud and more or less thinly veiled
perjury. But the wrongs done by the Amer-
icans were insignificant compared with those
they received. Any innocent merchant vessel
was liable to seizure at any moment ; and
when overhauled by a British cruiser short of
men was sure to be stripped of most of her
crew. The British officers were themselves
the judges as to whether a seaman should be
pronounced a native of America or of Britain,
and there was no appeal from their judgment.
If a captain lacked his full complement there
was little doubt as to the view he would take
of any man's nationality. The wrongs inflicted
on our seafaring countrymen by their impress-
ment into foreign ships formed the main cause
of the war.

There were still other grievances which are

1 The best idea of which can be gained by reading
Marryatt's novels.

34 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

thus presented by the British Admiral Coch-
rane.1 " Our treatment of its (America's)
citizens was scarcely in accordance with the
national privileges to which the young Re-
public had become entitled. There were no
doubt many individuals among the American
people who, caring little for the Federal Gov-
ernment, considered it more profitable to break
than to keep the laws of nations by aiding and
supporting our enemy (France), and it was
against such that the efforts of the squadron
had chiefly been directed ; but the way the
object was carried out was scarcely less an
infraction of those national laws which we
were professedly enforcing. The practice of
taking English (and American) seamen out of
American ships without regard to the safety
of navigating them when thus deprived of
their hands has been already mentioned. To
this may be added the detention of vessels
against which nothing contrary to international
neutrality could be established, whereby their
cargoes became damaged, the compelling
them, on suspicion only, to proceed to ports
other than those to which they were destined ;
and generally treating them as though they
were engaged in contraband trade. * * *
American ships were not permitted to quit
English ports without giving security for the
discharge of their cargoes in some other
British or neutral port." On the same sub-
ject James ' writes : " When, by the maritime

1 " Autobiography of a Seaman," by Thomas, tenth
Earl of Dundonald, Admiral of the Red, Rear-Admiral
of the Fleet, London, i860, vol. i, p. 24.

2 L. c, iv, 325.

INTRODUCTION. 35

supremacy of England, France could no longer
trade for herself, America proffered her serv-
ices, as a neutral, to trade for her ; and
American merchants and their agents, in the
gains that flowed in, soon found a compensa
tion for all the perjury and fraud necessary
to cheat the former out of her belligerent
fights. The high commercial importance of
the United States thus obtained, coupled with
a similarity of language and, to a superficial
observer, a resemblance in person between
the natives of America and Great Britain, has
caused the former to be the chief, if not the
only sufferers by the exercise of the right of
search. Chiefly indebted for their growth and
prosperity to emigration from Europe, the
United States hold out every allurement to
foreigners, particularly to British seamen,
whom, by a process peculiarly their own, they
can naturalize as quickly as a dollar can
exchange masters and a blank form, ready
signed and sworn to, can be filled up. ' It is
the knowledge of this fact that makes British
naval officers when searching for deserters
from their service, so harsh in their scrutiny,
and so sceptical of American oaths and
asseverations."

The last sentence of the foregoing from
James is an euphemistic way of saying that
whenever a British commander short of men
came across an American vessel he impressed
all of her crew that he wanted, whether they
were citizens of the United States or not. It
must be remembered, however, that the only
reason why Great Britain did us more injury

1 This is an exaggeration.

36 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

than any other power was because she was
better able to do so. None of her acts were
more offensive than Napoleon's Milan decree,
by which it was declared that any neutral ves-
sel which permitted itself to be searched by a
British cruiser should be considered as British,
and as the lawful prize of any French vessel.
French frigates and privateers were very apt
to snap up any American vessel they came
across, and were only withheld at all by the
memory of the sharp dressing they had re-
ceived in the West Indies during the quasi-
war of 1 799-1800. What we undoubtedly
ought to have done was to have adopted the
measure actually proposed in Congress, and
declared war on both France and England. As
it was, we chose as a foe the one that had
done, and could still do, us the greatest
injury.

The principles for which the United States
contended in 18 12 are now universally ac-
cepted, and those so tenaciously maintained
by Great Britain find no advocates in the
civilized world. That England herself was
afterwards completely reconciled to our views
was amply shown by her intense indignation
when Commodore W7ilkes, in the exercise of the
right of search for the persons of the foes of
his country, stopped the neutral British ship
Trent ; while the applause with which the act
was greeted in America proves pretty clearly
another fact, that we had warred for the right,
not because it was the right, but because it
agreed with our self-interest to do so. We
wer-s contending for " Free Trade and Sailors'
Rights " : meaning by the former expression,

INTRODUCTION.

freedom to trade wherever we chose without
hindrance save from the power with whom we
were trading ; and by the latter, that a man
who happened to be on the sea should have
the same protection accorded to a man who
remained on land. Nominally, neither of
these questions was settled by, or even alluded
to, in the treaty of peace ; but the immense
increase in reputation that the navy acquired
during the war practically decided both points
in our favor. Our sailors had gained too
great a name for any one to molest them with
impunity again.

Holding views on these maritime subjects so
radically different from each other, the two
nations could not but be continually dealing
with causes of quarrel. Not only did British
cruisers molest our merchant-men, but at
length one of them, the 50-gun ship Leopard
attacked an American frigate, the Chesapeake,
when the latter was so lumbered up that she
could not return a shot, killed or disabled
some twenty of her men and took away four
others, one Briton and three Americans, who
were claimed as deserters. For this act an
apology was offered, but it failed to restore
harmony between the two nations. Soon
afterward another action was fought. The
American frigate President, Commodore Rod-
gers, attacked the British sloop Little Belt,
Captain Bingham, and exchanged one or two
broadsides with her, — the frigate escaping scot-
free while the sloop was nearly knocked to
pieces. Mutual recriminations followed, each
side insisting that the other was the assailant.

When Great Britain issued her Orders in

38 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Council forbidding our trading with France,
we retaliated by passing an embargo act,
which prevented us from trading at all. There
could be but one result to such a succession
of incidents, and that was war. Accordingly,
in June, 181 2, war was declared; and as a
contest for the rights of seamen, it was largely
waged on the ocean. We also had not a
little fighting to do on land, in which, as a
rule, we came out second-best. Few or no
preparations for the war had been made, and
the result was such as might have been antici-
pated. After dragging on through three
dreary and uneventful years it came to an end
in 18 1 5, by a peace which left matters in
almost precisely the state in which the war
had found them. On land and water the
contest took the form of a succession of petty
actions, in which the glory acquired by the
victor seldom eclipsed the disgrace incurred
by the vanquished. Neither side succeeded
in doing what it intended. Americans de-
clared that Canada must and should be
conquered, but the conquering came quite as
near being the other way. British writers
insisted that the American navy should be
swept from the seas ; and, during the sweeping
process it increased fourfold.

When the United States declared war, Great
Britain was straining every nerve and muscle
in a death struggle with the most formidable
military despotism of modern times, and was
obliged to entrust the defence of her Canadian
colonies to a mere handful of regulars, aided
by the local fencibles. But Congress had
provided even fewer trained soldiers, and

INTRODUCTION.

relied on the militia. The latter chiefly ex-
ercised their fighting abilities upon one
another in duelling, and, as a rule, were
afflicted with conscientious scruples whenever
it was necessary to cross the frontier and
attack the enemy. Accordingly, the cam-
paign opened with the bloodless surrender of
an American general to a much inferior British
force, and the war continued much as it had
begun ; we suffered disgrace after disgrace,
while the losses we inflicted, in turn, on Great
Britain were so slight as hardly to attract her
attention. At last, having crushed her greater
foe, she turned to crush the lesser, and, in her
turn, suffered ignominious defeat. By this
time events had gradually developed a small
number of soldiers on our northern frontier,
who, commanded by Scott and Brown, were
able to contend on equal terms with the
veteran troops to whom they were opposed,
though these formed part of what was then
undoubtedly the most formidable fighting
infantry any European nation possessed. The
battles at this period of the struggle were
remarkable for the skill and stubborn courage
with which they were waged, as well as for
the heavy loss involved ; but the number of
combatants was so small that in Europe they
would have been regarded as mere outpost
skirmishes, and they wholly failed to attract
any attention abroad in that period of colossal
armies.

When Great Britain seriously turned her at-
tention to her transatlantic foe, and assembled
in Canada an army of 14,000 men at the head
of Lake Champlain, Congressional forethought

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

enabled it to be opposed by soldiers who, it is
true, were as well disciplined, as hardy, and
as well commanded as any in the world, but
who were only a few hundred strong, backed
by more or less incompetent militia. Only
McDonough's skill and Sir George Prevost's
incapacity saved us from a serious disaster ;
the sea-fight reflected high honor on our sea-
men, but the retreat of the British land-forces
was due to their commander and not to their
antagonists. Meanwhile a large British fleet
in the Chesapeake had not achieved much
glory by the destruction of local oyster-boats
and the burning of a few farmers' houses, so
an army was landed to strike a decisive blow.
At Bladensburg ' the five thousand British reg-
ulars, utterly worn out by heat and fatigue, by
their mere appearance, frightened into a panic
double their number of American militia well
posted. But the only success attained was
burning the public buildings of Washington,
and that result was of dubious value. Balti-
more was attacked next, and the attack re-
pulsed, after the forts and ships had shelled
one another with the slight results that usually
attend that spectacular and harmless species
of warfare.

The close of the contest was marked by the
extraordinary battle of New Orleans. It was
a perfectly useless shedding of blood, since
peace had already been declared. There is
hardly another contest of modern times where
the defeated side suffered such frightful car-
nage, while the victors came off almost scathe-

1 See the " Capture of Washington," by Edward D.
Ingraham (Philadelphia, 1849).

INTRODUCTION. 41

less. It is quite in accordance with the rest
of the war that the militia, hitherto worse than
useless, should on this occasion win against
great odds in point of numbers ; and, more-
over, that their splendid victory should have
been of little consequence in its effects upon
the result. On the whole, the contest by land,
where we certainly ought to have been suc-
cessful, reflected greater credit on our antag-
onists than upon us, in spite of the services of
Scott, Brown, and Jackson. Our small force
of regulars and volunteers did excellently ; as
for the militia, New Orleans proved that they
could fight superbly ; and the other battles that
they generally would not fight at all.

At sea, as will appear, the circumstances
were widely different. Here we possessed a
small but highly effective force, the ships well
built, manned by thoroughly trained men, and
commanded by able and experienced officers.
The deeds of our navy form a part of history
over which any American can be pardoned for
lingering.

Such was the origin, issue, and general
character of the war. It may now be well to
proceed to a comparison of the authorities on
the subject. Allusion has already been made
to them in the preface, but a fuller reference
seems to be necessary in this connection.

At the close of the contest, the large major-
ity of historians who wrote of it were so bit-
terly rancorous that their statements must be
received with caution. For the main facts I
have relied wherever it was practicable, upon
the official letters of the commanding officers,

42 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

taking each as authority for his own force and
loss. * For all the British victories we have
British official letters, which tally almost ex-
actly, as regards matters of fact and not of
opinion, with the corresponding American
accounts. For the first year the British also
published official accounts of their defeats,
which in the cases of the Guerriere, Macedo-
nian and Frolic, I have followed as closely as
the accounts of the American victors. The
last British official letter published announc-
ing a defeat was that in the case of the Java,
and it is the only letter that I have not strictly
accepted. The fact that no more were pub-
lished thereafter is of itself unfortunate ; and
from the various contradictions it contains it
would appear to have been tampered with.
The surgeon's report accompanying it is cer-
tainly false. Subsequent to 181 2 no letter of
a defeated British commander was published,2
and I have to depend upon the various British
historians, especially James, of whom more
anon.

The American and British historians from
whom we are thus at times forced to draw our
material regard the war from very different

1 As where Broke states his own force at 330, his an-
tagonists at 440, and the American court of inquiry
makes the numbers 396 and 379, I have taken them as
being 330 and 379 respectively. This is the only just
method ; I take it for granted that each commander
meant to tell the truth, and of course knew his own
force, while he might very naturally and in perfect good
faith exaggerate his antagonist's.

2 Except about the battles on the Lakes, where I
have accordingly given the same credit to the accounts
both of the British and of the Americans.

INTRODUCTION. 43

standpoints, and their accounts generally dif-
fer. Each writer naturally so colored the af-
fair as to have it appear favorable to his own
side. Sometimes this was done intentionally
and sometimes not. Not unfrequently errors
are made against the historian's own side ; as
when the British author, Brenton, says that
the British brig Peacock mounted 32^ instead
of 24's, while Lossing in his " Field Book of
the War of 18 12" makes the same mistake
about the armament of the American brig
Argus. Errors of this description are, of
course, as carefully to be guarded against as
any others. Mere hearsay reports, such as
" it has been said," " a prisoner on board the
opposing fleet has observed," "an American
(or British) newspaper of such and such a date
has remarked," are of course to be rejected.
There is a curious parallelism in the errors on
both sides. For example, the American, Mr.
Low, writing in 1813, tells how the Constitu-
tion, 44, captured the Guerriere of 49 guns,
while the British Lieutenant Low, writing in
1880, tells how the Pelican, 18, captured the
Argus of 20 guns. Each records the truth
but not the whole truth, for although rating 44
and 18 the victors carried respectively 54 and
21 guns, of heavier metal than those of their
antagonists. Such errors are generally inten-
tional. Similarly, most American writers men-
tion the actions in which the privateers were
victorious, but do not mention those in which
they were defeated ; while the British, in turn,
record every successful " cutting-out " expedi-
tion, but ignore entirely those which termi-
nated unfavorably. Other errors arise from

44 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

honest ignorance. Thus, James in speaking
of the repulse of the Endymioris boats by the
Neufchatel gives the latter a crew of 120 men ;
she had more than this number originally, but
only 40 were in her at the time of the attack.
So also when the captain of the Pelican writes
that the officers of the Argus report her loss
at 40, when they really reported it at 24 or
when Captain Dacres thought the Constitution
had lost about 20 men instead of 14. The
American gun-boat captains in recounting their
engagements with the British frigates invariably
greatly overestimated the loss of the latter.
So that on both sides there were some inten-
tional misstatements or garblings, and a much
more numerous class of simple blunders, aris-
ing largely from an incapacity for seeing more
than one side of the question.

Among the early British writers upon this
war, the ablest was James. He devoted one
work, his " Naval Occurrences," entirely to
it ; and it occupies the largest part of the
sixth volume of his more extensive " History
of the British Navy."1 Two other British
writers, Lieutenant Marshall2 and Captain
Brenton,3 wrote histories of the same events,
about the same time ; but neither of these
naval officers produced half as valuable a
work as did the civilian James. Marshall
wrote a dozen volumes, each filled with several
scores of dreary panegyrics, or memoirs of as

1 A new edition, London, 1826.

2 " Royal Naval Biography," by John Marshall (Lon-
don, 1823-1835).

8 " Naval History of Great Britain,' ' by Edward
Pelham Brenton (new edition, London, 1837).

INTRODUCTION. 45

many different officers. There is no attempt at
order, hardly anything about the ships, guns,
or composition of the crews ; and not even
the pretence of giving both sides, the object
being to make every Englishman appear in
his best light. The work is analogous to the
numerous lives of Decatur, Bainbridge, Porter,
etc., that appeared in the United States about
the same time, and is quite as untrustworthy.
Brenton made a far better and very interest-
ing book, written on a good and well-con-
nected plan, and apparently with a sincere
desire to tell the truth. He accepts the Brit-
ish official accounts as needing nothing what-
ever to supplement them, precisely as Cooper
accepts the American officials'. A more se-
rious fault is his inability to be accurate.
That this inaccuracy is not intentional is
proved by the fact that it tells as often against
his own side as against his opponents. He
says, for example, that the guns of Perry's and
Barclay's squadrons "were about equal in
number and weight," that the Peacock (Brit-
ish) was armed with 32^ instead of 24's, and
underestimates the force of the second Wasp.
But the blunders are quite as bad when dis-
tributed as when confined to one side ; in ad-
dition, Brenton's disregard of all details makes
him of but little use.

James, as already said, is by far the most
valuable authority on the war, as regards
purely British affairs. He enters minutely
into details, and has evidently laboriously
hunted up his authorities. He has examined
the ships' logs, the Admiralty reports, various
treaties, all the Gazette reports, gives very

46 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

well-chosen extracts, has arranged his work
in chronological order, discriminates between
the officers that deserve praise and those that
deserve blame, and in fact writes a work which
ought to be consulted by every student of
naval affairs. But he is unfortunately afflicted
with a hatred toward the Americans that
amounts to a monomania. He wishes to make
out as strong a case as possible against them.
The animus of his work may be gathered from
the not over complimentary account of the
education of the youthful seafaring American,
which can be found in vol. vi, p. 113, of his
" History." On page 153 he asserts that he
is an " impartial Historian " ; and about
three lines before mentions that " it may suit
the Americans to invent any falsehood, no
matter how barefaced, to foist a valiant char-
acter on themselves." On page 419 he says
that Captain Porter is to be believed, ° so far
as is borne out by proof (the only safe way
where an American is concerned)," — which
somewhat sweeping denunciation of the ve-
racity of all of Captain Porter's compatriots
would seem to indicate that James was not,
perhaps, in that dispassionate frame of mind
best suited for writing history. That he
should be biassed against individual captains
can be understood, but when he makes rabid
onslaughts upon the American people as a
whole, he renders it difficult for an American,
at any rate, to put implicit credence in him.
His statements are all the harder to confute
when they are erroneous, because they are
intentionally so. It is not, as with Brenton
and Marshall, because he really thinks a Brit-

INTRODUCTION, 47

ish captain cannot he beaten, except by some
kind of distorted special providence, for no
man says worse things than he does about
certain officers and crews. A writer of James'
undoubted ability must have known perfectly
well that his statements were untrue in many
instances, as where he garbles Hilyar's ac-
count of Porter's loss, or misstates the com-
parative force of the fleets on Lake Cham-
plain.

When he says (p. 194) that Captain Bain-
bridge wished to run away from the Java, and
would have done so if he had not been with-
held by the advice of his first lieutenant, who
was a renegade Englishman,1 it is not of much
consequence whether his making the state-
ment was due to excessive credulity or petty
meanness, for, in either case, whether the de-
fect was in his mind or his morals, it is
enough to greatly impair the value of his other
"facts." Again, when James (p. 165) states
that Decatur ran away from the Macedonian
until, by some marvellous optical delusion, he
mistook her for a 32, he merely detracts a
good deal from the worth of his own account.
When the Americans adopt boarding helmets,
he considers it as proving conclusively that
they are suffering from an acute attack of
cowardice. On p. 122 he says that " had the
President, when she fell in with the Belvidcra,
been cruising alone * * * Commodore Rod-
gers would have magnified the British frigate
into a line-of-battle ship, and have done his
utmost to avoid her," which gives an excellent

1 Who, by the way, was Mr. Parker, born in Virginia,
and never in England in his life.

48 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

idea of the weight to be attached to the va-
rious other anecdotes he relates of the much
abused Commodore Rodgers.

But it must always be remembered that un-
trustworthy as James is in anything referring
purely to the Americans, he is no worse than
his compeers of both nationalities. The mis-
statements of Niles in his " Weekly Register "
about the British are quite as flagrant, and his
information about his own side even more
valuable.1 Every little American author
crowed over Perry's " Nelsonic victory over a
greatly superior force." The Constitution
was declared to have been at a disadvantage
when she fought the Guerriere, and so on ad
infinitum. But these writers have all faded
into oblivion, and their writings are not even
referred to, much less believed. James, on
the contrary, has passed through edition after
edition, is considered as unquestionable au-
thority in his own country, and largely through-
out Europe, and has furnished the basis for
every subsequent account by British authors.
From Alison to Lieutenant Low, almost every
English work, whether of a popular character

1 In Niles, by the way, can be found excellent exam-
ples of the traditional American " spread-eagle " style.
In one place I remember his describing " The Immor-
tal Rodgers," baulked of his natural prey, the British,
as " soaring about like the bold bald eagle of his native
land," seeking whom he might devour. The accounts
he gives of British line-of-battle ships fleeing from
American 44's quite match James' anecdotes of the
latter's avoidance of British 38's and 36's for fear they
might mount twenty-four-pounders. The two works
taken together give a very good idea of the war ; separ-
ately, either is utterly unreliable, especially in matters
of opinion.

INTRODUCTION. 49

or not, is, in so far as it touches on the war,
simply a " rehash " of the works written by
James. The consequence is that the British
and American accounts have astonishingly
little resemblance. One ascribes the capture
of the British frigates simply to the fact that
their opponents were " cut down line-of-battle
ships " ; the other gives all the glory to the
"undaunted heroism, " etc., of the Yankee
sailors.

One not very creditable trait of the early
American naval historians gave their rivals a
great advantage. The object of the former
was to make out that the Constitution, for ex-
ample, won her victories against an equal foe,
and an exact statement of the forces showed
the contrary ; so they always avoided figures,
and thus left the ground clear for James* care-
ful misstatements. Even when they criticised
him they never went into details, confining
themselves to some remark about " hurling"
his figures in his face with u loathing." Even
Cooper, interesting though his work is, has
gone far less into figures than he should, and
seems to have paid little if any attention to the
British official statements, which of course
should be received as of equal weight with the
American. His comments on the actions are
generally very fair, the book never being dis-
figured by bitterness toward the British ; but
he is certainly wrong, for example, in ascrib-
ing the loss of the Chesapeake solely to accident,
that of the Argus solely to her inferiority in
force, and so on. His disposition to praise
a// the American commanders maybe generous
but is nevertheless unjust. If Decatur's sur-
4

50 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

render of the President is at least impliedly
praised, then Porter's defence of the Essex can
hardly receive its just award. There is no
weight in the commendation bestowed upon
Hull, if commendation, the same in kind
though less in degree, is bestowed upon Rod-
gers. It is a great pity that Cooper did not
write a criticism on James, for no one could
have done it more thoroughly. But he never
mentions him, except once in speaking of Bar-
clay's fleet. In all probability this silence
arose from sheer contempt, and the certainty
that most of James' remarks were false ; but
the effect was that very many foreigners believe
him to have shirked the subject. He rarely
gives any data by which the statements of
James can be disproved, and it is for this
reason that I have been obliged to criticise the
latter's work very fully. Many of James' re-
marks, however, defy criticism from their ran-
dom nature, as when he states that American
midshipmen were chiefly masters and mates
of merchantmen, and does not give a single
proof to support the assertion. It would be
nearly as true to assert that the British mid-
shipmen were for the most part ex-members
of the prize-ring, and as much labor would be
needed to disprove it. In other instances it
is quite enough to let his words speak for them-
selves, as where he says (p. 155) that of the
American sailors one third in number and one
half in point of effectiveness were in reality
British. That is, of the 450 men the Consti-
tution had when she fought the Java 150 were
British, and the remaining 300 could have
been as effectively replaced by 150 more Brit-

IN TROD UC TION. 5 1

ish. So a very little logic works Out a result
that James certainly did not intend to arrive
at ; namely, that 300 British led by American
officers could beat, with ease and comparative
impunity, 400 British led by their own officers.
He also forgets that the whole consists of the
sum of the parts. He accounts for the victories
of the Americans by stating (p. 280) that they
were lucky enough to meet with frigates and
brigs who had unskilful gunners or worthless
crews ; he also carefully shows that the Mace-
donian was incompetently handled,the Peacock
commanded by a mere martinet, the Avon's
crew unpractised at the guns, the Epervier's
mutinous and cowardly, the Penguin's weak
and unskilful, the fava's exceedingly poor, and
more to the same effect. Now the Americans
took in single fight three frigates and seven
sloops, and when as many as ten vessels are
met it is exceedingly probable that they rep-
resent the fair average ; so that James' stric-
tures, so far as true, simply show that the
average British ship was very apt to possess,
comparatively speaking, an incompetent cap-
tain or unskilful crew. These disadvantages
were not felt when opposed to navies in
which they existed to an even greater extent,
but became very apparent when brought into
contact with a power whose few officers knew
how to play their own parts very nearly to
perfection, and, something equally important,
knew how to make first-rate crews out of what
was already good raw material. Finally, a
large proportion of James' abuse of the Amer-
icans sufficiently refutes itself, and perhaps
Cooper's method of contemptuously disregard-

52 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

ing him was the best ; but no harm can follow
from devoting a little space to commenting
upon him.

Much the best American work is Lieutenant
George E. Emmons' statistical " History of
the United States Navy." Unfortunately it is
merely a mass of excellently arranged and
classified statistics, and while of invaluable
importance to the student, is not interesting
to the average reader. Almost all the state-
ments I have made of the force, tonnage, and
armament of the American vessels, though I
have whenever practicable taken them from
the Naval Records, etc., yet could be just as
well quoted from Emmons. Copies of most
of the American official letters which I have
quoted can be found in " Niles' Register/'
volumes 1 to 10, and all of the British ones in
the "London Naval Chronicle" for the same
years. It is to these two authorities that I
am most indebted, and nearly as much so to
the " American State Papers," vol. xiv. Next
in order come Emmons, Cooper, and the in-
valuable, albeit somewhat scurrilous, James ;
and a great many others whose names I have
quoted in their proper places. In commenting
upon the actions I have, whenever possible,
drawn from some standard work, such as Ju-
rien de la Graviere's " Guerres Maritimes,"
Lord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gunnery,"
or, better still, from the lives and memoirs of
Admirals Farragut, Codrington, Broke, or
Durham. The titles of the various works will
be found given in full as they are referred to.1

1 To get an idea of the American seamen of that
time CoQper's novels, " Miles Wallingford," " Home as

INTRODUCTION. 53

In a few cases, where extreme accuracy was
necessary, or where, as in the case of the
President's capture, it was desirable .that there
should be no room for dispute as to the facts.
I have given the authority for each sentence ;
but in general this would be too cumbersome,
and so I have confined myself to referring, at
or near the beginning of the account of each
action, to the authorities from whom I have
taken it. For the less important facts on
which every one is agreed I have often given
no references.

Fo.und," and the '« Pilot," are far better than any his-
tory ; in the " Two Admirals " the description of the
fleet manoeuvring is unrivalled. His view of Jack's
life is rather rose-colored however. " Tom Cringle's
log " ought to be read for the information it gives,
Marryatt's novels will show some of the darker aspects
of sailor life.

54 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

CHAPTER II.

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when
America declared war against her — Race identity of the
combatants — The American navy at the beginning of
the war — Officers well trained — Causes tending to
make our seamen especially efficient — Close similarity
between the British and American sailors — Our ships
manned chiefly by native Americans, many of whom
had formerly been impressed into the British navy —
Quotas of seamen contributed by the different States
— Navy yards — Lists of officers and men — List of
vessels — Tonnage — Different ways of estimating it in
Britain and America — Ratings — American ships prop-
erly rated — Armaments of the frigates and corvettes —
Three styles of guns used — Difference between long
guns and carronades — Short weight of American shot
— Comparison of British frigates rating 38, and Ameri-
can frigates rating 44 guns — Compared with a 74.

DURING the early years of this century
England's naval power stood at a height
never reached before or since by that of any
other nation. On every sea her navies rode,
not only triumphant, but with none to dispute
their sway. The island folk had long claimed
the mastery of the ocean, and they had
certainly succeeded in making their claim com-
pletely good during the time of bloody warfare
that followed the breaking out of the French
Revolution. Since the year 1792 each Euro-
pean nation, in turn, had learned to feel bitter
dread of the weight of England's hand. In
the Baltic, Sir Samuel Hood had taught the
Russians that they must needs keep in port

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 55

when the English cruisers were in the offing.
The descendants of the Vikings had seen
their whole navy destroyed at Copenhagen.
No Dutch fleet ever put out after the day
when, off Camperdown, Lord Duncan took
possession of l)e Winter's shattered ships.
But a few years before 18 12, the greatest sea-
fighter of all time had died in Trafalgar Bay,
and in dying had crumbled to pieces the
navies of France and of Spain.

From that day England's task was but to keep
in port such of her foes' vessels as she had
not destroyed. France alone still possessed
fleets that could be rendered formidable, and
so, from the Scheldt to Toulon, her harbors
were watched and her coasts harried by the
blockading squadrons of the English. Else-
where the latter had no fear of their power
being seriously assailed ; but their vast com-
merce and numerous colonies needed cease-
less protection. Accordingly in every sea
their cruisers could be found, of all sizes,
from the stately ship-of-the-line, with her tiers
of heavy cannon and her many hundreds of
men, down to the little cutter carrying but a
score of souls and a couple of light guns.
All these cruisers, but especially those of the
lesser rates, were continually brought into con-
tact with such of the hostile vessels as had
run through the blockade, or were too small
to be affected by it. French and Italian
frigates were often fought and captured when
they were skirting their own coasts, or had
started off on a plundering cruise through the
Atlantic, or to the Indian Ocean ; and though
the Danes had lost their larger ships they

56 NAVAL WAR OF 181

kept up a spirited warfare with brigs and gun-
boats. So the English marine was inconstant
exercise, attended with almost invariable
success.

Such was Great Britain's naval power when
the Congress of the United States declared
war upon her. While she could number her
thousand sail, the American navy included but
half a dozen frigates, and six or eight sloops
and brigs ; and it is small matter for surprise
that the British officers should have regarded
their new foe with contemptuous indifference.
Hitherto the American seamen had never
been heard of except in connection with two
or three engagements with French frigates,
and some obscure skirmishes against the
Moors of Tripoli ; none of which could pos-
sibly attract attention in the years that saw
Aboukir, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. And
yet these same petty wars were the school
which raised our marines to the highest
standard of excellence. A continuous course
of victory, won mainly by seamanship, had
made the English sailor overweeningly self-
confident, and caused him to pay but little
regard to manoeuvring or even to gunnery.
Meanwhile the American learned, by receiv-
ing hard knocks, how to give them, and
belonged to a service too young to feel an
over-confidence in itself. One side had let its
training relax, while the other had carried it
to the highest possible point. Hence our
ships proved, on the whole, victorious in the
apparently unequal struggle, and the men who
had conquered the best seamen of Europe
were now in turn obliged to succumb. Com-

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 57

pared with the great naval battles of the pre-
ceding few years, our bloodiest conflicts were
mere skirmishes, but they were skirmishes
between the hitherto acknowledged kings of
the ocean, and new men who yet proved to be
more than their equals. For over a hundred
years, or since the time when they had con-
tended on equal terms with the great Dutch
admirals, the British had shown a decided
superiority to their various foes, and during
the latter quarter of the time this superiority,
as already said, was very marked, indeed ; in
consequence, the victories of the new enemy
attracted an amount of attention altogether
disproportionate to their material effects.
And it is a curious fact that our little navy,
in which the art of handling and fighting the
old broadside, sailing frigate in single conflict
was brought to the highest point of perfection
ever reached, that this same navy should
have contained the first representative of the
modern war steamer, and also the torpedo —
the two terrible engines which were to drive
from the ocean the very white-winged craft
that had first won honor for the starry flag.
The tactical skill of Hull or Decatur is now
of merely archaic interest, and has but little
more bearing on the manoeuvring of a modern
fleet than have the tactics of the Athenian
gallies. But the war still conveys some most
practical lessons as to the value of efficient
ships and, above all, of efficient men in them.
Had we only possessed the miserable gun-
boats, our men could have done nothing ; had
we not possessed good men, the heavy frigates
would have availed us little. Poor ships and

58 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

impotent artillery had lost the Dutch almost
their entire navy ; fine ships and heavy cannon
had not saved the French and Spanish from
the like fate. We owed our success to putting
sailors even better than the Dutch on ships
even finer than those built by the two Latin
seaboard powers.

The first point to be remembered in order
to write a fair account of this war is that the
difference in fighting skill, which certainly
existed between the two parties, was due
mainly to training, and not to the nature of
the men. It seems certain that the American
had in the beginning somewhat the advan-
tage, because his surroundings, partly physical
and partly social and political, had forced
him into habits of greater self-reliance.
Therefore, on the average, he offered rather
the best material to start with ; but the differ-
ence was very slight, and totally disappeared
under good training. The combatants were
men of the same race, differing but little from
one another. On the New England coast the
English blood was as pure as in any part of
Britain ; in New York and New Jersey it was
mixed with that of the Dutch settlers — and
the Dutch are by race nearer to the true old
English of Alfred and Harold than are, for
example, the thoroughly anglicized Welsh of
Cornwall. Otherwise, the infusion of new
blood into the English race on this side of
the Atlantic has been chiefly from three
sources — German, Irish, and Norse; and
these three sources represent the elemental
parts of the composite English stock in about
the same proportions in which they were

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 59

originally combined, — mainly Teutonic,
largely Celtic, and with a Scandinavian ad-
mixture. The descendant of the German be-
comes as much an Anglo-American as the
descendant of the Strathclyde Celt has already
become an Anglo-Briton. Looking through
names of the combatants it would be difficult
to find any of one navy that could not be
matched in the other — Hull or Lawrence,
Allen Perry, or Stewart. And among all the
English names on both sides will be found
many Scotch, Irish, or Welsh — McDonough,
O'Brien, or Jones. Still stranger ones ap-
pear : the Huguenot Tattnall is one among
the American defenders of the Constellation,
and another Huguenot Tattnall is among the
British assailants at Lake Borgne. It must
always be kept in mind that the Americans
and the British are two substantially similar
branches of the great English race, which
both before and after their separation have
assimilated, and made Englishmen of many
other peoples.1 The lessons taught by the
war can hardly be learned unless this identity
is kept in mind.2

1 The inhabitants of Great Britain are best designated
as " British " — English being either too narrow or too
broad a term, in one case meaning the inhabitants of
but a part of Britain, and in the other the whole Anglo-
Saxon people.

2 It was practically a civil war, and was waged with
much harshness ana bitterness on both sides. I have
already spoken of the numerous grievances of the
Americans ; the British, in turn, looked upon our
blockade-runners which entered the French ports ex-
actly as we regarded, at a later date, the British
steamers that ran into Wilmington and Charleston.
It is curious to see how illogical writers are. The

6o NAVAL WAR OF i3i2.

To understand aright the efficiency of our
navy, it is necessary to take a brief look at
the character and antecedents of the officers
and men who served in it.

When war broke out the United States Navy
was but a few years old, yet it already had
a far from dishonorable history. The cap-
tains and lieutenants of 1812 had been taught
their duties in a very practical school, and the
flag under which they fought was endeared to
them already by not a few glorious traditions
— though these, perhaps, like others of their
kind, had lost none of their glory in the tell-
ing. A few of the older men had served in
the war of the Revolution, and all still kept
fresh in mind the doughty deeds of the old-
time privateering war craft. Men still talked
of Biddle's daring cruises and Barney's stub-
born fights, or told of Scotch Paul and the
grim work they had who followed his fortunes.
Besides these memories of an older genera-
tion, most of the officers had themselves taken
part, when younger in years and rank, in
deeds not a whit less glorious. Almost every
man had had a share in some gallant feat, to
which he, in part at least, owed his present
position. The captain had perhaps been a
midshipman under Truxton when he took the
Vengeance, and had been sent aboard the cap-
tured French frigate with the prize-master;

careers of the Argus and Alabama for example, were
strikingly similar in many ways, yet the same writer
who speaks of one as an " heroic little brig," will call
the other a " black pirate." Of course there can be
no possible comparison as to the causes for which the
two vessels were fighting ; but the cruises themselves
were very much alike, both in character and history.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 6l

the lieutenant had borne a part in the various
attacks on Tripoli, and had led his men in
the desperate hand-to-hand fights in which
the Yankee cutlass proved an overmatch for
the Turkish and Moorish scimitars. Nearly
every senior officer had extricated himself by
his own prowess or skill from the dangers of
battle or storm ; he owed his rank to the fact
that he had proved worthy of it. Thrown
upon his own resources, he had learned self-
reliance ; he was a first-rate practical seaman,
and prided himself on the way his vessel was
handled. Having reached his rank by hard
work, and knowing what real fighting meant,
he was careful to see that his men were trained
in the essentials of discipline, and that they
knew how to handle the guns in battle as well
as polish them in peace. Beyond almost any
of his countrymen, he worshipped the "Grid-
iron Flag/' and, having been brought up in
the Navy, regarded its honor as his own. It
was, perhaps, the Navy alone that thought
itself a match, ship against ship, for Great
Britain. The remainder of the nation pinned
its faith to the army, or rather to that weakest
of weak reeds, the militia. The officers of
the navy, with their strong esprit de eorps, their
jealousy of their own name and record, and
the knowledge, by actual experience, that the
British ships sailed no faster and were no
better handled than their own, had no desire
to shirk a conflict with any foe, and having
tried their bravery in actual service, they
made it doubly formidable by cool, wary skill.
Even the younger men, who had never been
in action, had been so well trained by the

62 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

tried veterans over them that the lack of ex-
perience was not sensibly felt.

The sailors comprising the crews of our
ships were well worthy of their leaders.
There was no better seaman in the world
than American Jack ; he had been bred to his
work from infancy, and had been off in a fish-
ing dory almost as soon as he could walk.
When he grew older, he shipped on a
merchantman or whaler, and in those warlike
times, when our large merchant-marine was
compelled to rely pretty much on itself for
protection, each craft had to be well handled ;
all who were not were soon weeded out by
a process of natural selection, of which the
agents were French picaroons, Spanish
buccaneers, and Malay pirates. It was a
rough school, but it taught Jack to be both
skilful and self-reliant; and he was all the
better fitted to become a man-of-war's man,
because he knew more about fire-arms than
most of his kind in foreign lands. At home
he had used his ponderous ducking gun with
good effect on the flocks of canvasbacks in
the reedy flats of the Chesapeake, or among
the sea-coots in the rough water off the New
England cliffs ; and when he went on a sail-
ing voyage the chances were even that there
would be some use for the long guns before he
returned, for the American merchant sailor
could trust to no armed escort.

The wonderful effectiveness of our seamen
at the date of which I am writing as well as
long subsequently to it was largely due to the
curious condition of things in Europe. For
thirty years all the European nations had

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 63

been in a state of continuous and very com-
plicated warfare, during the course of which
each nation in turn fought almost every other,
England being usually at loggerheads with
all. One effect of this was to force an
enormous proportion of the carrying trade of
the world into American bottoms. The old
Massachusetts town of Salem was then one of
the main depots of the East India trade; the
Baltimore clippers carried goods into the
French and German ports with small regard
to the blockade ; New Bedford and Sag
Harbor fitted out whalers for the Arctic seas
as well as for the South Pacific ; the rich
merchants of Philadelphia and New York sent
their ships to all parts of the world ; and
every small port had some craft in the coast-
ing trade. On the New England seaboard
but few of the boys would reach manhood
without having made at least one voyage to the
Newfoundland Banks after codfish ; and in
the whaling towns of Long Island it used to
be an old saying that no man could marry till
he struck his whale. The wealthy merchants
of the large cities would often send their sons
on a voyage or two before they let them enter
their counting-houses. Thus it came about
that a large portion of our population was
engaged in seafaring pursuits of a nature
strongly tending to develop a resolute and
hardy character in the men that followed them.
The British merchant-men sailed in huge
convoys, guarded by men-of-war, while, as
said before, our vessels went alone, and relied
for protection on themselves. If a fishing
smack went to the Banks it knew that it ran

64 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

a chance of falling in with some not over-
scrupulous Nova Scotian privateer. The
barques that sailed from Salem to the Spice
Islands kept their men well trained both at
great guns and musketry, so as to be able to
beat off either Malay proas, or Chinese junks.
The New York ships, loaded for the West
Indies, were prepared to do battle with the
picaroons that swarmed in the Spanish main ;
while the fast craft from Baltimore could fight
as well as they could run. Wherever an
American seaman went, he not only had to
contend with all the legitimate perils of the
sea, but he had also to regard almost every
stranger as a foe. Whether this foe called
himself pirate or privateer mattered but little.
French, Spaniards, Algerines, Malays, from
all alike our commerce suffered, and against
all, our merchants were forced to defend
themselves. The effect of such a state of
things, which made commerce so remunerative
that the bolder spirits could hardly keep out
of it, and so hazardous that only the most
skilful and daring could succeed in it, was to
raise up as fine a set of seamen as ever
manned a navy. The stern school in which
the American was brought up, forced him into
hadits of independent thought and action
which it was impossible that the more pro-
tected Briton could possess. He worked
more intelligently and less from routine, and
while perfectly obedient and amenable to dis-
cipline, was yet able to judge for himself in
an emergency. He was more easily managed
than most of his kind — being shrewd, quiet,
and, in fact, comparatively speaking, rather

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 65

moral than otherwise ; if he was a New Eng-
lander, when he retired from a sea life he
was not unapt to end his days as a deacon.
Altogether there could not have been better
material for a fighting crew than cool, gritty
American Jack. Moreover, there was a good
nucleus of veterans to begin with, who were
well fitted to fill the more responsible posi-
tions, such as captains of guns, etc. These
were men who had cruised in the little Enter-
prise after French privateers, who had been
in the Constellation in her two victorious fights,
or who, perhaps, had followed Decatur when
with only eighty men he cut out the
Philadelphia, manned by fivefold his force and
surrounded by hostile batteries and war
vessels, — one of the boldest expeditions of the
kind on record.

It is to be noted, furthermore, in this con*
nection, that by a singular turn of fortune,
Great Britain, whose system of impressing
American sailors had been one of the chief
causes of the war, herself became, in con-
sequence of that very system, in some sort a
nursery for the seamen of the young Repub-
lican navy. The American sailor feared
nothing more than being impressed on a
British ship — dreading beyond measure the
hard life and cruel discipline aboard of her ;
but once there, he usually did well enough,
and in course of time often rose to be of some
little consequence. For years before 181 2,
the number of these impressed sailors was in
reality greater than the entire number serving
in the American navy, from which it will
readily be seen that they formed a good stock
5

66 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

to draw upon. Very much to their credit,
they never lost their devotion to the home of
their birth, more than two thousand of them
being imprisoned at the beginning of the war
because they refused to serve against their
country. When Commodore Decatur captured
the Macedonian, that officer, as we learn from
Marshall's "Naval Biography" (ii, 1019),
stated that most of the seamen of his own
frigate, the United States, had served in
British war vessels, and that some had been
with Lord Nelson in the Victory, and had even
been bargemen to the great Admiral, — a
pretty sure proof that the American sailors
did not show at a disadvantage when com-
pared with others.1

Good seaman as the impressed American
proved to be, yet he seldom missed an oppor-
tunity to escape from the British service, by

1 With perfect gravity, James and his followers as-
sume Decatur's statement to be equivalent to saying
that he had chiefly British seamen on board ; whereas
even as quoted by Marshall, Decatur merely said that
" his seamen had served on board a British man-of-
war," and that some " had served under Lord Nelson."
Like the Constitution, the United States had rid herself
of most of the British subjects on board, before sailing.'
Decatur's remark simply referred to the number of his
American seamen who had been impressed on board
British ships. Whenever James says that an Ameri-
can ship had a large proportion of British sailors
aboard, the explanation is that a large number of the
crew were Americans who had been impressed on
British ships. It would be no more absurd to claim
Trafalgar as an American victory because there was a
certain number of Americans in Nelson's fleet, than it
is to assert that the Americans were victorious in 181 2,
because there were a few renegade British on board
their ships.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 67

desertion or otherwise. In the first place, the
life was very hard, and, in the second, the
American seaman was very patriotic. He had
an honest and deep affection for his own flag,
while, on the contrary, he felt a curiously
strong hatred for England, as distinguished
from Englishmen. This hatred was partly an
abstract feeling, cherished through a vague
traditional respect for Bunker Hill, and partly
something very real and vivid, owing to the
injuries he, and others like him, had received.
Whether he lived in Maryland or Massachu-
setts, he certainly knew men whose ships had
been seized by British cruisers, their goods
confiscated, and the vessels condemned. Some
of his friends had fallen victims to the odious
right of search, and had never been heard of
afterward. He had suffered many an injury
to friend, fortune, or person, and some day he
hoped to repay them all ; and when the war
did come, he fought all the better because he
knew it was in his own quarrel. But, as I
have said, this hatred was against England,
not against Englishmen. Then, as now,
sailors were scattered about over the world
without any great regard for nationality ; and
the resulting intermingling of natives and
foreigners in every mercantile marine was es-
pecially great in those of Britain and America,
whose people spoke the same tongue and wore
the same aspect. When chance drifted the
American into Liverpool or London, he was
ready enough to ship in an Indiaman or whaler,
caring little for the fact that he served under
the British flag ; and the Briton, in turn, who
found himself in New York or Philadelphia,

-68 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

willingly sailed in one of the clipper-built
barques, whether it floated the stars and
stripes or not. When Captain Porter wrought
such havoc among the British whalers in the
South Seas, he found that no inconsiderable
portion of their crews consisted of Americans,
some of whom enlisted on board his own ves-
sel ; and among the crews of the American
whalers were many British. In fact, though
the skipper of each ship might brag loudly of
his nationality, yet in practical life he knew
well enough that there was very little to choose
between a Yankee and a Briton.1 Both were
bold and hardy, cool and intelligent, quick
with their hands, and showing at their best in

* What choice there was, was in favor of the Ameri-
can. In point of courage there was no difference what-
ever. The Essex and the Lawrence, as well as the
Frolic and the Reindeer, were defended with the same
stubborn, desperate, cool bravery that marks the Eng-
lish race on both sides of the Atlantic. But the Amer-
ican was a free citizen, any one's equal, a voter with a
personal interest in his country's welfare, and, above
all, without having perpetually before his eyes the de-
grading fear of the press-gang. In consequence, he
was more tractable than the Englishman, more self-re-
liant, and possessed greater judgment. In the fight
between the Wasp and the Frolic, the tatter's crew had
apparently been well trained at the guns, for they
aimed well ; but they fired at the wrong time, and
never corrected the error ; while their antagonists, de-
livering their broadsides far more slowly, by intelligently
■waiting until the proper moment, worked frightful
havoc. But though there was a certain slight differ-
ence between the seamen of the two nations, it must
never be forgotten that it was very much less than that
between the various individuals of the same nation ;
and when the British had been trained for a few years
by such commanders as Broke and Manners, it was
impossible to surpass them, and it needed our best men
to equal them.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 69

an emergency. They looked alike and spoke
alike ; when they took the trouble to think,
they thought alike ; and when they got drunk,
which was not an unfrequent occurrence, they
quarrelled alike.

Mingled with them were a few seamen of
other nationalities. The Irishman, if he came
from the old Dano- Irish towns of Waterford,
Dublin, and Wexford, or from the Ulster
coast, was very much like the two chief com-
batants ; the Celto-Turanian kern of the west
did not often appear on shipboard. The
French, Danes, and Dutch were hemmed in at
home ; they had enough to do on their own
sea board, and could not send men into for-
eign fleets. A few Norse, however, did come
in, and excellent sailors and fighters they
made. With the Portuguese and Italians, of
whom some were to be found serving under
the union-jack, and others under the stars and
stripes, it was different ; although there were
many excellent exceptions they did not, as a
rule, make the best kind of seamen. They
were treacherous, fond of the knife, less ready
with their hands, and likely to lose either their
wits or their courage when in a tight place.

In the American navy, unlike the British,
there was no impressment ; the sailor was a
volunteer, and he shipped in whatever craft
his fancy selected. Throughout the war there
were no " picked crews " on the American side,1

1 James' statements to the contrary being in erery
case utterly without foundation. He is also wrong in
his assertion that the American ships had no boys ;
they had nearly as many in proportion as the British.
The Constitution had 31, the Adams 15, etc. So, when

70 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

excepting on the last two cruises of the
Constitution. In fact (as seen by the letter of
Captain Stewart and Bainbridge to Secretary
Hamilton), there was often much difficulty in
getting enough men.1 Many sailors preferred
to serve in the innumerable privateers, and,
the two above-mentioned officers, in urging
the necessity of building line-of-battle ships,
state that it was hard work to recruit men for
vessels of an inferior grade, so long as the
enemy had ships of the line.

One of the standard statements made by
the British historians about this war is that
our ships were mainly or largely manned by

he states that our midshipmen were generally masters
and mates of merchantmen ; they were generally from
eleven to seventeen years old at the beginning of the
war, and, besides, had rarely or never been in the mer-
chant marine.

1 Reading through the volumes of official letters
about this war, which are preserved in the office of the
Secretary of the Navy, one of the most noticeable
things is the continual complaints about the difficulty
of getting men. The Adams at one time had a crew
of but nineteen men — " fourteen of whom are marines,"
adds the aggrieved commander. A log-book of one of
the gun-boats records the fact that after much difficulty
ttvo men were enlisted— from the jail, with a parenthe-
tical memorandum to the effect that they were both
very drunk. British ships were much more easily
manned, as they could always have recourse to impress-
ment.

The Constitution on starting out on her last cruises
had an extraordinary number of able seamen aboard,
viz., 218, with but 92 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 44
marines, making, with the officers, a total of 440 men.
(See letter of Captain Bainbridge, Oct. 16, 1814 ; it is
letter No. 51, in the fortieth volume of " Captains'
Letters," in the clerk's office of the Secretary of the
Navy.)

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 71

British sailors. This, if true, would not inter-
fere with the lessons which it teaches ; and,
besides that, it is not true. %

In this, as in everything else, all the modern
writers have merely followed James or Bren-
ton, and I shall accordingly confine myself to
examining their assertions. The former be-
gins (vol. iv, p. 470) by diffidently stating
that there is a " similarity " of language be-
tween the inhabitants of the two countries —
an interesting philological discovery that but
few will attempt to controvert. In vol. vi, p.
154, he mentions that a number of blanks
occur in the American Navy List in the
column " Where Born " ; and in proof of the
fact that these blanks are there because the
men were not Americans, he says that their
names "are all English and Irish."1 They
certainly are ; and so are all the other names
in the list. It could not well be otherwise,
as the United States Navy was not officered
by Indians. In looking over this same Navy

1 For example, James writes : " Out of the 32 cap-
tains one only, Thomas Tingey, has England marked
as his birthplace. . . . Three blanks occur, and
we consider it rather creditable to Captains John
Shaw, Daniel S. Patterson, and John Ord Creighton,
that they were ashamed to tell where they were born."
I have not been able to find out the latter's birth-place,
but Captain Shaw was born in New York, and I have
seen Captain Patterson incidentally alluded to as
" born and bred in America." Generally, whenever I
have been able to fill up the vacancies in the column
" Where Born," I have found that it was in America.
From these facts it would appear that James was
somewhat hasty in concluding that the omission of the
birth-place proved the owner of the name to be a na-
tive of Great Britain.

*j2 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

List (of 1816) it will be seen that but a little
over 5 per cent, of the officers were born
abroad — a smaller proportion by far than
would exist in the population of the country
at large — and most of these had come to
America when under ten years of age. On p.
155 James adds that the British sailors com-
posed " one third in number and one half in
point of effectiveness " of the American crews.
Brenton in his " Naval History " writes : " It
was said, and I have no reason to doubt the
fact, that there were 200 British seamen
aboard the Constitution.1 These statements
are mere assertions, unsupported by proof
and of such a loose character as to be difficult
to refute. As our navy was small, it may be
best to take each ship in turn. The only ones
of which the British could write authoritatively
were, of course, those which they captured.
The first one taken was the Wasp. James
says many British were discovered among her
crew, instancing especially one sailor named
Jack Lang ; now Jack Lang was born in the
town of Brunswick, New Jersey, but had been
impressed and forced to serve in the British Navy.
The same was doubtless true of the rest of
the " many British " seamen of her crew ; at
any rate, as the only instance James mentions
(Jack Lang) was an American, he can hardly
be trusted for those whom he does not
name.

Of the 95 men composing the crew of the
Nautilus when she was captured, " 6 were de-
tained and sent to England to await examina-
tion as being suspected of being British sub-

1 New edition, London, 1837, vol. ii, p. 456.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 73

jects. " ' Of the other small brigs, the Viper,
Vixen, Rattlesnake, and Syren, James does not
mention the composition of the crew, and I
do not know that any were claimed as British.
Of the crew of the Argus "about 10 or 12
were believed to be British subjects ; the
American officers swore the crew contained
none " (James, u Naval Occurrences,'' p. 278).
From o to 10 per cent, can be allowed.
When the Frolic was captured ' ' her crew con-
sisted of native Americans " (do. p. 340).
James speaks (" History," p. 418) of " a por-
tion of the British subjects on board the
Jzssex" but without giving a word of proof or
stating his grounds of belief. One man was
claimed as a deserter by the British, but he
turned out to be a New Yorker. There were
certainly a certain number of British aboard,
but the number probably did not exceed
thirty. Of the Presidents crew he says
(" Naval Occurrences," p. 448): "In the
opinion of several British officers there were
among them many British seamen "; but Com-
modore Decatur, Lieutenant Gallagher, and
the other officers swore that there were none.
Of the crew of the Chesapeake, he says, " about

1 Quoted from letter of Commodore Rodgers of
September 12, 1812 (in Naval Aichives, "Captains'
Letters," vol. xxv, No. 43), enclosing a "List of
American prisoners of war discharged out of custody
of Lieutenant William Miller, agent at the port of
Halifax," in exchange for some of the British captured
by Porter. This list, by the way, shows the crew of
the Nautilus (counting the six men detained as British)
to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as stated by
James. Commodore Rodgers adds that he has de-
tained 12 men of the Guerrtire 's crew as an offset to
the 6 men belonging to the Nautilus.

74 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

32 " were British subjects, or about 10 per
cent. One or two of these were afterward
shot, and some 25, together with a Portuguese
boatswain's mate, entered into the British
service. So that of the vessels captured by
the British, the Chesapeake had the largest
number of British (about 10 per cent, of her
crew) on board, the others ranging from that
number down to none af all, as in the case of
the Wasp.

As these eleven ships would probably rep-
resent a fair average, this proportion, of from
o to 10 per cent., should be taken as the proper
one. James, however, is of the opinion that
those ships manned by Americans were more
apt to be captured than those manned by
the braver British ; which calls for an exami-
nation of the crews of the remaining vessels.
Of the American sloop Peacock, James says
(" Naval Occurrences," p. 348) that " several
of her men were recognized as British sea-
men "; even if this were true, " several " could
not probably mean more than sixteen, or 10
per cent. Of the second Wasp he says,
" Captain Blakely was a native of Dublin,
and, along with some English and Scotch, did
not, it may be certain, neglect to have in his
crew a great many Irish.'' Now Captain
Blakely left Ireland when he was but 16 months
old, and the rest of James' statement is
avowedly mere conjecture. It was asserted
positively in the American newspapers that
the Wasp, which sailed from Portsmouth, was
manned exclusively by New Englanders, ex-
cept a small draft of men from a Baltimore pri-
vateer, and that there was not a foreigner in her

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 75

crew. Of the Hornet James states that " some
of her men were natives of the United King-
dom "; but he gives no authority, and the men
he refers to were in all probability those spoken
of in the journal of one of the Hornefs
officers, which says that " many of our men
(Americans) had been impressed in the
British service." As regards the gun-boats,
James asserts that they were commanded by
" Commodore Joshua Barney, a native of Ire-
land. " This officer, however, was born at
Baltimore on July 6, 1759. As to the Consti-
tution, Brenton, as already mentioned, sup-
poses the number of British sailors in her
crew to have been 200 ; James makes it less,
or about 150. Respecting this, the only def-
inite statements I can find in British works
are the following: In the "Naval Chronicle,"
vol. xxix, p. 452, an officer of the Java states
that most of the Constitution 's men were Brit-
ish, many being from the Guerriere ; which
should be read in connection with James'
statement (vol. vi, p. 156) that but eight of
the Guerriere's crew deserted, and but two
shipped on board the Constitution. Moreover,
as a matter of fact, these eight men were all
impressed Americans. In the " Naval Chron-
icle " it is also said that the Chesapeake s sur-
geon was an Irishman, formerly of the British
navy; he was born in Baltimore, and was
never in the British navy in his life. The
third lieutenant "was supposed to be an
Irishman" (Brenton, ii, 456). The first lieu-
tenant " was a native of Great Britain, we
have been informed" (James, vi, 194); he
was Mr. George Parker, born and bred in

?6 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Virginia. The remaining three citations, if
true, prove nothing. " One man had served
under Mr. Kent " of the Guerriere (James, vi,
p. 153). " One had been in the Achille " and
"one in the Eurydice" (Brenton, ii, 456).
These three men were most probably Amer-
ican seamen who had been impressed on
British ships. From Cooper (in " Putnam's
Magazine," vol. 1, p. 593) as well as from
several places in the Constitution's log,1 we
learn that those of the crew who were British
deserters were discharged from the Constitu-
tion before she left port, as they were afraid
to serve in a war against Great Britain. That
this fear was justifiable may be seen by read-
ing James, vol. iv, p. 483. Of the four men
taken by the Leopard from the Chesapeake, as
deserters, one was hung and three scourged.
In reality the crew of the Constitution probably
did not contain a dozen British sailors; in
her last cruises she was manned almost ex-
clusively by New Englanders. The only re-
maining vessel is the United States, respecting
whose crew some remarkable statements have
been made. Marshall (vol. ii, p. 1019) writes
that Commodore Decatur " declared there was
not a seaman in his ship who had not served
from 5 to 12 years in a British man-of-war,"

1 See her log-book (vol. ii, Feb. 1, 1812 to Dec. 13,
1813) ; especially on July 12th, when twelve men were
discharged. In some of Hull's letters he alludes to
the desire of the British part of the crew to serve
on the gun-boats or in the ports ; and then writes that
" in accordance with the instructions sent him by the
Secretary of the Navy " he had allowed the British-
born portion to leave the ship. The log-books are in
the Bureau of Navigation.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 77

from which he concludes that they were Brit-
ish themselves. It may be questioned
whether Decatur ever made such an asser-
tion ; or if he did, it is safe to assume again
that his men were long-impressed Americans.1
Of the Carolina's crew of 70 men, five were
British. This fact was not found out till three
deserted, when an investigation was made and
the two other British discharged. Captain
Henly, in reporting these facts, made no con-

1 At the beginning of the war there were on record
in the American State Department 6,257 cases of im-
pressed American seamen. These could represent but
a small part of the whole, which must have amounted
to 20,000 men, or more than sufficient to man our
entire navy five times over. According to the British
Admiralty Report to the House of Commons, Febru-
ary I, 181 5, 2,548 impressed American seamen, who
refused to serve against their country, were imprisoned
in 181 2. According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in
the House, February 18, 1813, 3,300 men claiming to
be American subjects were serving in the British navy
in January, 181 1, and he certainly did not give any-
thing like the whole number. In the American service
the term of enlistment extended for two years, and the
frigate, United States, referred to, had not had her crew
for any very great length of time as yet. If such a
crew were selected at random from American sailors,
among them there would be, owing to the small num-
ber serving in our own navy and the enormous number
impressed into the British navy, probably but one of
the former to two of the latter. As already mentioned
the American always left a British man-of-war as soon
as he could, by desertion or discharge ; but he had no
unwillingness to serve in the home navy, where the pay
was larger, and the discipline far more humane, not to
speak of motives of patriotism. Even if the ex-British
man-of-war's man kept out of service for some time,
he would be very apt to enlist when a war broke out,
which his country undertook largely to avenge his own
wrongs.

78 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

cealment of his surprise that there should be
any British at all in his crew.1

From these facts and citations we may ac-
cordingly conclude that the proportion of
British seamen serving on American ships
after the war broke out, varied between none,
as on the Wasp and Constitution, to ten per
cent., as on the Chesapeake and Essex. On
the average, nine tenths of each of our crews
were American seamen, and about one twen-
tieth British, the remainder being a mixture
of various nationalities.

On the other hand, it is to be said that the
British frigate Guerriere had ten Americans
among her crew, who were permitted to go
beiow during action, and the Macedonian
eight, who were not allowed that privilege,
three of them being killed. Three of the
British sloop Peacock's men were Americans,
who were forced to fight against the Hornet ;
one of them was killed. Two of the Epervier's
men were Americans, who were also forced to
fight. When the crew of the Nautilus was
exchanged, a number of other American pris-
oners were sent with them ; among these were
a number of American seamen who had been
serving in the Shannon, Acasta, Africa, and
various other vessels. So there was also a
certain proportion of Americans among the
British crews, although forming a smaller per-
centage of them than the British did on board
the American ships. In neither case was the
number sufficient to at all affect the result.

The crews of our ships being thus mainly

1 See his letter in " Letters of Masters' Command-
ant," 1814, 1. No. 116.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

native Americans, it may be interesting to try
to find out the proportions that were furnished
by the different sections of the country.
There is not much difficulty about the officers.
The captains, masters commandant, lieu-
tenants, marine officers, whose birthplaces are
given in the Navy List of 18 16, — 240 in all, —
came from the various States as follows :

f N. H.,

New England J ^a*s"

[ Conn.,

f N. Y..

Middle States

N. J.,

Penn.,

Del.,

District of Columbia | D. C,

'Md.,
Va.,
N.C.,

Southern States <J S. C,
Ga.,
La.,

IKy.,

I 4

► Il6

Total of given birthplaces .... 240

Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely
and proportionately, the greatest number of
officers, Virginia, then the most populous of
all the States, coming next ; four-fifths of the
remainder came from the Northern States.

It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces
of the sailors. Something can be inferred

So ' NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

from the number of privateers and letters of
marque fitted out. Here Baltimore again
headed the list ; following closely came New
York, Philadelphia, and the New England
coast towns, with, alone among the Southern
ports, Charleston, S. C. A more accurate
idea of the quotas of sailors furnished by the
different sections can be arrived at by com-
paring the total amount of tonnage the coun-
try possessed at the outbreak of the war.
Speaking roughly, 44 per cent, of it belonged
to New England, $2 per cent, to the Middle
States, and 11 per cent, to Maryland. This
makes it probable (but of course not certain)
that three-fourths of the common sailors
hailed from the Northern States, half the re-
mainder from Maryland, and the rest chiefly
from Virginia and South Carolina.

Having thus discussed somewhat at length
the character of our officers and crews, it will
now be necessary to present some statistical
tables to give a more accurate idea of the
composition of the navy; the tonnage, com-
plements, and armaments of the ships, etc.

At the beginning of the war the Govern-
ment possessed six navy yards (all but the
last established in 1801) as follows : x

Minimum number of

Place.

Original cost.

men employed.

Portsmouth, N. H.,

$ 5>5°o

Charleston, Mass.,

39>2I4

New York,

40,000

102

Philadelphia,

37,000

Washington,

4,000

3£

Gosport,

1 2,000

1 Report of Naval Secretary Jones, Nov. 30, 1814.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 8l

In 1812 the following was the number of
officers in the navy : '

12 captains,

10 masters commandant,
73 lieutenants,
53 masters,
310 midshipmen,
42 marine officers,

500

At the opening of the year, the number of
seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys in service
was 4,010, and enough more were recruited
to increase it to 5,230, of whom only 2,346
were destined for the cruising war vessels,
the remainder being detailed for forts, gun-
boats, navy yards, the lakes, etc.* The ma-
rine corps was already ample, consisting of
1,523 men.8

No regular navy lists were published till
1816, and I have been able to get very little
information respecting the increase in officers
and men during 1813 and 1814; but we have
full returns for 18 15, which may be summar-
ized as follows : *

30 captains, 25 masters commandant,

141 lieutenants, 24 commanders,

510 midshipmen, 230 sailing-masters,

50 surgeons, 12 chaplains,

50 pursers, 10 coast pilots,

45 captain's clerks, 80 surgeon's mates,

* " list of Vessels," etc., by Geo. H. Preble, U.S.N.
(1874).

a Report of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 181 2.

• Ibid.

4 Seybert's "Statistical Annals," p. 676 (Philadel-
phia, 1818).

82 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sail-
makers,
268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc,
1,106 quarter gunners, etc,
5,000 able seamen,
6,849 ordinary seamen and boys.

Making a total of 14,960, with 2,715 marines.1

Comparing this list with the figures given
before, it can be seen that during the course
of the war our navy grew enormously, increas-
ing to between three and four times its original
size.

At the beginning of the year 18 12, the
navy of the United States on the ocean con-
sisted of the following vessels, which either
were, or could have been, made available
during the war : a

(Guns) Name> Where Built

44 United States, Philadelphia,

44 Constitution, Boston,

44 President, New York,

38 Constellation, Baltimore,

38 Congress, Portsmouth,

38 Chesapeake, Norfolk,

32 Essex, Salem,

28 Adams, New York,

18 Hornet, Baltimore,

18 Wasp, Washington,

16 Argus, Boston,

16 Syren, Philadelphia,

14 Nautilus, Baltimore,

14 Vixen, Baltimore,

12 Enterprise, Baltimore,

12 Viper, Purchased,

1 Report of Secretary B. W. Crowninshield, April 18,
1816.

2 Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth
Congress, Dec. 24, 1798; Letters of Secretary Paul
Hamilton, Feb. 21, 181 2 ; "American State Papers,"
vol. xix, p. 149. See also The " History of the Navy
of the United States," by Lieut. G. E. Emmons, U. S.
N. (published in Washington, mdcccliii, under the
authority of the Navy Department).

When
Built.

Ton-
nage.

Cost.

1797

1576

$299,336

1797

1576

302,718

1800

1576

220,910

1797

1265

314,212

1799

1268

197,246

1799

1244

220,677

1799

860

139.362

1799

560

76,622

1805

480

52,603

1806

450

40,000

1803

298

37,428

1803

250

32,521

1803

i8S

18,763

1803

185

20,872

1799

165

16,240

1810

148

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. S$

There also appeared on the lists the New
York, 36, Boston, 28, and John Adams, 28.
The two former were condemned hulks ; the
latter was entirely rebuilt after the war. The
Hornet was originally a brig of 440 tons, and
18 guns ; having been transformed into a
ship, she was pierced for 20 guns, and in size
was of an intermediate grade between the Wasp
and the heavy sloops, built somewhat later,
of 509 tons. Her armament consisted of 32-
pound carronades, with the exception of the
two bow-guns, which were long iVs. The
whole broadside was in nominal weight just
300 pounds ; in actual weight about 277
pounds. Her complement of men was 140,
but during the war she generally left port
with 150.1 The Wasp had been a ship from
the beginning, mounted the number of guns
she rated (of the same calibres as the Hornefs)
and carried some ten men less. She was
about the same length as the British 18-gun
brig-sloop, but, being narrower, measured
nearly 30 tons less. The Argus and Syren
were similar and very fine brigs, the former
being the longer. Each carried two more
guns than she rated ; and the Argus, in addi-
tion, had a couple thrust through the bridle-
ports. The guns were 24-pound carronades,
with two long iVs for bow-chasers. The
proper complement of men was 100, but each
sailed usually with about 125. The four

1 In the Hornet's log of Oct. 25, 181 2, while in port,
it is mentioned that she had 1 ;8 men; four men who
were sick were left behind before she started. (See,
in the Navy Archives, the Log-book, Hornet, Wasp,
and Argus, July 20, 1809, to Oct. 6, 1813.)

84 NAVAL WAR OF 1812,

smaller craft were originally schooners, armed
with the same number of light long guns as
they rated, and carrying some 70 men apiece ;
but they had been very effectually ruined by
being changed into brigs, with crews increased
to a hundred men. Each was armed with 18-
pound carronades, carrying two more than
she rated. The Enterprise, in fact, mounted
16 guns, having two long nines thrust through
the bridle-ports. These little brigs were
slow, not very seaworthy, and overcrowded
with men and guns; they all fell into the
enemy's hands without doing any good what-
ever, with the single exception of the Enter >
prise, which escaped capture by sheer good
luck, and in her only battle happened to be
pitted against one of the corresponding and
equally bad class of British gun-brigs. The
Adams after several changes of form finally
became a flush-decked corvette. The Essex
had originally mounted twenty-six long i2*s
on her main-deck, and sixteen 24-pound car-
ronades on her spar-deck ; but official wisdom
changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty-four
32-pound carronades, and two long 12's on
the main-deck, and sixteen 32-pound carron-
ades with four long 12's on the spar-deck.
When Captain Porter had command of her
he was deeply sensible of the disadvantages
of an armament which put him at the mercy
of any ordinary antagonist who could choose
his distance ; accordingly he petitioned sev-
eral times, but always without success, to
have his long 12's returned to him.

The American 38's were about the size of
the British frigates of the same rate, and

NAVAL WAR OF 18 1 2. 85

armed almost exactly in the same way, each
having 28 long i8's on the main-deck and 20
32-pound carronades on the spar-deck. The
proper complement was 300 men, but each
carried from 40 to 80 more.1

Our three 44-gun ships were the finest
frigates then afloat (although the British pos-
sessed some as heavy, such as the Egyptienney
44). They were beautifully modelled, with,
very thick scantling, extremely stout masts,
and heavy cannon. Each carried on her
main-deck thirty long 24's, and on her spar-
deck two long bow-chasers, and twenty or
twenty-two carronades — 42-pounders on the
President and United States, 3 2 -pounders on
the Constitution. Each sailed with a crew of
about 450 men — 50 in excess of the regular
complement.3

1 The Chesapeake, by some curious mistake, was fre-
quently rated as a 44, and this drew in its train a num-
ber of attendant errors. When she was captured,
James says that in one of her lockers was found a let-
ter, dated in February, 181 1, from Robert Smith, the
Secretary of War, to Captain Evans, at Boston, direct-
ing him to open houses of rendezvous for manning the
Chesapeake, and enumerating her crew at a total of 441.
Naturally this gave British historians the idea that such
was the ordinary complement of our 3&gun frigates.
But the ordering so large a crew was merely a mistake,
as may be seen by a letter from Captain Bainbridge to
the Secretary of the Navy, which is given in full in the
" Captains' Letters," vol. xxv, No. 19 (Navy Archives).
In it he mentions the extraordinary number of men
ordered for the Chesapeake, saying, " There is a mis-
take in the crew ordered for the Chesapeake, as it
equals in number the crews of our 44-gun frigates,
whereas the ChesapeakAs of the class of the Congress
and Constellation"

% The President when in action with the Endymion
had 450 men aboard, as sworn by Decatur; the muster-

86 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

It may be as well to mention here the only
other class of vessels that we employed during
the war. This was composed of the ship-
sloops built in 1813, which got to sea in 1814.
They were very fine vessels, measuring 509
tons apiece,1 with very thick scantling and
stout masts and spars. Each carried twenty
32-pound carronades and two long i2's with
a crew nominally of 160 men, but with usually
a few supernumeraries.2

The British vessels encountered were simi-
lar, but generally inferior, to our own. The
only 24-pounder frigate we encountered was
the JEndymion, of about a fifth less force than
the President. Their 38-gun frigates were
almost exactly like ours, but with fewer men

roll of the Constitution, a few days before her action
with the Guerriere contains 464 names (including 51
marines) ; 8 men were absent in a prize, so she had
aboard in the action 456. Her muster-roll just before
the action with the Cyane and Levant shows 461 names.

1 The dimensions were 117 feet 11 inches upon the
gun-deck, 97 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage, measuring
from one foot before the forward perpendicular and
along the base line to the front of the rabbet of the
port, deducting f of the moulded breadth of the beam,
which is 31 feet 6 inches ; making 509!^ tons. (See in
Navy Archives, " Contracts," vol. ii, p. 137.)

2 The Peacock had 166 men, as we learn from her
commander, Warrington's, letter of June 1st (Letter
No. 140 in " Masters' Commandant Letters," 1814,
vol. i). The Frolic took aboard " 10 or 12 men beyond
her regular complement " (see letter of Joseph Bain-
bridge, No. 51, in same vol.). Accordingly when she
was captured by the Orpheus, the commander of the
latter, Captain Hugh Pigot, reported the number of
men aboard to be 171. The Wasp left port with 173
men, with which she fought her first action ; she had a
much smaller number aboard in her second.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 87

in crew as a rule. They were three times
matched against our 44-gun frigates, to which
they were inferior about as three is to four.
Their 36-gun frigates were larger than the
Essex, with a more numerous crew, but the
same number of guns ; carrying on the lower
deck, however, long i8's instead of 32-pound
carronades, — a much more effective armament.
The 32-gun frigates were smaller, with long
i2's on the main-deck. The largest sloops
were also frigate-built, carrying twenty-two
32-pound carronades on the main-deck, and
twelve lighter guns on the quarter-deck and
forecastle, with a crew of 180. The large
flush-decked ship-sloops carried 21 or 23
guns, with a crew of 140 men. But our ves-
sels most often came in contact with the
British 18-gun brig-sloop; this was a tubby
craft, heavier than any of our brigs, being
about the size of the Hornet. The crew con-
sisted of from no to 135 men ; ordinarily each
was armed with sixteen 32-pound carronades,
two long 6's, and a shifting 12-pound carron-
ade ; often with a light long gun as a stern-
chaser, making 20 in all. The Reindeer and
Peacock had only 24-pound carronades ; the
Epervier had but eighteen guns, all carron-
ades.1

Among the stock accusations against our

1 The Epervier was taken into our service under the
same name and rate. Both Preble and Emmons de-
scribe her as of 477 tons. Warrington, her captor,
however, says : " The surveyor of the port has just
measured the Epervier and reports her 467 tons." (In
the Navy Archives, " Masters Commandant Letters,"
1814, i, No. 125.)

For a full discussion of tonnage, see Appendix, A.

88 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

navy of 18 12, were, and are, statements that
our vessels were rated at less than their real
force, and in particular that our large frigates
were " disguised line-of-battle ships." As
regards the ratings, most vessels of that time
carried more guns than they rated ; the dis-
parity was less in the French than in either
the British or American navies. Our 38-gun
frigates carried 48 guns, the exact number the
British 38's possessed. The worst case of
underrating in our navy was the Essex, which
rated 32, and carried 46 guns, so that her real
was 44 per cent, in excess of her nominal
force ; but this was not as bad as the British
sloop Cyane ; which was rated a 20 or 22, and
carried 34 guns, so that she had either 55 or
70 per cent, greater real than nominal force.
At the beginning of the war we owned two
18-gun ship-sloops, one mounting 18 and the
other 20 guns ; the 18-gun brig-sloops they
captured mounted each 19 guns, so the aver-
age was the same. Later we built sloops that
rated 18 and mounted 22 guns, but when one
was captured it was also put down in the
British navy list as an 18-gun ship-sloop.
During all the combats of the war there were
but four vessels that carried as few guns as
they rated. Two were British, the Epervier
and Levanty and two American, the Wasp and
Adams. One navy was certainly as deceptive
as another, as far as underrating went.

The force of the statement that our large
frigates were disguised line-of-battle ships, of
course depends entirely upon what the words
" frigate n and " line-of-battle ship " mean.
When on the 10th of August, 1653, De Ruyter

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 89

saved a great convoy by beating off Sir George
Ayscough's fleet of 38 sail, the largest of the
Dutch admiral's "33 sail of the line " carried
but 30 guns and 150 men, and his own flag-
ship but 28 guns and 134 men.1 The Dutch
book from which this statement is taken speaks
indifferently of frigates of 18, 40, and 58 guns.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century the
terms had crystallized. Frigate then meant a
so-called single-decked ship ; it in reality
possessed two decks, the main, or gun-deck,
and the upper one, which had no name at all,
until our sailors christened it spar-deck. The
gun-deck possessed a complete battery, and
the spar-deck an interrupted one, mounting
guns on the forecastle and quarter-deck. At
that time all " two-decked " or " three-decked"
(in reality three-and four-decked) " ships were
liners. But in 18 12 this had changed some-
what; as the various nations built more and
more powerful vessels, the lower rates of the
different divisions were dropped. Thus the
British ship Cyaney captured by the Constitution
was in reality a small frigate, with a main-deck
battery of 22 guns, and 12 guns on the spar-
deck ; a few years before she would have been
called a 24-gun frigate, but she then ranked
merely as a 22-gan sloop. Similarly the 50,
and 64-gun ships that had fought in the line
at the Doggerbank, Camperdown, and even at

1 " La Vie et les Actions Memorables du Sr. Michel de
Ruyter a Amsterdam, Chez Henry et Theodore Boom,
mdclxxxvii. The work is by Barthelemy Pielat, a
surgeon in de Ruyter's fleet, and personally present
during many of his battles. It is written in French, but
is in tone more strongly anti-French than anti-English.

9o NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Abouhir, were now no longer deemed fit for
that purpose, and the 74 was the lowest line-
of-battle ship.

The Constitution, President, and States must
then be compared with the existing European
vessels that were classed as frigates. The
French in 1812 had no 24-pounder frigates,
for the very good reason that they had all
fallen victims to the English i8-pounder's ; but
in July of that year a Danish frigate, the Nay-
aden, which carried long 24's, was destroyed
by the English ship Dictator, 64.

The British frigates were of several rates.
The lowest rated 32, carrying in all 40 guns,
26 long iVs on the main-deck and 14 24-pound
carronades on the spar-deck — a broadside of
324 pounds.1 The 36-gun frigates, like the
Phabe, carried 46 guns, 26 long 18's on the
gun-deck and 32-pound carronades above.
The 38-gun frigates, like the Macedonian, car-
ried 48 or 49 guns, long i8's below and 32-
pound carronades above. The 32 -gun frigates,
then, presented in broadside 13 long 12's be-
low and 7 24-pound carronades above ; the
38-gun frigates, 14 long i8's below and 1032-
pound carronades above ; so that a 44-gun
frigate would naturally present 15 long 24^
below and 12 42-pound carronades above, as
the United States did at first. The rate was
perfectly proper, for French, British, and Danes
already possessed 24-pounder frigates ; and
there was really less disparity between the
force and rate of a 44 that carried 54 guns,
than there was in a 38 that carried 49, or, like

1 In all these vessels there were generally two long
6's or 9's substituted for the bow-chase carronades.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 91

the Shannon, 52. Nor was this all. Two of
our three victories were won by the Constitu-
tion, which only carried 32-pound carronades,
and once 54 and once 52 guns ; and as two-
thirds of the work was thus done by this ves-
sel, I shall now compare her with the largest
British frigates. Her broadside force consist-
ed of 15 long 24's on the main-deck, and on
the spar-deck one long 24, and in one case 10,
in the other 1 1 32-pound carronades — a broad-
side of 704 or 736 pounds.1 There was then
in the British navy the Acasta, 40, carrying in
broadside 15 long i8's and 11 32-pound car-
ronades ; when the spar-deck batteries are
equal, the addition of 90 pounds to the main-
deck broadside (which is all the superiority of
the Constitution over the Acastd) is certainly
not enough to make the distinction between a
frigate and a disguised 74. But not considering
the Acasta, there were in the British navy three
24-pounder frigates, the Comwa//is, Indefati-
gable, and Endymion. We only came in con-
tact with the latter in 18 15, when the Cofistitu-
tion had but 52 guns. The Endymion then
had an armament of 28 long 24's, 2 long i8's,
and 20 32-pound carronades, making abroad-
side of 674 pounds,9 or including a shifting
24-pound carronade, of 698 pounds — just six
pounds, or 1 per cent., less than the force of
that " disguised line-of-battle ship " the Con-
stitution ! As the Endymion only rated as a
40, and the Constitution as a 44, it was in

1 Nominally ; in reality about 7 per cent, less on ac-
count of the short weight in metal.

2 According to James 664 pounds : he omits the chase
guns for no reason.

92 NAVAL WAR OF 1812,

reality the former and not the latter which was
underrated. I have taken the Constitution,
because the British had more to do with her
than they did with our other two 44 s taken to-
gether. The latter were both of heavier metal
than the Constitution, carrying 42 -pound car-
ronades. In 18 12 the United States carried
her full 54 guns, throwing a broadside of 846
pounds ; when captured, the President carried
53, having substituted a 24-pound carronade
for two of her 42 's, and her broadside amount-
ed to 828 pounds, or 16 per cent, nominal, and,
on account of the short weight of her shot, 9
per cent, real excess over the Endymion. If
this difference made her a line-of-battle ship,
then the Endymion was doubly a line-of-battle
ship compared to the Congress or Constellation.
Moreover, the American commanders found
their 42-pound carronades too heavy ; as I
have said the Constitution only mounted 32's,
and the United States landed 6 of her guns.
When, in 18 13, she attempted to break the
blockade, she carried but 48 guns, throwing
a broadside of 720 pounds — just 3 per cent,
more than the Endymion.1 If our frigates
were line-of-battle ships the disguise was cer-

1 It was on account of this difference of 3 per cent,
that Captain Hardy refused to allow the Endymion to
meet the States (James, vi, p. 470). This was during
the course of some challenges and counter-challenges
which ended in nothing, Decatur in his turn being un-
willing to have the Macedonian meet the Statira, unless
the latter should agree not to take on a picked crew.
He was perfectly right in this ; but he ought never to
have sent the challenge at all, as two ships but an hour
or two out of port would be at a frightful disadvantage
in a fight.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 95

tainly marvellously complete, and they had a
number of companions equally disguised in
the British ranks.

The 44's were thus true frigates^ with one
complete battery of long guns and one inter-
rupted one of carronades. That they were
better than any other frigates was highly
creditable to our ingenuity and national skill.
We cannot, perhaps, lay claim to the invention
and first use of the heavy frigate, for 24-
pounder frigates were already in the service of
at least three nations, and the French 36-
pound carronade, in use on their spar-decks,
threw a heavier ball than our 42-pounder.
But we had enlarged and perfected the heavy
frigate, and were the first nation that ever
used it effectively. The French Forte and the
Danish Nayaden shared the fate of ships
carrying guns of lighter calibre; and the
British 24-pounders, like the l{ndymion,
had never accomplished anything. '^Hitherto
there had been a strong feeling, especially in
England, that an 18-pound gun was as effect-
ive as a 24- in arming a frigate ; we made
a complete revolution in this respect. Eng-
land had been building only 18-pounder
vessels when she ought to have been building
24-pounders. It was greatly to our credit
that our average frigate was superior to the
average British frigate ; exactly as it was to
our discredit that the Essex was so ineffect-
ively armed. Captain Porter owed his defeat
chiefly to his ineffective guns, but also to
having lost his topmast, to the weather being
unfavorable, and, still more, to the admirable
skill with which Hilyar used his superior

94 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

armament. The Java, Macedonian, and Gner-
riere owed their defeat partly to their lighter
guns, but much more to the fact that their
captains and seamen did not display either as
good seamanship or as good gunnery as their
foes. Inferiority in armament was a factor to
be taken into account in all the four cases,
but it was more marked in that of the Essex
than in the other three ; it would have been
fairer for Porter to say that he had been cap-
tured by a line-of-battle ship, than for the
captain of the Java to make that assertion.
In this last case the forces of the two ships
compared almost exactly as their rates. A
44 was matched against a 38 ; it was not
surprising that she should win, but it was
surprising that she should win with ease and
impunity. The long 24's on the Constitution 's
gun-deck no more made her a line-of battle
ship thaf* the 32-pound carronades mounted
on an English frigate's quarter-deck and
forecastle made her a line-of-battle ship when
opposed to a Frenchman with only 8's and 6's
on his spar-deck. When, a few years before,
the English Phoebe had captured the French
Nereide, their broadsides were respectively
407 and 258 pounds, a greater disparity than
in any of our successful rights ; yet no author
thought of claiming that the Phoebe was any-
thing but a frigate. So with the Clyde,
throwing 425 lbs., which took the Vestale,
throwing but 246. The facts were that 18-
pounder frigates had captured 12-pounders,
exactly as our 24-pounders in turn captured
the 18-pounders.

Shortly before Great Britain declared war

NAVAL WAR OF 1812, 95

on us, one of her 18-pounder frigates, the San
Florenzo, throwing 476 lbs. in a broadside,
captured the 1 2-pounder French frigate Pysche,
whose broadside was only 246 lbs. The force
of the former was thus almost double that of
the latter, yet the battle was long and des-
perate, the English losing 48 and the French
124 men. This conflict, then, reflected as
much credit on the skill and seamanship of
the defeated as of the victorious side ; the
difference in loss could fairly be ascribed to
the difference in weight of metal. But where,
as in the famous ship-duels of 18 12, the
difference in force is only a fifth, instead of a
half, and yet the slaughter, instead of being as
five is to two, is as six to one, then the victory
is certainly to be ascribed as much to superi-
ority in skill as to superiority in force. But,
on the other hand, it should always be remem-
bered that there was a very decided superiority
in force. It is a very discreditable feature of
many of our naval histories that they utterly
ignore this superiority, seeming ashamed to
confess that it existed. In reality it was
something to be proud of. It was highly to
the credit of the United States that her frigates
were of better make and armament than any
others ; it always speaks well for a nation's
energy and capacity that any of her imple-
ments of warfare are of a superior kind. This
is a perfectly legitimate reason for pride.

It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that
they opposed breech-loaders to the muzzle-
loaders of the Austrians ; but it would be folly
to give all the credit of the victory to the
breech-loaders and none to Moltke and his

96 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. (

lieutenants. Thus, it must be remembered
that two things contributed to our victories.
One was the excellent make and armament
of our ships ; the other was the skilful sea-
manship, excellent discipline, and superb
gunnery of the men who were in them.
British writers are apt only to speak of the
first, and Americans only of the last, whereas
both should be taken into consideration.

To sum up : the American 44-gun frigate
was a true frigate, in build and armament,
properly rated, stronger than a 38-gun frigate
just about in the proportion of 44 to 38, and
not exceeding in strength an 18-pounder
frigate as much as the latter exceeded one
carrying 12-pounders. They were in no way
whatever line-of-battle ships ; but they were
superior to any other frigates afloat, and, what
is still more important, they were better
manned and commanded than the average
frigate of any other navy. Lord Codrington
says ("Memoirs," i, p. 310): "But I well
know the system of favoritism and borough
corruption prevails so very much that many
people are promoted and kept in command
that should be dismissed the service, and while
such is the case the few Americans chosen for
their merit may be expected to follow up their
successes except where they meet with our
best officers on even terms." * The small size

1 To show that I am not quoting an authority biassed
in our favor I will give Sir Edward Codrington's opin-
ion of our rural better class (i, 318). " It is curious to
observe the animosity which prevails here among what
is called the better order of people, which I think is
more a misnomer here than in any other country I have
ever been. Their whig and tory are democrat and

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 97

of our navy was probably to a certain extent
effective in keeping it up to a high standard ;
but this is not the only explanation, as can be
seen by Portugal's small and poor navy. On
the other hand, the champions or pick of a
large navy ought to be better than the
champions of a small one.1

federalist, and it would seem for trie sake of giving
vent to that bitterness of hatred which marks the
Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the term)
who takes possession of a property adopts the opposite
political creed to that of his nearest neighbor." \

1 In speaking of tonnage I wish I could have got
better authority than James for the British side of the
question. He is so bitter that it involuntarily gives
one a distrust of his judgment. Thus, in speaking of
the Penguin's capture, he, in endeavoring to show that
the Hornet's loss was greater than she acknowledged,
says, " several of the dangerously wounded were thrown
overboard because the surgeon was afraid to amputate,
owing to his want of experience " (*' Naval Occurren-
ces," 492). Now what could persuade a writer to
make such a foolish accusation ? No matter how ut-
terly depraved and brutal Captain Biddle might be, he
would certainly not throw his wounded over alive be-
cause he feared they might die. Again, in vol. vi, p.
546, he says : " Captain Stewart had caused the Cyan*
to be painted to resemble a 36-gun frigate. The object
of this was to aggrandize his exploit in the eyes of the
gaping citizens of Boston." No matter how skilful an
artist Captain Stewart was, and no matter how great
the gaping capacities of the Bostonians, the Cyane
(which by the way went to New York and not Bos-
ton) could no more be painted to look like a 36-gun
frigate than a schooner could be painted to look like a
brig. Instances of rancor like these two occur constantly
in his work, and make it very difficult to separate what
is matter of fact from what is matter of opinion. I
always rely on the British official accounts when they
can be reached, except in the case of the Java, which
seem garbled. That such was sometimes the case with
British officials is testified to by both James (vol. iv, p.

98 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Again, the armaments of the American as
well as of the British ships were composed of
three very different styles of guns. The first,
or long gun, was enormously long and thick-
barrelled in comparison to its bore, and in
consequence very heavy ; it- possessed a very
long range, and varied in calibre from two to
forty-two pounds. The ordinary calibres in
our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24. The sec-
ond style was the carronade, a short, light
gun of large bore ; compared to a long gun of
the same weight it carried a much heavier ball
for a much shorter distance. The chief cali-
bres were 9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 42, and 68 pound-
ers, the first and the last being hardly in use in
our navy. The third style was the columbiad,
of an intermediate grade between the first two.
Thus it is seen that a gun of one style by no

17) and Brenton (vol. ii, p. 454, note) From the
" Memoir of Admiral Broke " we learn that his public
letter was wrong in a number of particulars. See also
any one of the numerous biographies of Lord Dundon-
ald, the hero of the little Speedy's fight. It is very
unfortunate that the British stopped publishing official
accounts of their defeats ; it could not well help giving
rise to unpleasant suspicions.

It may be as well to mention here, again, that James'
accusations do not really detract from the interest at-
taching to the war, and its value for purposes of study.
If, as he says, the American commanders were cowards,
and their crews renegades, it is well worth while to
learn the lesson that good training will make such men
able to beat brave officers with loyal crews. And why
did the British have such bad average crews as he
makes out ? He says, for instance, that the Java's was
unusually bad; yet Brenton says (vol. ii, p. 461) it was
like " the generality of our crews." It is worth while
explaining the reason that such a crew was generally
better than a French and worse than an American one.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 99

means corresponds to a gun of another style
of the same calibre. As a rough example, a
long 12, a columbiad 18, and a 32-pound car-
ronade would be about equivalent to one an-
other. These guns were mounted on two dif-
ferent types of .vessel. The first was flush-
decked ; that is, it had a single straight open
deck on which all the guns were mounted.
This class included one heavy corvette, (the
Adams), the ship-sloops, and the brig-sloops.
Through the bow-chase port, on each side,
each of these mounted a long gun ; the rest
of their guns were carronades, except in the
case of the Adams, which had all long guns.
Above these came the frigates, whose gun-
deck was covered above by another deck ; on
the fore and aft parts (forecastle and quarter-
deck) of this upper, open deck were also
mounted guns. The main-deck guns were all
long, except on the Essex, which had carron-
ades ; on the quarter-deck were mounted car-
ronades, and on the forecastle also carronades,
with two long bow-chasers.

Where two ships of similar armament fought
one another, it is easy to get the comparative
force by simply comparing the weight in
broadsides, each side presenting very nearly
the same proportion of long guns to carron-
ades. For such a broadside we take half the
guns mounted in the ordinary way ; and all
guns mounted on pivots or shifting. Thus
Perry's force in guns was 54 to Barclay's 63 ;
yet each presented 34 in broadside. Again,
each of the British brig-sloops mounted 19
guns, presenting 10 in broadside. Besides
these, some ships mounted bow-chasers run

ioo NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

through the bridle-ports, or stern-chasers,
neither of which could be used in broadsides.
Nevertheless, I include them, both because it
works in about an equal number of cases
against each navy, and because they were
sometimes terribly effective. James excludes
the Guerrieres bow-chaser ; in reality he
ought to have included both it and its fellow,
as they worked more damage than all the
broadside guns put together. Again, he ex-
cludes the Endymiorfs bow-chasers, though in
her action they proved invaluable. Yet he
includes those of the Enterprise and Argus>
though the former's were probably not fired.
So I shall take the half of the fixed, plus all
the movable, guns aboard, in comparing broad-
side force.

But the chief difficulty appears when guns
of one style are matched against those of an-
other. If a ship armed with long 12's meets
one armed with 32-pound carronades, which
is superior in force ? At long range the first,
and at short range the second ; and of course
each captain is pretty sure to insist that " cir-
cumstances " forced him to fight at a disadvan-
tage. The result would depend largely on the
skill or luck of each commander in choosing
position.

One thing is certain ; long guns are more
formidable than carronades of the same cali-
bre. There are exemplifications of this rule
on both sides ; of course, American writers,
as a rule, only pay attention to one set of cases
and British to the others. The Cyane and
Levant threw a heavier broadside than the
Constitution but were certainly less formidably

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. ioi

armed ; and the Essex threw a heavier broad-
side than the Pho>be, yet was also less formi-
dable. On Lake Ontario the American ship
General Pike threw less metal at a broadside
than either of her two chief antagonists, but
neither could be called her equal ; while on
Lake Champlain a parallel case is afforded by
the British ship Confiance. Supposing that
two ships throw the same broadside weight of
metal, one from long guns, the other from
carronades, at short range they are equal ; at
long, one has it all her own way. Her cap-
tain thus certainly has a great superiority of
force, and if he does not take advantage of it
it is owing to his adversary's skill or his own
mismanagement. As a mere approximation,
it may be assumed, in comparing the broad-
sides of two vessels or squadrons, that long
guns count for at least twice as much as car-
ronades of the same calibre. Thus on Lake
Champlain Captain Downie possessed an im-
mense advantage in his long guns, which
Commodore Macdonough's exceedingly good
arrangements nullified. Sometimes part of
the advantage may be willingly foregone, so as
to acquire some other. Had the Constitution
kept at long bowls with the Cyane and Levant
she could have probably captured one without
any loss to herself, while the other would
have escaped ; she preferred to run down
close so as to insure the capture of both,
knowing that even at close quarters long guns
are somewhat better than short ones (not to
mention her other advantages in thick scant-
ling, speed, etc.). The British carronades
often upset in action ; this was either owing

102 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

to their having been insufficiently secured,
and to this remaining undiscovered because
the men were not exercised at the guns, or
else it was because the unpractised sailors
would greatly overcharge them. Our better-
trained sailors on the ocean rarely committed
these blunders, but the less-skilled crews on
the lakes did so as often as their antagonists.
But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had
heavier and better-fitted guns, they labored
under one or two disadvantages. Our found-
ries were generally not as good as those of the
British, and our guns, in consequence, more
likely to burst ; it was an accident of this na-
ture which saved the British Belvidera ; and
the General Pike, under Commodore Chauncy,
and the new American frigate Guerriere suf-
fered in the same way ; while often the muz-
zles of the guns would crack. A more uni-
versal disadvantage was in the short weight of
our shot. When Captain Blakely sunk the
Avon he officially reported that her four shot
which came aboard weighed just 32 pounds
apiece, a pound and three-quarters more than
his heaviest; this would make his average shot
about 2^ pounds less, or rather over 7 per
cent. Exactly similar statements were made
by the officers of the Constitution in her three
engagements. Thus when she fought the Java,
she threw at a broadside, as already stated,
704 pounds ; the Java mounted 28 long 18's,
18 32-pound carronades, 2 long i2's, and one
shifting 24-pound carronade, a broadside of
576 pounds. Yet by the actual weighing of
all the different shot on both sides it was
found that the difference in broadside force

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 103

was only about 77 pounds, or the Constitution's
shot were about 7 per cent, short weight. The
long 24/s of the United States each threw a
shot but 4^ pounds heavier than the long 18's
of the Macedonian ; here again the difference
was about 7 per cent. The same difference
existed in favor of the Penguin and Epervier
compared with the Wasp and Hornet. Mr.
Fenimore Cooper1 weighed a great number of
shot some time after the war. The later cast-
ings, even, weighed nearly 5 per cent, less
than the British shot, and some of the older
ones, about 9 per cent. The average is safe
to take at 7 per cent, less, and I shall through-
out make this allowance for ocean cruisers.
The deficit was sometimes owing to windage,
but more often the shot was of full size but
defective in density. The effect of this can
be gathered from the following quotation from
the work of a British artillerist : " The greater
the density of shot of like calibres, projected
with equal velocity and elevation, the greater
the range, accuracy, and penetration."3 This
defectiveness in density might be a serious in-
jury in a contest at a long distance, but would
make but little difference at close quarters
(although it may have been partly owing to
their short weight that so many of the Chesa-
peake's shot failed to penetrate the Shannon's

1 See Naval History," i, p. 380.

a " Heavy Ordnance," Captain T. F. Simmons, R. A.,
London, 1837. James supposes that the " Yankee
captains " have in each case hunted round till they
could get particularly small American shot to weigh ;
and also denies that short weight is a disadvantage.
The last proposition carried out logically would lead
to some rather astonishing results.

104 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

hull). Thus in the actions with the Macedon-
ian and Java the American frigates showed
excellent practice when the contest was carried
on within fair distance, while their first broad-
sides at long range went very wild ; but in the
case of the Guertiere, the Constitution reserved
her fire for close quarters, and was probably
not at all affected by the short weight of her
shot.

As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun
frigate, the following was the regular comple-
ment established by law : 1

1 captain,

1 purser,

4 lieutenants,

1 surgeon,

2 lieutenants of marines,

2 surgeon's mates,

2 sailing-masters,

1 clerk,

2 master's mates,

1 carpenter,

7 midshipmen,

2 carpenter's mates,

1 boatswain,

1 cook,

2 boatswain's mates

1 chaplain.

1 yeoman of gun-room,

1 gunner,

5° ,

1 1 quarter gunners,

120 able seamen,

I coxswain,

150 ordinary seamen,

1 sailmaker,

30 boys,

1 cooper,

50 marines.

1 steward,

1 armorer,

400 in all.

1 master of arms,

An 18-gun ship had 32 officers and petty
officers, 30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen,
12 boys, and 20 marines — 140 in all. Some-
times ships put to sea without their full com-
plements (as in the case of the first Wasp),
but more often with supernumeraries aboard.
The weapons for close quarters were pikes,
cutlasses, and a few axes ; while the marines

1 See State Papers, vol. xiv, 159 (Washington, 1834).

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 105

and some of the topmen and muskets, and
occasionally rifles.

In comparing the forces of the contestants
I have always given the number of men in
crew ; but this in most cases was unnecessary.
When there were plenty of men to handle the
guns, trim the sails, make repairs, act as ma-
rines, etc., any additional number simply
served to increase the slaughter on board.
The Guerriere undoubtedly suffered from being
short-handed, but neither the Macedonian nor
Java would have been benefited by the pres-
ence of a hundred additional men. Barclay
possessed about as many men as Perry, but
this did not give him an equality of force.
The Penguin and Frolic would have been taken
just as surely had the Hornet and Wasp had
a dozen men less apiece than they did. The
principal case where numbers would help
would be in a hand-to-hand fight. Thus the
Chesapeake having fifty more men than the
Shannon ought to have been successful ; but
she was not, because the superiority of her
crew in numbers was more than counter-
balanced by the superiority of the Shannon's
crew in other respects. The result of the
battle of Lake Champlain, which was fought
at anchor, with the fleets too far apart for
musketry to reach, was not in the slightest
degree affected by the number of men on
either side, as both combatants had amply
enough to manage the guns and perform every
other service.

In all these conflicts the courage of both
parties is taken for granted ; it was not so
much a factor in gaining the victory, as one

lo6 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

which if lacking was fatal to all chances of
success. In the engagements between regular
cruisers, not a single one was gained by supe-
riority in courage. The crews of both the
Argus and Epervier certainly flinched ; but
had they fought never so bravely they were
too unskilful to win. The Chesapeake s crew
could hardly be said to lack courage ; it was
more that they were inferior to their opponents
in discipline as well as in skill.

There was but one conflict during the war
where the victory could be said to be owing
to superiority in pluck. This was when the
Neufchatel privateer beat off the boats of the
Endymion. The privateersmen suffered a
heavier proportional loss than their assailants,
and they gained the victory by sheer ability
to stand punishment.

For convenience in comparing them I give
in tabulated form the force of the three Brit-
ish 38's taken by American 44's (allowing for
short weight of metal of latter).

CONSTITUTION. GUERRIERE.

30 long 24's, 30 long 18's,

2 long 24's, 2 long 12's,

22 short 32's. 16 short 32's,

Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs.

short 18.

real, 684 lbs. Broadside, 556 lbs.

UNITED STATES. MACEDONIAN.

30 long 24's, 28 long 18's,

2 long 24's, 2 long 12's,

22 short 42's, 2 long o/s,

16 short 32's,
Broadside, nominal, 846 lbs. 1 short 18.

real, 786 lbs.

Broadside, 547 lbs.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 107

CONSTITUTION. JAVA.

30 long 24's, 28 long 18's,

2 long 24's, 2 long 12's,

20 short 32's. 18 short 32's,

1 short 24.

Broadside, nominal, 704 lbs.

real, 654 lbs. Broadside, 576 lbs.

The smallest line-of-battle ship, the 74,
with only long 18's on the second deck, was
armed as follows :

28 long 32's,
28 " 18's,

6 " 12's,
14 short 32's,

7 " 18's,

or a broadside of 1,032 lbs., 736 from long
guns, 296 from carronades ; while the Consti-
tution threw (in reality) 684 lbs., 356 from
long guns, and 328 from her carronades, and
the United States 102 lbs. more from her car-
ronades. Remembering the difference be-
tween long guns and carronades, and con-
sidering sixteen of the 74's long 18's as being
replaced by 42-pound carronades1 (so as to
get the metal on the ships distributed in
similar proportions between the two styles of
cannon), we get as the 74^ broadside 592
lbs. from long guns, and 632 from carronades.
The United States threw nominally 360 and

1 That this change would leave the force about as it
was, can be gathered from the fact that the Adams and
John Adams, both of which had been armed with 42-
pound carronades (which were sent to Sackett's Har-
bor), had them replaced by long and medium 18-
pounders, these being considered to be more formi-
dable ; so that the substitution of 42-pound carronades
would, if anything, reduce the force of the 74.

108 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

486, and the Constitution nominally 360 and
352 ; so the 74 was superior even to the
former nominally about as three is to two ;
while the Constitution, if "a line-of-battle
ship/' was disguised to such a degree that
she was in reality of but little more than one
half the force of one of the smallest true liners
England possessed 1

NAVAL WAR OF 18 12- 109

CHAPTER III.

1812.

ON THE OCEAN.

Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase
of the Betvidera— Cruise of the Essex — Captain Hull's
cruise, and escape from the squadron of Commodore
Broke — Constitution captures Guerriere — Wasp cap-
tures Frolic — Second unsuccessful cruise of Commo-
dore Rodgers — United States captures Macedonian —
Constitution captures Java — Essex starts on a cruise —
Summary.

AT the time of the declaration of war, June
18, 181 2, the American navy was but
partially prepared for effective service. The
Wasp, 18, was still at sea, on her return
voyage from France ; the Constellation, 38, was
lying in the Chesapeake river, unable to re-
receive a crew for several months to come ;
the Chesapeake, 38, was lying in a similar con-
dition in Boston harbor; the Adams, 28, was
at Washington, being cut down and length-
ened from a frigate into a corvette. These
three cruisers were none of them fit to go to
sea till after the end of the year. The Essex,
32, was in New York harbor, but, having some
repairs to make, was not yet ready to put out.
The Constitution, 44, was at Annapolis, with-
out all of her stores, and engaged in shipping
a new crew, the time of the old one being up.

no NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

The JS/autilus, 14, was cruising off New Jersey,
and the other small brigs were also off the
coast. The only vessels immediately avail-
able were those under the command of Com-
modore Rodgers, at New York, consisting of
his own ship, the President, 44, and of the
United States, 44, Commodore Decatur, Con-
gress, 38, Captain Smith, Hornet, 18, Captain
Lawrence, and Argus, 16, Lieut. Sinclair. It
seems marvellous that any nation should have
permitted its ships to be so scattered, and
many of them in such an unfit condition, at
the beginning of hostilities. The British
vessels cruising off the coast were not at that
time very numerous or formidable, consisting
of the Africa, 64, Acasta, 40, Shannon, 38,
Guerriere, 38, Belvidera, ^6,y^o/us, 32, South-
ampton, 32, and Minerva, 32, with a number
of corvettes and sloops ; their force was, how-
ever, strong enough to render it impossible
for Commodore Rodgers to make any attempt
on the coast towns of Canada or the West
Indies. But the homeward bound plate fleet
had sailed from Jamaica on May 20th, and
was only protected by the Thalia, 36, Capt.
Vashon, and Reindeer, 18, Capt. Manners.
Its capture or destruction would have been a
serious blow, and one which there seemed a
good chance of striking, as the fleet would
have to pass along the American coast, run-
ning with the Gulf Stream. Commodore
Rodgers had made every preparation, in ex-
pectation of war being declared, and an hour
after official intelligence of it, together with
his instructions, had been received, his squad-
ron put to sea, on June 21st, and ran off to-

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. in

ward the south-east ■ to get at the Jamaica
ships. Having learned from an American
brig that she had passed the plate fleet four
days before in lat. 360 N., long. 670 W., the
Commodore made all sail in that direction.
At 6 a. m. on June 23d a sail was made out in
the N. K, which proved to be the British fri-
gate Belvidera, 36, Capt. Richard Byron.2 The
latter had sighted some of Commodore Rod-
gers' squadron some time before, and stood
toward them, till at 6.30 she made out the
three largest ships to be frigates. Having
been informed of the likelihood of war by a
New York pilot boat, the Belvidera now stood
away, going N. E. by E., the wind being fresh
from the west. The Americans made all sail
in chase, the President, a very fast ship off
the wind, leading, and the Congress coming
next. At noon the President bore S. W., dis-
tant 2 3-4 miles from the Belvidera, Nan-
tucket shoals bearing 100 miles N. and 48
miles E.' The wind grew lighter, shifting
more toward the southwest, while the ships
continued steadily in their course, going N. E.
by E. As the President kept gaining, Captain
Byron cleared his ship for action, and shifted
to the stern ports two long eighteen pounders
on the main-deck and two thirty-two pound
carronades on the quarter-deck.

At 4.304 the President's starboard forecastle

1 Letter of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secre-
tary of the Navy, Sept. 1, 181 2,

2 Brenton, v. 46

8 Log of Belvidera, June 23, 181 2.

4 Cooper, ii, 151. According to James, vi, 117, the
President was then 600 yards distant from the Belvi-
Jera half a point on her weather or port quarter.

112 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

bow-gun was fired by Commodore Rodgers
himself ; the corresponding main-deck gun
was next discharged, and then Commodore
Rodgers fired again. These three shots all
struck the stern of the Belvidera, killing and
wounding nine men, — one of them went
through the rudder coat, into the after gun-
room, the other two into the captain's cabin.
A few more such shots would have rendered
the Belvidera's capture certain, but when the
Presidents main-deck gun was discharged for
the second time it burst, blowing up the fore-
castle deck and killing and wounding 16 men,
among them the Commodore himself, whose
leg was broken. This saved the British frig-
ate. Such an explosion always causes a
half panic, every gun being at once suspected.
In the midst of the confusion Captain Byron's
stern-chasers opened with spirit and effect,
killing or wounding six men more. Had the
President still pushed steadily on, only using
her bow-chasers until she closed abreast,
which she could probably have done, the Bel-
videra could still have been taken ; but, in-
stead, the former now bore up and fired her
port broadside, cutting her antagonist's rig-
ging slightly, but doing no other damage,
while the Belvidera kept up a brisk and gall-
ing fire, although the long bolts, breeching-
hooks, and breechings of the guns now broke
continually, wounding several of the men,
including Captain Byron. The President had
lost ground by yawing, but she soon regained
it, and, coming up closer than before, again
opened from her bow-chasers a well-directed
fire, which severely wounded her opponent's

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 113

main-top mast, cross- jack yard, and one or
two other spars ; ' but shortly afterward she
repeated her former tactics and again lost
ground by yawing to discharge another broad-
side, even more ineffectual than the first
Once more she came up closer than ever, and
once more yawed ; the single shots from her
bow-chasers doing considerable damage, but
her raking broadsides none.2 Meanwhile the
active crew of the Belvidera repaired every-
thing as fast as it was damaged, while under
the superintendence of Lieutenants Sykes,
Bruce, and Campbell, no less than 300 shot
were fired from her stern guns." Finding
that if the President ceased yawing she could
esslly run alongside, Captain Byron cut away
one bower, one stream, and two sheet an-
chors, the barge, yawl, gig, and jolly boat,
and started 14 tons of water. The effect of
this was at once apparent, and she began to
gain ; meanwhile the damage the sails of the
combatants had received had enabled the
Congress to close, and when abreast of his
consort Captain Smith opened with his bow-
chasers, but the shot fell short. The Belvi-
dera soon altered her course to east by south,
set her starboard studding-sails, and by mid-
night was out of danger ; and three days
afterward reached Halifax harbor.

Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on this
encounter seem very just. He says that the

1 James, vi, 119. He says the President was within
400 yards.

3 Lord Howard Douglass, " Naval Gunnery," p. 419
(third edition).

8 James, vi, 118.
8

114 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

President opened very well with her bow-
chasers (in fact the Americans seemed to have
aimed better and to have done more execu-
tion with these guns than the British with
their stern-chasers ; but that she lost so
much ground by yawing and delivering harm-
less broadsides as to enable her antagonist to
escape. Certainly if it had not been for the
time thus lost to no purpose, the Commodore
would have run alongside his opponent, and
the fate of the little 36 would have been sealed.
On the other hand it must be remembered
that it was only the bursting of the gun on
board the President, causing such direful con-
fusion and loss, and especially harmful in dis-
abling her commander, that gave the Belvi-
dera any chance of escape at all. At any
rate, whether the American frigate does, or
does not, deserve blame, Captain Byron and
his crew do most emphatically deserve praise
for the skill with which their guns were
served and repairs made, the coolness with
which measures to escape were adopted, and
the courage with which they resisted so supe-
rior a force. On this occasion Captain Byron
showed himself as good a seaman and as
brave a man as he subsequently proved a
humane and generous enemy when engaged
in the blockade of the Chesapeake.1

This was not a very auspicious opening of
hostilities for America. The loss of the Bel-

1 Even Niles, unscrupulously bitter as he is toward
the British, does justice to the humanity of Captains
Byron and Hardy — which certainly shone in compari-
son to some of the rather buccaneering exploits of
Cockburn's followers in Chesapeake Bay.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

videra was not the only thing to be regretted,
for the distance the chase took the pur-
suers out of their course probably saved the
plate fleet. When the Belvidera was first
made out, Commodore Rodgers was in lati-
tude 390 26' N., and longitude 710 10' W., at
noon the same day the Thalia and her
convoy were in latitude 390 N., longitude 620
W. Had they not chased the Belvidera the
Americans would probably have run across
the plate fleet.

The American squadron reached the west-
ern edge of the Newfoundland Banks on June
29th,1 and on July 1st, a little to the east of
the Banks, fell in with large quantities of
cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, etc., which
filled every one with great hopes of overtaking
the quarry. On July 9th, the Hornet captured
a British privateer, in latitude 450 30' N., and
longitude 230 W., and her master reported
that he had seen the Jamaica-men the pre-
vious evening ; but nothing further was heard
or seen of them, and on July 13th, being
within twenty hours' sail of the English Chan-
nel, Commodore Rodgers reluctantly turned
southward, reaching Madeira July 21st.
Thence he cruised toward the Azores and by
the Grand Banks home, there being consider-
able sickness on the ships. On August 31st
he reached Boston after a very unfortunate
cruise, in which he had made but seven prizes,
all merchant-men, and had recaptured one
American vessel.

On July 3d the Essex, 32, Captain David
Porter, put out of New York. As has been
1 Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 1st.

n6 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

already explained she was most inefficiently
armed, almost entirely with carronades. This
placed her at the mercy of any frigate with
long guns which could keep at a distance of a
few hundred yards ; but in spite of Captain
Porter's petitions and remonstrances he was
not allowed to change his armament. On the
nth of July at 2 a. M., latitude 330 N., long-
itude 66° W., the Essex fell in with the Mi-
nerva, 32, Captain Richard Hawkins, convoy-
ing seven transports, each containing about
200 troops, bound from Barbadoes to Quebec.
The convoy was sailing in open order, and,
there being a dull moon, the Essex ran in and
cut out transport No. 299, with 197 soldiers
aboard. Having taken out the soldiers, Cap-
tain Porter stood back to the convoy, expect-
ing Captain Hawkins to come out and fight
him ; but this the latter would not do, keep-
ing the convoy in close order around him.
The transports were all armed and still con-
tained in the aggregate 1,200 soldiers. As
the Essex could only fight at close quarters
these heavy odds rendered it hopeless for her
to try to cut out the Minerva. Her carron-
ades would have to be used at short range to
be effective, and it would of course have been
folly to run in right among the convoy, and
expose herself to the certainty of being
boarded by five times as many men as she
possessed. The Minerva had three less guns
a side, and on her spar-deck carried 24-pound
carronades instead of 32's, and, moreover,
had fifty men less than the Essex, which had
about 270 men this cruise ; on the other hand,
her main-deck was armed with long i2's, so

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 117

that it is hard to say whether she did right or
not in refusing to fight. She was of the same
force as the Southampton, whose captain, Sir
James Lucas Yeo, subsequently challenged
Porter, but never appointed a meeting-place.
In the event of a meeting, the advantage, in
ships of such radically different armaments,
would have been with that captain who suc-
ceeded in outmanoeuvring the other and in
making the fight come off at the distance best
suited to himself. At long range either the
Mi?ierva or Southampton would possess an
immense superiority ; but if Porter could have
contrived to run up within a couple of hundred
yards, or still better, to board, his superiority
in weight of metal and number of men would
have enabled him to carry either of them.
Porter's crew was better trained for boarding
than almost any other American commander's ;
and probably none of the British frigates on
the American station, except the Shannon and
Tenedos, would have stood a chance with the
Essex in a hand-to-hand struggle. Among
her youngest midshipmen was one, by name
David Glasgow Farragut, then but thirteen
years old, who afterward became the first and
greatest admiral of the United States. His
own words on this point will be read with in-
terest. " Every day," he says,1 " the crew
were exercised at the great guns, small arms,
and single stick. And I may here mention
the fact that I have never been on a ship
where the crew of the old Essex was repre-

1 " Life of Farragut " (embodying his journal and
letters), p. 31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York,
1879.

Il8 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

sented but that I found them to be the best
swordsmen on board. They had been so
thoroughly trained as boarders that every
man was prepared for such an emergency,
with his cutlass as sharp as a razor, a dirk
made by the ship's armorer out of a file, and
a pistol." '

On August 13th a sail was made out to
windward, which proved to be the British
ship-sloop Alert, 16, Captain T. L. O. Laug-
harne, carrying 20 eighteen-pound carronades
and 100 men.2 As soon as the JEssex dis-

1 James says : " Had Captain Porter really endeav-
ored to bring the Minerva to action we do not see
what could have prevented the Essex, with her supe-
riority of sailing, from coming alongside of her. But
no such thought, we are sure, entered into Captain
Porter's head." What "prevented the Essex" was
the Minerva's not venturing out of the convoy. Far-
ragut, in his journal, writes : " The captured British
officers were very anxious for us to have a fight with
the Minerva, as they considered her a good match for
the Essex, and Captain Porter replied that he should
gratify them with pleasure if his majesty's commander
was of their taste. So we stood toward the convoy and
when within gunshot hove to, and awaited the Minerva,
but she tacked and stood in among the convoy, to the
utter amazement of our prisoners, who denounced the
commander as a base coward, and expressed their
determination to report him to the Admiralty." An
incident of reported " flinching " like this is not worth
mentioning ; I allude to it only to show the value of
James' sneers.

2 James (History, vi, p. 128) says "86 men." In the
Naval Archives at Washington in the " Captains'
Letters" for 181 2 (vol. ii, No. 182) can be found en-
closed in Porter's letter the parole of the officers and
crew of the Alert signed by Captain Laugharne; it
contains either 100 or 101 names of the crew of the
Alert besides those of a number of other prisoners
sent back in the same cartel.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 119

covered the Alert she put out drags astern,
and led the enemy to believe she was trying
to escape by sending a few men aloft to shake
out the reefs and make sail. Concluding the
frigate to be a merchant-man, the Alert bore
down on her ; while the Americans went to
quarters and cleared for action, although the
tompions were left in the guns, and the ports
kept closed.1 The Alert fired a gun and the
Essex hove to, when the former passed under
her stern, and when on her lee quarter poured
in a broadside of grape and canister ; but the
sloop was so far abaft the frigate's beam that
her shot did not enter the ports and caused
no damage. Thereupon Porter put up his
helm and opened as soon as his guns would
bear, tompions and all. The Alert now dis-
covered her error and made off, but too late,
for in eight minutes the Essex was alongside,
and the Alert fired a musket and struck, three
men being wounded and several feet of water
in the hold. She was disarmed and sent as a
cartel into St. Johns. It has been the fashion
among American writers to speak of her as if
she were " unworthily " given up, but such an
accusation is entirely groundless. The Essex
was four times her force, and all that could
possibly be expected of her was to do as she
did — exchange broadsides and strike, having
suffered some loss and damage. The Essex
returned to New York on September 7th, hav-
ing made 10 prizes, containing 423 men.3

1 " Life of Farragut," p. 16.

2 Before entering New York the Essex fell in with
a British force which, in both Porter's and Farragut's
works, is said to have been composed of the Acasta

120 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

The JBelvidera, as has been stated, carried
the news of the war to Halifax. On July 5th
Vice-Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadron
to cruise against the United States, com*
manded by Philip Vere Broke, of the Shan*
no?i, 38, having under him the Belvidera, 36,
Captain Richard Byron, Africa, 64, Captain
John Bastard, and sEolus, 32, Captain Lord
James Townsend. On the 9th, while off Nan-
tucket, they were joined by the Guerriere, 38,
Captain James Richard Dacres. On the 16th
the squadron fell in with and captured the
United States brig Nautilus, 14, Lieutenant
Crane, which, like all the little brigs, was
overloaded with guns and men. She threw
her lee guns overboard and made use of every
expedient to escape, but to no purpose. At
3 p. m. of the following day, when the British
ships were abreast of Barnegat, about four
leagues off shore, a strange sail was seen and
immediately chased, in the south by east, or
windward quarter, standing to the northeast.
This was the United States frigate Constitu-
tion, 44, Captain Isaac Hull.1 When the war
broke out he was in the Chesapeake River

and Shannon, each of fifty guns, and Ringdove, of
twenty. James says it was the Shannon, accompanied
by a merchant vessel. It is not a point of much im-
portance, as nothing came of the meeting, and the
Shannon, alone, with her immensely superior armament,
ought to have been a match twice over for the Essex ;
although, if James is right, as seems probable, it gives
rather a comical turn to Porter's account of his " ex-
traordinary escape."

1 For the ensuing chase I have relied mainly on
Cooper ; see also " Memoir of Admiral Broke," p. 240 ;
James, vi, 133; and Marshall's "Naval Biography"
(London, 1825), ii, 625.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 121

getting a new crew aboard. Having shipped
over 450 men (counting officers), he put out
of harbor on the 12th of July. His crew was
entirely new, drafts of men coming on board
up to the last moment.1 On the 17th, at 2
p. m. , Hull discovered four sail, in the north-
ern board, heading to the westward. At 3,
the wind being very light, the Constitution
made sail and tacked, in 18^ fathoms. At 4,
in the N. E., a fifth sail appeared, which after-
ward proved to be the Guerrilre. The first
four ships bore N. N. W. , and were all on the
starboard tack; while by 6 o'clock the fifth
bore E. N. E. At 6. 15 the wind shifted and
blew lightly from the south, bringing the
American ship to windward. She then wore
round with her head to the eastward, set her
Jight studding-sails and stay-sails, and at 7.30
beat to action, intending to speak the nearest
vessel, the Guerrtire. The two frigates neared
one another gradually and at 10 the Constitu-
tion began making signals, which she continued
for over an hour. At 3.30 a. m. on the 18th
the Guerrtire, going gradually toward the Con-
stitution on the port tack, and but one half
mile distant, discovered on her lee beam the
Belvidera and the other British vessels, and
signalled to them. They did not answer the

1 In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy (" Captains'
Letters," 181 2, ii, No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the
way his men were arriving, says : "The crew areas vet
unacquainted with a ship of war, as many have but
lately joined and have never been on an armed ship
before. * * * We are doing all that we can to
make them acquainted with their duty, and in a few
days we shall have nothing to fear from any single-
decked ship."

122 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

signals, thinking she must know who they
were — a circumstance which afterward gave
rise to sharp recriminations among the cap-
tains— and Dacres, concluding them to be
Commodore Rodgers' squadron, tacked, and
then wore round and stood away from the
Constitution for some time before discovering
his mistake.

At 5 a. m. Hull had just enough steerage
way on to keep his head to the east, on the
starboard tack; on his lee quarter, bearing
N. E. by N., were the Belvidera and Gue?-riere
and astern the Shannon, sEolus, and Africa.
At 5.30 it fell entirely calm, and Hull put out
his boats to tow the ship, always going south-
ward. At the same time he whipped up a 24
from the main-deck, and got the forecastle-
chaser aft, cutting away the taffrail to give
the two guns more freedom to work in and
also running out, through the cabin windows,
two of the long main-deck 24's. The British
boats were towing also. At 6 a. m. a light
breeze sprang up, and the Constitution set
studding-sails and stay-sails ; the Shannon
opened at her with her bow guns, but ceased
when she found she could not reach her. At
6.30, the wind having died away, the Shan?ion
began to gain, almost all the boats of the
squadron towing her. Having sounded in 26
fathoms, Lieutenant Charles Morris suggested
to Hull to try kedging. All the spare rope
was bent on to the cables, payed out into the
cutters, and a kedge run out half a mile ahead
and let go; then the crew clapped on and
walked away with the ship, overrunning and
tripping the kedge as she came up with the

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 123

end of the line. Meanwhile, fresh lines and
another kedge were carried ahead, and the
frigate glided away from her pursuers. At
7.30 a. m. a little breeze sprang up, when the
Constitution set her ensign and fired a shot at
the Shannon. It soon fell calm again and the
Shannon neared. At 9.10 a light air from the
southward struck the ship, bringing her to
windward. As the breeze was seen coming,
her sails were trimmed, and as soon as she
obeyed her helm she was brought close up on
the port tack. The boats dropped in along-
side ; those that belonged to the davits were
run up, while the others were just lifted clear
of the water, by purchases on the spare spars,
stowed outboard, where they could be used
again at a minute's notice. Meanwhile, on
her lee beam the Guerriere opened fire ; but
her shot fell short, and the Americans paid
not the slightest heed to it. Soon it again fell
calm, when Hull had 2000 gallons of water
started, and again put out his boats to tow.
The Shannon, with some of the other boats of
the squadron helping her, gained on the Con-
stitution, but by severe exertion was again left
behind. Shortly afterward, a slight wind
springing up, the Belvidera gained on the
other British ships, and when it fell calm she
was nearer to the Constitution than any of her
consorts, their boats being put on to her.1 At

1 Cooper speaks as if this was the Shannon ; but
from Marshall's " Naval Biography " we learn that it
was the Belvidera. At other times he confuses the
Belvidera with the Guerriere. Captain Hull, of course,
could not accurately distinguish the names of his pur-
suers. My account is drawn from a careful comparison
of Marshall, Cooper, and James.

124 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

10.30, observing the benefit that the Constitu-
tion had derived from warping, Captain Byron
did the same, bending all his hawsers to one
another, and working two kedge anchors at
the same time by paying the warp out through
one hawse-hole as it was run in through the
other opposite. Having men from the other
frigates aboard, and a lighter ship to work,
Captain Byron, at 2 P. m., was near enough to
exchange bow- and stern-chasers with the Con-
stitution, out of range however. Hull expected
to be overtaken, and made every arrangement
to try in such case to disable the first frigate
before her consorts could close. But neither
the Belvidera nor the Shannon dared to tow
very near for fear of having their boats sunk
by the American's stern-chasers.

The Constitution's crew showed the most ex-
cellent spirit. Officers and men relieved each
other regularly, the former snatching their
rest any where on deck, the latter sleeping at
the guns. Gradually the Constitution drew
ahead, but the situation continued most critical.
All through the afternoon the British frigates
kept towing and kedging, being barely out of
gunshot. At 3 p. m. a light breeze sprung up,
and blew fitfully at intervals ; every puff was
watched closely and taken advantage of to the
utmost. At 7 in the evening the wind almost
died out, and for four more weary hours the
worn-out sailors towed and kedged. At 10.45
a little breeze struck the frigate, when the
boats dropped alongside and were hoisted up,
excepting the first cutter. Throughout the
night the wind continued very light, the Belvi-
dera forging ahead till she was off the Consti-

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 125

tution's lee beam ; and at 4 a. M. on the morn-
ing of the 19th, she tacked to the eastward,
the breeze being light from the south by east.
At 4.20 the Constitution tacked also ; and at
5.15 the Alolusy which had drawn ahead,
passed on the contrary tack. Soon afterward
the wind freshened so that Captain Hull took
in his cutter. The Africa was now so far to
leeward as to be almost out of the race ; while
the five frigates were all running on the star-
board tack with every stitch of canvas set. At
9 a. m. an American merchant-man hove in
sight and bore down toward the squadron.
The Belvidera, by way of decoy, hoisted
American colors, when the Constitution hoisted
the British flag, and the merchant vessel
hauled off. The breeze continued light till
noon, when Hull found he had dropped the
British frigates well behind ; the nearest was
the Belvidera, exactly in his wake, bearing W.
N. W. 2% miles distant. The Shannon was
on his lee, bearing N. by W. Yz W. distant $%
miles. The other two frigates were five miles
off on the lee quarter. Soon afterward the
breeze freshened, and "old Ironsides" drew
slowly ahead from her foes, her sails being
watched and tended with the most consum-
mate skill. At 4 p. m. the breeze again light-
ened, but even the Belvidera was now four
miles astern and to leeward. At 6.45 there
were indications of a heavy rain squall, which
once more permitted Hull to show that in sea-
manship he excelled even the able captains
against whom he was pitted. The crew were
stationed and everything kept fast till the last
minute, when all was clewed up just before

126 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

the squall struck the ship. The light canvas
was furled, a second reef taken in the mizzen
top-sail, and the ship almost instantly brought
under short sail. The British vessels seeing
this began to let go and haul down without
waiting for the wind, and were steering on
different tacks when the first gust struck them.
But Hull as soon as he got the weight of the
wind sheeted home, hoisted his fore and main-
top gallant sails, and went off on an easy bow-
line at the rate of n knots. At 7.40 sight
was again obtained of the enemy, the squall
having passed to leeward ; the Belvidera, the
nearest vessel, had altered her bearings two
points to leeward, and was a long way astern.
Next came the Shannon; the Guerriere and
JEolus were hull down, and the Africa barely
visible. The wind now kept light, shifting
occasionally in a very baffling manner, but the
Constitution gained steadily, wetting her sails
from the sky-sails to the courses. At 6 a. m.
on the morning of the 20th the pursuers were
almost out of sight; and at 8.15 a. m. they
abandoned the chase. Hull at once stopped
to investigate the character of two strange
vessels, but found them to be only Americans ;
then, at midday, he stood toward the east,
and went into Boston on July 26th.

In this chase Captain Isaac Hull was
matched against five British captains, two of
whom, Broke and Byron, were fully equal to
any in their navy ; and while the latter showed
great perseverance, good seamanship, and
ready imitation, there can be no doubt that
the palm in every way belongs to the cool old
Yankee. Every daring expedient known to

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 127

the most perfect seamanship was tried, and
tried with success ; and no victorious fight
could reflect more credit on the part of the
conqueror than this three days' chase did on
Hull. Later, on two occasions, the Constitu-
tion proved herself far superior in gunnery to
the average British frigate; this time her
officers and men showed that they could han-
dle the sails as well as they could the guns.
Hull out-manoeuvred Broke and Byron as
cleverly as a month later he out-fought Dacres.
His successful escape and victorious fight
were both performed in a way that place him
above any single ship captain of the war.

On Aug. 2d the Constitution made sail from
Boston ' and stood to the eastward, in hopes
of falling in with some of the British cruisers.
She was unsuccessful, however, and met noth-
ing. Then she ran down to the Bay of Fundy,
steered along the coast of Nova Scotia, and
thence toward Newfoundland, and finally took
her station off Cape Race in the Gulf of St.
Lawrence, where she took and burned two
brigs of little value. On the 15th she recap-
tured an American brig from the British ship-
sloop Avenger, though the latter escaped ;
Capt. Hull manned his prize and sent her in.
He then sailed southward, and on the night
of the 18th spoke a Salem privateer which
gave him news of a British frigate to the
south; thither he stood, and at 2 p. m. on the
19th, in lat. 41 ° 30' N. and 550 W., made out
a large sail bearing E. S. E. and to leeward,*
which proved to be his old acquaintance, the

1 Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 28, 18 12.

2 Do., Aug. 30th.

128 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

frigate Guerrzere, Captain Dacres. It was a
cloudy day and the wind was blowing fresh
from the northwest. The Guerriere was stand-
ing by the wind on the starboard tack, under
easy canvas ; * she hauled up her courses,
took in her top-gallant sails, and at 4.30
backed her main-top sail. Hull then very de-
liberately began to shorten sail, taking in top-
gallant sails, stay-sails, and flying-jib, sending
down the royal yards and putting another reef
in the top-sails. Soon the Englishman hoisted
three ensigns, when the American also set his
colors, one at each mast-head, and one at the
mizzen peak.

The Constitution now ran down with the
wind nearly aft. The Guerriere was on the
starboard tack, and at five o'clock opened with
her weather-guns,2 the shot falling short, then
wore round and fired her port broadside, of
which two shots struck her opponent, the rest
passing over and through her rigging.3 As
the British frigate again wore to open with
her starboard battery, the Constitution yawed
a little and fired two or three of her port bow-
guns. Three or four times the Guerriere
repeated this manoeuvre, wearing and firing

1 Letter of Capt. James R. Dacres, Sept. 7, 1812.

2 Log of Guerriere.

3 See in the Naval Archives (Bureau of Navigation)
the Constitution's Log-Book (vol. ii, from Feb. I, 18 12,
to Dec. 13, 18 1 3). The point is of some little impor-
tance because Hull, in his letter, speaks as if both the
first broadsides fell short, whereas the log distinctly
says that the second went over the ship, except two
shot, which came home. The hypothesis of the
Guerriere having damaged powder was founded purely
on this supposed falling short of the first two broad-
sides.

NAVAL WAR OF iZ\2. 129

alternate broadsides, but with little or no
effect, while the Constitution yawed as often to
avoid being raked, and occasionally fired one
of her bow guns. This continued nearly an
hour, as the vessels were very far apart when
the action began, hardly any loss or damage
being inflicted by either party. At 6.00 the
Guerriere bore up and ran off under her top-
sails and jib, with the wind almost astern, a
little on her port quarter ; when the Constitution
set her main-top gallant sail and foresail, and
at 6. 05 closed within half pistol-shot distance
on her adversary's port beam.1 Immediately
a furious cannonade opened, each ship firing
as the guns bore. By the time the ships were
fairly abreast, at 6.20, the Constitution shot
away the Guerriere's mizzen-mast, which fell
over the starboard quarter, knocking a large
hole in the counter, and bringing the ship
round against her helm. Hitherto she had
suffered very greatly and the Constitution
hardly at all. The latter, finding that she was
ranging ahead, put her helm aport and then
luffed short round her enemy's bows,a deliver-
ing a heavy raking fire with the starboard guns
and shooting away the Guerriere's main-yard.
Then she wore and again passed her adver-
sary's bows, raking with her port guns. The
mizzen-mast of the Guerriere, dragging in the
water, had by this time pulled her bow round
till the wind came on her starboard quarter ;
and so near were two ships that the English-
man's bowsprit passed diagonally over the

1 " Autobiography of Commodore Morris " (Annapo-
lis, 1880), p. 164.

2 Log of Constitution.

130 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Constitution's quarter-deck, and as the latter
ship fell off it got foul of her mizzen-rigging,
and the vessels then lay with the Guerriere's
starboard-bow against the Constitution's port,
or lee quarter-gallery.1 The Englishman's
bow guns played havoc with Captain Hull's
cabin, setting fire to it ; but the flames were
soon extinguished by Lieutenant Hoffmann.
On both sides the boarders were called away ;
the British ran forward, but Captain Dacres
relinquished the idea of attacking 2 when he
saw the crowds of men on the American's
decks. Meanwhile, on the Constitution, the
boarders and marines gathered aft, but such a
heavy sea was running that they could not get
on the Guerriere. Both sides suffered heavily
from the closeness of the musketry fire ;
indeed, almost the entire loss on the Constitu-
tion occurred at this juncture. As Lieutenant
Bush, of the marines, sprang upon the taffrail
to leap on the enemy's decks, a British marine
shot him dead ; Mr. Morris, the first Lieuten-
ant, and Mr. Alwyn, the master, had also both
leaped on the taffrail, and both were at the
same moment wounded by the musketry fire.
On the Guerriere the loss was far heavier,
almost all the men on the forecastle being
picked off. Captain Dacres himself was shot
in the back and severely wounded by one of
the American mizzen topmen, while he was
standing on the starboard forecastle ham-
mocks cheering on his crew ; s two of the lieu-

1 Cooper, in Putnam's Magazine, i, 475.

2 Address of Captain Dacres to the court-martial at
Halifax.

3 James, vi, 144.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 131

tenants and the master were also shot down.
The ships gradually worked round till the
wind was again on the port quarter, when they
separated, and the Guer Hire's foremast and
main-mast at once went by the board, and fell
over on the starboard side, leaving her a
defenceless hulk, rolling her main-deck guns
into the water.1 At 6.30 the Constitution
hauled aboard her tacks, ran off a little distance
to the eastward, and lay to. Her braces and
standing and running rigging were much cut
up and some of the spars wounded, but a few
minutes sufficed to repair damages, when
Captain Hull stood under his adversary's lee,
and the latter at once struck, at 7.00 p.m.,2 just
two hours after she had fired the first shot.
On the part of the Constitution, however, the
actual fighting, exclusive of six or eight guns
fired during the first hour, while closing,
occupied less than 30 minutes.

The tonnage and metal of the combatants
have already been referred to. The Constitu-
tion had, as already said, about 456 men
aboard, while of the Guerriere's crew, 267
prisoners were received aboard the Constitu-
tion ; deducting 10 who were Americans and
would not fight, and adding the 15 killed out-
right, we get 272 ; 28 men were absent in
prizes.

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Compara-
Broad- Compara- tive loss

Tons. Guns. side. Men. Loss, tive I orce. Inflicted.
Constitution 1576 27 684 456 14 1.00 1.00

Cuerriirt 1338 25 556 272 79 .70 .18

The loss of the Constitution included Lieu-
iBrenton, v, 51. 2Log of the Constitution.

132 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

tenant William S. Bush, of the marines, and
six seamen killed, and her first lieutenant,
Charles Morris, Master, John C. Alwyn, four
seamen, and one marine, wounded. Total,
seven killed and seven wounded. Almost all
this loss occurred when the ships came foul,
and was due to the Guerrure's musketry and
the two guns in her bridle-ports.

The Guerriere lost 23 killed and mortally
wounded, including her second lieutenant,
Henry Ready, and 56 wounded severely and
slightly, including Captain Dacres himself, the
first lieutenant, Bartholomew Kent, Master,
Robert Scott, two master's mates, and one
midshipman.

The third lieutenant of the Constitution, Mr.
George Campbell Read, was sent on board
the prize, and the Constitution remained by
her during the night ; but at daylight it was
found that she was in danger of sinking.
Captain Hull at once began removing the
prisoners, and at three o'clock in the afternoon
set the Guerriere on fire, and in a quarter of an
hour she blew up. He then set sail for Bos-
ton, where he arrived on August 30th. " Cap-
tain Hull and his officers," writes Captain
Dacres in his official letter, " have treated us
like brave and generous enemies ; the greatest
care has been taken that we should not lose
the smallest trifle."

The British laid very great stress on the
rotten and decayed condition of the Guerriere ;
mentioning in particular that the main-mast
fell solely because of the weight of the falling
foremast. But it must be remembered that
until the action occurred she was considered
a very fine ship. Thus, in Brighton's " Me-

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

*33

CONSTITUTION

This diagram is taken from Commo-
dore Morris' autobiography and the
log of the Guerrihre; the official
accounts apparently consider "lar-
board" and "starboard" aa inter-
changeable terms.

630

134 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

moir of Admiral Broke," it is declared that
Dacres freely expressed the opinion that she
could take a ship in half the time the Shan?ion
could. The fall of the main-mast occurred
when the fight was practically over ; it had no
influence whatever on the conflict. It was
also asserted that her powder was bad, but on
no authority ; her first broadside fell short,
but so, under similar circumstances, did the
first broadside of the United States. None of
these causes account for the fact that her shot
did not hit. Her opponent was of such su-
perior force — nearly in the proportion of 3 to
2 — that success would have been very difficult
in any event, and no one can doubt the gal-
lantry and pluck with which the British ship
was fought ; but the execution was very
greatly disproportioned to the force. The
gunnery of the Guerriere was very poor, and
that of the Constitution excellent ; during the
few minutes the ships were yard-arm and
yard-arm, the latter was not hulled once,
while no less than 30 shot took effect on the
former's engaged side,1 five sheets of copper
beneath the bends. The Guerriere, moreover,
was out-manceuvred ; " in wearing several
times and exchanging broadsides in such rapid
and continual changes of position, her fire was
much more harmless than it would have been
if she had kept more steady." 2 The Consti-
tution was handled faultlessly ; Captain Hull
displayed the coolness and skill of a veteran
in the way in which he managed, first to avoid
being raked, and then to improve the advan-

1 Captain Dacres' address to the couit-martial.

2 Lord Howard Douglass' " Treatise on Naval Gun-
nery " (London 1851), p. 454

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 135

tage which the precision and rapidity of his
fire had gained. " After making every allow-
ance claimed by the enemy, the character of
this victory is not essentially altered. Its
peculiarities were a fine display of seamanship
in the approach, extraordinary efficiency in
the attack, and great readiness in repairing
damages ; all of which denote cool and cap-
able officers, with an expert and trained crew ;
in a word, a disciplined man-of-war." ' The
disparity of force, 10 to 7, is not enough to
account for the disparity of execution, 10 to 2.
Of course, something must be allowed for the
decayed state of the Englishman's masts, al-
though I really do not think it had any influ-
ence on the battle, for he was beaten when
the main-mast fell ; and it must be remem-
bered, on the other hand, that the American
crew was absolutely new, while the Guerriere
was manned by old hands. So that, while
admitting and admiring the gallantry, and, on
the whole, the seamanship, of Captain Dacres
and his crew, and acknowledging that he
fought at a great disadvantage, especially in
being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge
that the combat showed a marked superiority,
particularly in gunnery, on the part of the
Americans. Had the ships not come foul,
Captain Hull would probably not have lost
more than" three or four men ; as it was, he
suffered but slightly. That the Guerritrev/as
not so weak as she was represented to be can
be gathered from the fact that she mounted
two more main-deck guns than the rest of her
class; thus carrying on her main-deck 30 long
18-pounders in battery to oppose to the 30 long
1 Cooper, ii, 173.

136 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

24's, or rather (allowing for the short weight
of shot) long 22's, of the Constitution. Char-
acteristically enough, James, though he care-
fully reckons in the long bow-chasers in the
bridle-ports of the Argus and Enterprise, yet
refuses to count the two long eighteens
mounted through the bridle-ports on the
Guerriere's main-deck. Now, as it turned
out, these two bow guns were used very effect-
ively, when the ships got foul, and caused
more damage and loss than all of the other
main-deck guns put together.

Captain Dacres, very much to his credit,
allowed the ten Americans on board to go be-
low, so as not to fight against their flag ; and
in his address to the court-martial mentions,
among the reasons for his defeat, " that he
was very much weakened by permitting the
Americans on board to quit their quarters."
Coupling this with the assertion made by
James and most other British writers that the
Constitution was largely manned by English-
men, we reach the somewhat remarkable con-
clusion, that the British ship was defeated
because the Americans on board would not
fight against their country, and that the Amer-
ican was victorious because the British on
board would. However, as I have shown, in
reality there were probably not a score of
British on board the Constitution.

In this, as well as the two succeeding frig-
ate actions, every one must admit that there
was a great superiority in force on the side of
the victors, and British historians have in-
sisted that this superiority was so great as to
preclude any hopes of a successful resistance.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 137

That this was not true, and that the disparity
between the combatants was not as great as
had been the case in a number of encounters
in which English frigates had taken French
ones, can be best shown by a few accounts
taken from the French historian Troude, who
would certainly not exaggerate the difference.
Thus on March 1, 1799, the English 38-gun
18-pounder frigate Sybil, captured the French
44-gun 24-pounder frigate Forte, after an ac-
tion of two hours and ten minutes.1 In actual
weight the shot thrown by one of the main-
deck guns of the defeated Forte was over six
pounds heavier than the shot thrown by one
of the main-deck guns of the victorious Con-
stitution or United States*

There are later examples than this. But a
very few years before the declaration of war
by the United States, and in the same struggle
that was then still raging, there had been at
least two victories gained by English frigates
over French foes as superior to themselves as
the American 44^ were to the British ships they
captured. On Aug. 10, 1805, the P/icenix, 36,
captured the Didon, 40, after 3^ hours' fight-
ing, the comparative broadside force being : *

PHOZNIX.

I3XI3

2X 9

6X32

DIDOX.

I4Xl8
2X 8
7X36

21 guns, 444 lbs.
"Batailles Navales

23 guns, 522 lbs.
(nominal ; about
600, real).
France." O. Troude

(Paris, 1868), iv, 171.
3 See Appendix B, for actual weight of French shot.
« Ibid., iii, 425.

138 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

On March 8, 1808, the San F/orenzo, 36,
captured the Piedmontaise, 40, the force being
exactly what it was in the case of the Phoenix
and Didon.x Comparing the real, not the
nominal, weight of metal, we find that the
Didon and Piedmontaise were proportionately
of greater force compared to the Phoenix and
San Florenzo, than the Constitution was com-
pared to the Guerriere or Java. The French
i8's threw each a shot weighing but about
two pounds less than that thrown by an
American 24 of 1812, while their 36-pound
carronades each threw a shot over 10 pounds
heavier than that thrown by one of the Con-
stitution's spar-deck 32's.

That a 24-pounder cannot always whip an
18-pounder frigate is shown by the action of
the British frigate Eurotas with the French
frigate Chlorinde, on Feb. 25, 181 4.* The
first with a crew of 329 men threw 625 pounds
of shot at a broadside, the latter carrying 344
men and throwing 463 pounds ; yet the re-
sult was indecisive. The French lost 90 and
the British 60 men. The action showed that
heavy metal was not of much use unless used
well.

To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's
victory caused in the United States, and the
intense annoyance it created in England, it
must be remembered that during the past
twenty years the Island Power" had been at
war with almost every state in Europe, at one
time or another, and in the course of about
two hundred single conflicts between ships of

1 " Batailles Navales de la France," iii, 199.

2 James, vi, 391.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 139

approximately equal force (that is, where the
difference was less than one-half), waged
against French, Spanish, Italian, Turkish,
Algerine, Russian, Danish, and Dutch an-
tagonists, her ships had been beaten and cap-
tured in but five instances. Then war broke
out with America, and in eight months five
single-ship actions occurred, in every one of
which the British vessel was captured.

Even had the victories been due solely to
superior force this would have been no mean
triumph for the United States.

On October 13, 18 12, the American 18-gun
ship-sloop IVasp, Captain Jacob Jones, with
137 men aboard, sailed from the Delaware
and ran off south-east to get into the track of
the West India vessels ; on the 16th a heavy
gale began to blow, causing the loss of the
jib-boom and two men who were on it. The
next day the weather moderated somewhat,
and at 11.30 p. m., in latitude 370 N., longi-
tude 650 W., several sail were descried.1
These were part of a convoy of 14 merchant-
men which had quitted the bay of Honduras on
September 12th, bound for England," under the
convoy of the British 18-gun brig-sloop Frolic,
of 19 guns and no men, Captain Thomas
Whinyates. They had been dispersed by the
gale of the 16th, during which the Frolics
main-yard was carried away and both her
top-sails torn to pieces ; * next day she spent
in repairing damages, and by dark six of the
missing ships had joined her. The day broke

1 Capt. Jones' official letter, Nov. 24, 181 2.

2 James' History, vi, 158.

* Capt. Whinyates' official letter, Oct. 18, 181 2.

140 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

almost cloudless on the 18th (Sunday), show-
ing the convoy, ahead and to leeward of the
American ship, still some distance off, as
Captain Jones had not thought it prudent to
close during the night, while he was ignorant
of the force of his antagonists. The Wasp
now sent down her top-gallant yards, close
reefed her top-sails, and bore down under
short fighting canvas ; while the Frolic re-
moved her main-yard from the casks, lashed
it on deck, and then hauled to the wind under
her boom main-sail and close-reefed foretop-
sail, hoisting Spanish colors to decoy the
stranger under her guns, and permit the con-
voy to escape. At 11.32 the action began —
the two ships running parallel on the star-
board tack, not 60 yards apart, the Wasp
firing her port, and the Frolic her starboard
guns. The latter fired very rapidly, deliver-
ing three broadsides to the Wasp's two,1 both
crews cheering loudly as the ships wallowed
through the water. There was a very heavy
sea running, which caused the vessels to pitch
and roll heavily. The Americans fired as the
engaged side of their ship was going down,
aiming at their opponent's hull ; * while the
British delivered their broadsides while on
the crests of the seas, the shot going high.
The water dashed in clouds of spray over
both crews, and the vessels rolled so that the
muzzles of the guns went under.3 But in
spite of the rough weather, the firing was not
only spirited but well directed. At 11.36 the
Wasp's maintop-mast was shot away and fell,

j 1 Cooper, 182. 2 Niles' Register, iii, p. 324. 8 Do.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 14.1

with its yard, across the port fore and foretop-
sail braces, rendering the head yards unman-
ageable ; at 11.46 the gaff and mizzentop-
gallant mast came down, and by 11.52 every
brace and most of the rigging was shot away.1
It would now have been very difficult to brace
any of the yards. But meanwhile the Frolic
suffered dreadfully in her hull and lower
masts, and had her gaff and head braces shot
away.* The slaughter among her crew was
very great, but the survivors kept at their
work with the dogged courage of their race.
At first the two vessels ran side by side, but
the American gradually forged ahead, throw-
ing in her fire from a position in which she her-
self received little injury ; by degrees the ves-
sels got so close that the Americans struck the
Frolic's side with her rammers in loading,* and
the British brig was raked with dreadful effect.
The Frolic then fell aboard her antagonist,
her jib-boom coming in between the main
and mizzen-rigging of the Wasp and passing
over the heads of Captain Jones and Lieutenant
Biddle, who were standing near the capstan.
This forced the Wasp up in the wind, and
she again raked her antagonist, Captain Jones
trying to restrain his men from boarding till
he could put in another broadside. But they
could no longer be held back, and Jack Lang,
a New Jersey seaman, leaped on the Frolic's
bowsprit. Lieutenant Biddle then mounted
on the hammock cloth to board, but his feet
got entangled in the rigging, and one of the
midshipmen seizing his coat-tails to help him-

1 Capt. Jones' letter. 2 Capt. Whinyates' letter.
8 Capt. Jones' letter.

i42 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

self up, the lieutenant tumbled back on the
deck. At the next swell he succeeded in
getting on the bowsprit, on which there were
already two seamen whom he passed on the
forecastle. But there was no one to oppose
him ; not twenty Englishmen were left un-
hurt.1 The man at the wheel was still at his
post, grim and undaunted, and two or three
more were on deck, including Captain Whin-
yates and Lieutenant Wintle, both so severely
wounded that they could not stand without
support.2 There could be no more resistance,
and Lieutenant Biddle lowered the flag at
12.15 — Just 43 minutes after the beginning
of the fight.3 A minute or two afterward both
the Frolic's masts went by the board — the
foremast about fifteen feet above the deck,
the other short off. Of her crew, as already
said, not twenty men had escaped unhurt.
Every officer was wounded ; two of them, the
first lieutenant, Charles McKay, and master,
John Stephens, soon died. Her total loss
was thus over 90 ; 4 about 30 of whom were
killed outright or died later. The Wasp suf-
fered very severely in her rigging and aloft
generally, but only two or three shots struck
her hull ; five of her men were killed — two in
her mizzen-top and one in her maintop-mast
rigging — and five wounded,6 chiefly while aloft.
The two vessels were practically of equal

1 Capt. Whinyates' letter.

2 James, vi, 161.

3 Capt. Jones' letter.

4 Capt. Whinyates' official letter thus states it, and
is, of course, to be taken as authority ; the Bermuda
account makes it 69, and James only 62.

5 Capt. Jones' letter.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

!43

force. The loss of the Frolic's main-yard had
merely converted her into a brigantine, and,
as the roughness of the sea made it necessary
to fight under very short canvas, her inferior-
ity in men was fully compensated for by her
superiority in metal. She had been desper-
ately defended ; no men could have fought
more bravely than Captain Whinyates and
his crew. On the other hand, the Americans

DIAGRAM.1

WASP

now

1 It is difficult to reconcile the accounts of the ma-
noeuvres in this action. James says " larboard " where
Cooper says " starboard " ; one says the Wasp wore,
the other says that she could not do so, etc.

144 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

had done their work with a coolness and skill
that could not be surpassed ; the contest had
been mainly one of gunnery, and had been
decided by the greatly superior judgment and
accuracy with which they fired. Both officers
and crew had behaved well ; Captain Jones
particularly mentions Lieutenant Claxton,
who, though too ill to be of any service, per-
sisted in remaining on deck throughout the
engagement.

The Wasp was armed with 2 long 12's and
16 3 2 -pound carronades ; the Frolic with 2
long 6's, 16 32-pound carronades, and 1 shift-
ing 12-pound carronade.

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Tons. No. Guns. Weight Metal. Grews Loss.
Wasp 450 9 250 135 10

Frolic 467 10 274 no 90

Vice- Admiral Jurien de la Graviere com-
ments on this action as follows \ :

" The American fire showed itself to be as
accurate as it was rapid. On occasions when
the roughness of the sea would seem to render
all aim excessively uncertain, the effects of
their artillery were not less murderous than
under more advantageous conditions. The
corvette Wasp fought the brig Frolic in an
enormous sea, under very short canvas, and
yet, forty minutes after the beginning of the
action, when the two vessels came together,
the Americans who leaped aboard the brig
found on the deck, covered with dead and

1 " Guerres Maritimes," ii, 287 (Septieme Edition,
Paris, 1881).

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 145

dying, but one brave man, who had not left
the wheel, and three officers, all wounded,
who threw down their swords at the feet of
the victors." Admiral de la Graviere's criti-
cisms are especially valuable, because they
are those of an expert, who only refers to the
war of 18 1 2 in order to apply to the French
navy the lessons which it teaches, and who is
perfectly unprejudiced. He cares for the
lesson taught, not the teacher, and is quite as
willing to learn from the defeat of the Chesa-
peake as from the victories of the Constitution
— while most American critics only pay heed
to the latter.

The characteristics of the action are the
practical equality of the contestants in point
of force and the enormous disparity in the
damage each suffered ; numerically, the Wasp
was superior by 5 per cent., and inflicted a
ninefold greater loss.

Captain Jones was not destined to bring
his prize into port, for a few hours afterward
the Poictiers, a British 74, Captain John Poer
Beresford, hove in sight. Now appeared the
value of the Frolics desperate defence ; if
she could not prevent herself from being cap-
tured, she had at least ensured her own re-
capture, and also the capture of the foe.
When the Wasp shook out her sails they
were found to be cut into ribbons aloft, and
she could not make off with sufficient speed.
As the Poictiers passed the Frolic, rolling like
a log in the water, she threw a shot over her,
and soon overtook the Wasp. Both vessels
were carried into Bermuda. Captain Whin-
yates was again put in command of the Frolic.
10

146 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

•

Captain Jones and his men were soon ex-
changed; 25,000 dollars prize-money was
voted them by Congress, and the Captain and
Lieutenant Biddle were both promoted, the
former receiving the captured ship Macedonian.
Unluckily the blockade was too close for him
to succeed in getting out during the remainder
of the war.

On Oct. 8th Commodore Rodgers left
Boston on his second cruise, with the Pres-
ident, United States, Congress, and Argus,1
leaving the Hornet in port. Four days out,
the United States and Argus separated, while
the remaining two frigates continued their
cruise together. The Argus? Captain Sinclair,
cruised to the eastward, making prizes of 6
valuable merchant-men, and returned to port
on January 3d. During the cruise she was
chased for three days and three nights (the
latter being moonlight) by a British squadron,
and was obliged to cut away her boats and
anchors and start some of her water. But she
saved her guns, and was so cleverly handled
that during the chase she actually succeeded
in taking and manning a prize, though the
enemy got near enough to open fire as the
vessels separated. Before relating what be-
fell the United States, we shall bring Commo-
dore Rodgers* cruise to an end.

On Oct. 10th the Commodore chased, but
failed to overtake, the British frigate Nymphe,
38, Captain Ep worth. On the 18th, off the
great Bank of Newfoundland, he captured the
Jamaica packet Swallow, homeward bound,

1 Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Jan. 1, 1813.
i 2 Letter of Capt. Arthur Sinclair, Jan. 4, 1813.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

147

with 200,000 dollars in specie aboard. On
the 31st. at 9 a. m., lat. 330 N., long. 32*
W., his two frigates fell in with the British
frigate Galatea, 36, Captain Woodley Losack,
convoying two South Sea ships, to windward.
The Galatea ran down to reconnoitre, and at
10 a. m., recognizing her foes, hauled up on
the starboard tack to escape. The American
frigates made all sail in chase, and continued
beating to windward, tacking several times,
for about three hours. Seeing that she was
being overhauled, the Galatea now edged away
to get on her best point of sailing; at the
same moment one of her convoy, the Argo,
bore up to cross the hawse of her foes, but
was intercepted by the Congress, who lay to
to secure her. Meanwhile the President kept
after the Galatea ; she set her top-mast, top-
gallant mast and lower studding-sails, and
when it was dusk had gained greatly upon her.
But the night was very dark, the President lost
sight of the chase, and, toward midnight,
hauled to the wind to rejoin her consort.
The two frigates cruised to the east as far as
220 W., and then ran down to 170 N. ; but
during the month of November they did not
see a sail. They had but slightly better luck
on their return toward home. Passing 120
miles north of Bermuda, and cruising a little
while toward the Virginia capes, they re-
entered Boston on Dec. 31st, having made
9 prizes, most of them of little value.

When four days out, on Oct. 12th, Com-
modore Decatur had separated from the rest
of Rodgers' squadron and cruised east ; on
the 25th, in lat. 290 N., and long. 290 30', W.

148 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

while going close-hauled on the port tack,
with the wind fresh from the S. S. E., a sail
was descried on the weather beam, about 12
miles distant.1 This was the British 38-gun
frigate Macedonian, Captain John Surnam
Carden. She was not, like the Guerriere, an
old ship captured from the French, but newly
built of oak, and larger than any American
18-pounder frigate ; she was reputed (very
wrongfully) to be a " crack ship." According
to Lieut. David Hope, " the state of discipline
on board was excellent; in no British ship
was more attention paid to gunnery. Before
this cruise the ship had been engaged almost
every day with the enemy ; and in time of
peace the crew were constantly exercised at
the great guns."2 How they could have
practised so much and learned so little is
certainly marvellous.

The Macedonian set her foretop-mast and
top-gallant studding-sails and bore away in
chase,8 edging down with the wind a little aft
the starboard beam. Her first lieutenant
wished to continue on this course and pass
down ahead of the United States* but Captain
Carden's over-anxiety to keep the weather-
gage lost him this opportunity of closing.5
Accordingly he hauled by the wind and passed
way to windward of the American. As Com-
modore Decatur got within range, he eased

1 Official letter of Commodore Decatur, Oct. 30, 181 2.

2 Marshall's "Naval Biography," vol. iv, p. 1018.
8 Capt. Carden to Mr. Croker, Oct. 28, 181 2.

4 James, vi, 166.

6 Sentence of Court-martial held on the San Domingo,
74, at the Bermudas, May 27, 1812.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 149

off and fired a broadside, most of which- fell
short ; * he then kept his luff, and, the next
time he fired, his long 24's told heavily, while
he received very little injury himself.3 The
fire from his main-deck (for he did not use
his carronades at all for the first half-hour) '
was so very rapid that it seemed as if the ship
was on fire ; his broadsides were delivered
with almost twice the rapidity of those of the
Englishman.4 The latter soon found he could
not play at long bowls with any chance of
success ; and, having already erred either
from timidity or bad judgment, Captain Car-
den decided to add rashness to the catalogue
of his virtues. Accordingly he bore up, and
came down end on toward his adversary, with
the wind on his port quarter. The States
now (10.15) k^d her main-topsail aback and
made heavy play with her long guns, and, as
her adversary came nearer, with her carron-
ades also. The British ship would reply with
her starboard guns, hauling up to do so ; as
she came down, the American would ease off,
run a little way and again come to, keeping
up a terrific fire. As the Macedonian bore
down to close, the chocks of.all her forecastle
guns (which were mounted on the outside)
were cut away ; * her fire caused some damage
to the American's rigging, but hardly touched
her hull, while she herself suffered so heavily
both alow and aloft that she gradually dropped

1 Marshall, iv, 1080.

2 Cooper, ii, 178.

8 Letter of Commodore Decatur.

4 James, vi, 169.

8 Letter of Captain Carden.

150 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

to leeward, while the American forereached
on her. Finding herself ahead and to wind-
ward, the States tacked and ranged up under
her adversary's lee, when the latter struck her
colors at 11. 15, just an hour and a half after
the beginning of the action.1

The United States had suffered surprisingly
little ; what damage had been done was aloft.
Her mizzen top-gallant mast was cut away,
some of the spars were wounded, and the rig-
ging a good deal cut ; the hull was only struck
two or three times. The ships were never
close enough to be within fair range of grape
and musketry,2 and the wounds were mostly
inflicted by round shot and were thus apt
to be fatal. Plence the loss of the Amer-
icans amounted to Lieutenant John Messer
Funk (5th of the ship) and six seamen killed
or mortally wounded, and only five severely
and slightly wounded.

The Macedonian, on the other hand, had re-
ceived over a hundred shot in her hull, several
between wind and water; her mizzen-mast
had gone by the board ; her fore- and main-
top-masts had been shot away by the caps,
and her main-yard in the slings ; almost all
her rigging was cut away (only the foresail
being left) ; on the engaged side all of her
carronades but two, and two of her main-deck
guns, were dismounted. Of her crew 43 were
killed and mortally wounded, and 61 (includ-
ing her first and third lieutenants) severely and
slightly wounded.3 Among her crew were

1 Letter of Commodore Decatur.

2 Letter of Commodore Decatur.
8 Letter of Captain Garden.

NAVAL WAR OF i8l2.

152 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

eight Americans (as shown by her muster-
roll) ; these asked permission to go below be-
fore the battle, but it was refused by Captain
Carden, and three were killed during the ac-
tion. James says that they* were allowed to
go below, but this is untrue ; for if they had
the three would not have been slain. The
others testified that they had been forced to
fight, and they afterward entered the Ameri-
can service — the only ones of the Macedonian's
crew who did, or who were asked to.

The Macedonian had her full complement of
301 men ; the States had, by her muster-roll
of October 20th, 428 officers, petty officers,
seamen, and boys, and 50 officers and privates
of marines, a total of 478 (instead of 509 as
Marshall in his "Naval Biography" makes
it).

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Broadside Weight
Size. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss.

United States 1576 27 786 478 13

Macedonian 1325 25 547 301 104

Comparative Compara" *re Loss

Force. Inflicted.

States 100 100

Macedonian 66 1 1

That is, the relative force being about as
three is to two,1 the damage done was as nine
to one !

1 I have considered the United States as mounting
her full allowance of 54 guns ; but it is possible that
she had no more than 49. In Decatur's letter of chal-
lenge of Jan. 17, 1814 (which challenge, by the way,
was a most blustering affair, reflecting credit neither on
Decatur, nor his opponent, Captain Hope, nor on any

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 153

Of course, it would have been almost im-
possible for the Macedonian to conquer with
one third less force ; but the disparity was by
no means sufficient to account for the nine-
fold greater loss suffered, and the ease and
impunity with which the victory was won.
The British sailors fought with their accus-
tomed courage, but their gunnery was exceed-
ingly poor ; and it must be remembered that
though the ship was bravely tought, still the
defence was by no means so desperate as that
made by the Essex or even the Chesapeake, as
witnessed by their respective losses. The
Macedonian, moreover, was surrendered when
she had suffered less damage than either the
Guerriere or Java. The chief cause of her
loss lay in the fact that Captain Carden was a
poor commander. The gunnery of the Java,
Guerriere, and Macedonian was equally bad;
but while Captain Lambert proved himself to
be as able as he was gallant, and Captain
Dacres did nearly as well, Captain Carden, on
the other hand, was first too timid, and then
too rash, and showed bad judgment at all
times. By continuing his original course he
could have closed at once ; but he lost his

one else, excepting Captain Stackpole of H. M. S.
Statira), she is said to have had that number ; her
broadside would then be 1 5 long 24's below, 1 long 24,
1 1 2-pound, and 8 42-pound, carronades above. Her
real broadside weight of metal would thus be about
680 lbs., and she would be superior to the Macedonian
in the proportion of 5 to 4. But it is possible that De-
catur had landed some of his guns in 18 13, as James
asserts; and though I am not at all sure of this, I have
thought it best to De on the safe side in describing his
force.

154 NAVAL WAR OF 1812,

chance by over-anxiety to keep the weather-
gage, and was censured by the court-martial
accordingly. Then he tried to remedy one
error by another, and made a foolishly rash
approach. A very able and fair-minded Eng-
lish writer says of this action : "Asa display
of courage the character of the service was
nobly upheld, but we would be deceiving our-
selves were we to admit that the comparative
expertness of the crews in gunnery was equally
satisfactory. Now, taking the difference of
effect as given by Captain Carden, we must
draw this conclusion — that the comparative
loss in killed and wounded (104 to 12), to-
gether with the dreadful account he gives of
the condition of his own ship, while he admits
that the enemy's vessel was in comparatively
good order, must have arisen from inferiority
in gunnery as well as in force. " 1

On the other hand, the American crew, even
according to James, were as fine a set of men
as ever were seen on shipboard. Though not
one-fourth were British by birth, yet many of
them had served on board British ships of
war, in some cases voluntarily, but much more
often because they were impressed. They had
been trained at the guns with the greatest
care by Lieutenant Allen. And finally Com-
modore Decatur handled his ship with abso-
*ute faultlessness. To sum up : a brave and
skilful crew, ably commanded, was matched
against an equally brave but unskilful one,
with an incompetent leader ; and this accounts
for the disparity of loss being so much greater
than the disparity in force.

1 Lord Howard Douglass, " Naval Gunnery," p. 515.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 155

At the outset of this battle the position of
the parties was just the reverse of that in
the case of the Constitution and Guerriere ;
the Englishman had the advantage of the
wind, but he used it in a very different man-
ner from that in which Captain Hull had done.
The latter at once ran down to close, but
manoeuvred so cautiously that no damage
could be done him till he was within pistol
shot. Captain Carden did not try to close
till after fatal indecision, and then made the
attempt so heedlessly that he was cut to pieces
before he got to close quarters. Commodore
Decatur, also, manoeuvred more skilfully than
Captain Dacres, although the difference was
less marked between these two. The combat
was a plain cannonade ; the States derived no
advantage from the superior number of her
men, for they were not needed. The marines
in particular had nothing whatever to do,
while they had been of the greatest service
against the Guerriere. The advantage was
simply in metal, as 10 is to 7. Lord Howard
Douglass' criticisms on these actions seem to
me only applicable in part. He says (p. 524):
li The Americans would neither approach nor
permit us to join in close battle until they had
gained some extraordinary advantage from the
superior faculties of their long guns in distant
cannonade, and from the intrepid, uncircum-
spect, and often very exposed approach of
assailants who had long been accustomed to
contemn all manoeuvring. Our vessels were
crippled in distant cannonade from encoun-
tering rashly the serious disadvantage of mak-
ing direct attacks ; the uncircumspect gal-

156 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

lantry of our commanders led our ships
unguardedly into the snares which wary cau-
tion had spread."

These criticisms are very just as regards
the Macedonian, and I fully agree with them
(possibly reserving the right to doubt Captain
Garden's gallantry, though readily admitting
his uncircumspection). But the case of the
Guerriere differed widely. There the Ameri-
can ship made the attack, while the British at
first avoided close combat ; and, so far from
trying to cripple her adversary by a distant
cannonade, the Constitution hardly fired a
dozen times until within pistol shot. This
last point is worth mentioning, because in a
work on " Heavy Ordnance/' by Captain T.
F. Simmons, R. A. (London, 1837), it is stated
that the Guerriere received her injuries before
the closing, mentioning especially the " thirty
shot below the water-line " ; whereas, by the
official accounts of both commanders, the
reverse was the case. Captain Hull, in his
letter, and Lieutenant Morris (in his auto-
biography) say they only fired a few guns be-
fore closing ; and Captain Dacres, in his letter,
and Captain Brenton, in his "History," say
that not much injury was received by the
Guerriere until about the time the mizzen-mast
fell, which was three or four minutes after
close action began.

Lieutenant Allen was put aboard the Mace*
donian as prize-master ; he secured the fore-
arid main-masts and rigged a jury mizzen-mast,
converting the vessel into a bark. Commo-
dore Decatur discontinued his cruise to con-
voy his prize back to America ; they reached

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 157

New London Dec. 4th. Had it not been for
the necessity of convoying the Macedonia?i,
the States would have continued her cruise,
for the damage she suffered was of the most
trifling character.

Captain Carden stated (in Marshall's
" Naval Biography ") that the States meas-
ured 1,670 tons, was manned by 509 men,
suffered so from shot under water that she
had to be pumped out every watch and that
two eighteen-pound shot passed in a horizontal
line through her main-masts ; all of which
statements were highly creditable to the vivid-
ness of his imagination. The States measured
but 1,576 tons (and by English measurement
very much less), had 478 men aboard, had not
been touched by a shot under water-line and
her lower masts were unwounded. James
states that most of her crew were British,
which assertion I have already discussed ;
and that she had but one boy aboard, and that
he was seventeen years old, — in which case
29 others, some of whom (as we learn from
the " Life of Decatur ") were only twelve,
must have grown with truly startling rapidity
during the hour and a half that the combat
lasted.

During the twenty years preceding 18 12,
there had been almost incessant warfare on
the ocean, and although there had been innu-
merable single conflicts between French and
English frigates, there had been but one case
in which the French frigate, single-handed,
was victorious. This was in the year 1805,
when the Milan captured the Cleopatra. Ac-
cording to Troude, the former threw at a

158 NAVAL WAR OF 18 1 2.

broadside 574 pounds (actual), the latter but
334; and the former lost 35 men out of her
crew of 350; the latter 58 out of 200. Or,
the forces being as 100 to 58, the loss inflicted
was as 100 to 60; while the States' tores com-
pared to the Macedonian's being as 100 to 66,
the loss she inflicted was as 100 to 11.

British ships, moreover, had often con-
quered against odds as great ; as, for instance,
when the Sea Horse captured the great Turk-
ish frigate Badere-Zaffer ; when the Astrea
captured the French frigate Gloire, which
threw at a broadside 286 pounds of shot,
while she threw but 174; and when, most
glorious of all, Lord Dundonald, in the gallant
little Speedy, actually captured the Spanish
xebec Gamo, of over five times her own force 1
Similarly, the corvette Cotnus captured the
Danish frigate Fredrickscoarn, the brig Onyx
captured the Dutch sloop Ma?ily, the little
cutter Thorn captured the French Courier-
National, and the Pasley the Spanish Virgin ;
while there had been many instances of drawn
battles between English 12-pound frigates
and French or Spanish 18-pounders.

Captain Hull having resigned the com-
mand of the Co7istitutio7i she was given to
Captain Bainbridge, of the Constellation, who
was also entrusted with the command of the
Essex and Hornet. The latter ship was in the
port of Boston with the Constitution, under
the command of Captain Lawrence. The
Essex was in the Delaware, and accordingly
orders were sent to Captain Porter to rendez-
vous at the Island of San Jago ; if that failed
several other places were appointed, and if,

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 159

after a certain time, he did not fall in with
his commodore he was to act at his own
discretion.

On October 26th the Constitution and Hor-
net sailed, touched at the different rendezvous,
and on December 13th arrived off San
Salvador, where Captain Lawrence found the
Bonne Citoyenne, 18, Captain Pitt Barnaby
Greene. The Bonne Citoyenne was armed
with 18 32-pound carronades and 2 long nines,
and her crew of 150 men was exactly equal in
number to that of the Hornet; the latter's
short weight in metal made her antagonist
superior to her in about the same proportion
that she herself was subsequently superior to
the Penguin, or, in other words, the ships
were practically equal. Captain Lawrence
now challenged Captain Greene to single fight,
giving the usual pledges that the Constitution
should not interfere. The challenge was not
accepted for a variety of reasons ; among
others the Bonne Citoyenne was carrying
home half a million pounds in specie.1 Leav-
ing the Hornet to blockade her, Commodore
Bainbridge ran off to the southward, keeping
the land in view.

1 Brenton and James both deny that Captain Greene
was blockaded by the Hornet, and claim that he feared
the Constitution. James says (p. 275) that the occur-
rence was one which " the characteristic cunning of
Americans Hirned greatly to their advantage " ; and
adds that Lawrence only sent the challenge because " it
could not be accepted, and so he would "suffer no
personal risk." He states that the reason it was sent, as
well as the reason that it was refused, was because the
Constitution was going to remain in the offing and cap-
ture the British ship if she proved conqueror. It is
somewhat surprising that even James should have had

160 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

At 9 A. m., Dec. 29, 18 1 2, while the Consti-
tution was running along the coast of Brazil,
about thirty miles ofr* shore in latitude 130 6'
S., and longitude 310 W., two strange sail were
made,1 inshore and to windward. These were
H. B. M. frigate Java, Captain Lambert, forty-
eight days out of Spithead, England, with the
captured ship William in company. Direct-
ing the latter to make for San Salvador, the
Java bore down in chase of the Constitution?
The wind was blowing light from the N.N.E.,
and there was very little sea on. At 10 the
Java made the private signals, English, Span-
ish, and Portuguese in succession, none being
answered; meanwhile the Constitution was
standing up toward the Java on the starboard
tack ; a little after 1 1 she hoisted her private
signal, and then, being satisfied that the
strange sail was an enemy, she wore and stood

the temerity to advance such arguments. According
to his own account (p. 277) the Constitution left for
Boston on Jan. 6th, and the Hornet remained blockad-
ing the Bonne Citoyenne till the 24th, when the Montagu,
74, arrived. During these eighteen days there could
have been no possible chance of the Constitution or any
other ship interfering, and it is ridiculous to suppose
that any such fear kept Captain Greene from sailing
out to attack his foe. No doubt Captain Greene's
course was perfectly justifiable, but it is curious that
with all the assertions made by James as to the coward-
ice of the Americans, this is the only instance through-
out the war in which a ship of either party declined a
contest with an antagonist of equal force (the cases of
Commodore Rodgers and Sir George Collier being
evidently due simply to an overestimate of the oppos-
ing ships.)

* Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, Jan. 3,
1813.

2 Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, Dec. 31, 181 2.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. l6l

off toward the S. E. , to draw her antagonist
away from the land,1 which was plainly visible.
The/ava hauled up, and made sail in a paral-
lel course, the Constitution bearing about three
points on her lee bow. The Java gained rap-
idly, being much the swifter.

At 1.30 the Constitution luffed up, shortened
her canvas to top-sails, top-gallant sails, jib,
and spanker, and ran easily off on the port
tack, heading toward the southeast ; she car-
ried her commodore's pendant at the main,
national ensigns at the mizzen-peak and main
top-gallant mast-head, and a Jack at the fore.
The Java also had taken in the main-sail and
royals, and came down in a lasking course on
her adversary's weather-quarter,2 hoisting her
ensign at the mizzen-peak, a union Jack at
the mizzen top-gallant mast-head, and another
lashed to the main-rigging. At 2 p. m., the
Constitution fired a shot ahead of her, follow-
ing it quickly by a broadside,3 and the two
ships began at long bowls, the English firing
the lee or starboard battery while the Ameri-
cans replied with their port guns. The can-
nonade was very spirited on both sides, the
ships suffering about equally. The first broad-
side of the Java was very destructive, killing
and wounding several of the Constitution's
crew. The Java kept edging down, and the
action continued, with grape and musketry in
addition ; the swifter British ship soon fore-
reached and kept away, intending to wear

1 Log of the Constitution.

2 Lieutenant Chads' Address to the Court-martial,
April 23, 1813.

* Commodore Bainbridge's letter.
II

162 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

across her slower antagonist's bow and rake
her ; but the latter wore in the smoke, and
the two combatants ran off to the westward,
the Englishman still a-weather and steering
freer than the Constitution, which had luffed
to close.1 The action went on at pistol-shot
distance. In a few minutes, however, the
Java again forged ahead, out of the weight of
her adversary's fire, and then kept off, as
before, to cross her bows ; and, as before, the
Constitution avoided this by wearing, both
ships again coming round with their heads to
the east, the American still to leeward. The
Java kept the weather-gage tenaciously, fore-
reaching a little, and whenever the Consti-
tution luffed up to close,8 the former tried to
rake her. But her gunnery was now poor,
little damage being done by it ; most of the
loss the Americans suffered was early in the
action. By setting her foresail and main-sail
the Constitution got up close on the enemy's
lee beam, her fire being very heavy and carry-
ing away the end of the Java's bowsprit and
her jib-boom.3 The Constitution forged ahead
and repeated her former manoeuvre, wearing
in the smoke. The Java at once hove in
stays, but owing to the loss of headsail fell off
very slowly, and the American frigate poured
a heavy raking broadside into her stern, at
about two cables' length distance. The Java
replied with her port guns as she fell off.4
Both vessels then bore up and ran off free,
with the wind on the port quarter ; the Java
being abreast and to windward of her antago-

1 Log of the Constitution. 2 Log of the Constitution,
3 Lieutenant Chads' letter. 4 Lieut. Chads' letter.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 1C3

nist, both with their heads a little east of
south. The ships were less than a cable's
length apart, and the Constitution inflicted
great damage while suffering very little her-
self. The British lost many men by the mus-
ketry of the American topmen, and suffered
still more from the round and grape, especially
on the forecastle,1 many marked instances of
valor being shown on both sides. The Java's
masts were wounded and her rigging cut to
pieces, and Captain Lambert then ordered her
to be laid aboard the enemy, who was on her
lee beam. The helm was put a-weather, and
the Java came down for the Constitution's
main-chains. The boarders and marines
gathered in the gangways and on the fore-
castle, the boatswain having been ordered to
cheer them up with his pipe that they might
make a clean spring.2 The Americans, how-
ever, raked the British with terrible effect,
cutting off their main top-mast above the cap,
and their foremast near the cat harpings.3
The stump of the Java's bowsprit got caught
in the Constitution 's mizzen-rigging, and be-
fore it got clear the British suffered still more.
Finally the ships separated, the Java's bow-
sprit passing over the taffrail of the Constitu-
tion ; the latter at once kept away to avoid
being raked. The ships again got nearly
abreast, but the Constitution, in her turn, fore-
reached; whereupon Commodore Bainbridge

1 Testimony of Christopher Speedy, in minutes of
the Court-martial on board H. M. S. Gladiator^ at
Portsmouth, April 23, 181 3.

2 Testimony of James Humble, in do., do.
8 Log of Constitution.

164 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

wore, passed his antagonist, luffed up under
his quarter, raked him with the starboard
guns, then wore, and recommenced the action
with his port broadside at about 3.10. Again
the vessels were abreast, and the action went
on as furiously as ever. The wreck of the top
hamper on the Java lay over her starboard
side, so that every discharge of her guns set
heron fire,1 and in a few minutes her able and
gallant commander was mortally wounded by
a ball fired by one of the American main-top-
men.51 The command then devolved on the
first lieutenant, Chads, himself painfully
wounded. The slaughter had been terrible,
yet the British fought on with stubborn reso-
lution, cheering lustily. But success was now
hopeless, for nothing could stand against the
cool precision of the Yankee fire. The stump
of the Java's foremast was carried away by a
double-headed shot, the mizzen-mast fell, the
gaff and spanker boom were shot away, also
the main-yard, and finally the ensign was cut
down by a shot, and all her guns absolutely
silenced ; when at 4. 05 the Constitution, think-
ing her adversary had struck,3 ceased firing,
hauled aboard her tacks, and passed across
her adversary's bows to windward, with her
top-sails, jib, and spanker set. A few minutes
afterward the Java's main-mast fell, leaving
her a sheer hulk. The Constitution assumed
a weatherly position, and spent an hour in
repairing damages and securing her masts ;

1 Lieut. Chads' Address.

2 Surgeon J. C. Jones' Report.

3 Log of the Constitution (as given in Bainbridge's
-letter).

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 165

then she wore and stood toward her enemy,
whose flag was again flying, but only for
bravado, for as soon as the Constitution stood
across her forefoot she struck. At 5.25 she
was taken possession of by Lieutenant Parker,
1 st of the Constitution, in one of the latter's
only two remaining boats.

The American ship had suffered compara-
tively little. But a few round shot had struck
her hull, one of which carried away the wheel ;
one 18-pounder went through the mizzen-
mast ; the foremast, main-top-mast, and a few
other spars were slightly wounded, and the
running rigging and shrouds were a good
deal cut ; but in an hour she was again in good
fighting trim. Her loss amounted to 8 sea-
men and 1 marine killed ; the 5th lieutenant,
John C. Aylwin, and 2 seamen, mortally, Com-
modore Bainbridge and 12 seamen, severely,
and 7 seamen and 2 marines, slightly wound-
ed ; in all 12 killed and mortally wounded,
and 22 wounded severely and slightly.1

" The Java sustained unequally injuries
beyond the Constitution," says the British ac-
count.a These have already been given in
detail ; she was a riddled and entirely dis-
masted hulk. Her loss (for discussion of
which see farther on) was 48 killed (including
Captain Henry Lambert, who died soon after
the close of the action, and five midshipmen),
and 102 wounded, among them Lieutenant
Henry Ducie Chads, Lieutenant of Marines
David Davies, Commander John Marshall,
Lieut. James Saunders, the boatswain, James

1 Report of Surgeon Amos A. Evans.

2 " Naval Chronicle," xxix, 452.

166 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Humble, master, Batty Robinson, and four
midshipmen.

In this action both ships displayed equal
gallantry and seamanship. " The Java"
says Commodore Bainbridge, " was exceed-
ingly well handled and bravely fought. Poor
Captain Lambert was a distinguished and
gallant officer, and a most worthy man, whose
death I sincerely regret." The manoeuvring
on both sides was excellent ; Captain Lambert
used the advantage which his ship possessed
in her superior speed most skilfully, always
endeavoring to run across his adversary's
bows and rake him when he had forereached,
and it was only owing to the equal skill which
his antagonist displayed that he was foiled,
the length of the combat being due to the
number of evolutions. The great superiority
of the Americans was in their gunnery. The
fire of the Java was both less rapid and less
well-directed than that of her antagonist ; the
difference of force against her was not heavy,
being about as ten is to nine, and was by no
means enough to account for the almost five-
fold greater loss she suffered.

On next page is a diagram of the battle. It
differs from both of the official accounts, as
these conflict, greatly both as to time and as
regards some of the evolutions. I generally
take the mean in cases of difference ; for ex-
ample, Commodore Bainbridge's report makes
the fight endure but 1 hour and 55 minutes,
Lieutenant Chad's 2 hours and 25 minutes ;
I have made it 2 hours and 10 minutes, etc.,
etc.

The tonnage and weight of metal of the

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

167

II!

lis

Ifi

*4\

/ \

/ »

"01

v if/

168 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

combatants have already been stated ; I will
give the complements shortly. The following
is the

COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS.

Tons. Weight Metal. No. Men. Loss.
Constitiction 1576 654 475 34

Java 1340 576 426 150

Relative Relative Loss

Force. Inflicted.

Constitution 1 00 100

Java 89 23

In hardly another action of the war do the
accounts of the respective forces differ so
widely ; the official British letter makes their
total of men at the beginning of the action
377, of whom Commodore Bainbridge official-
ly reports that he paroled 378 ! The British
state their loss in killed and mortally wounded
at 24; Commodore Bainbridge reports that
the dead alone amounted to nearly 60 !
Usually I have taken each commander's ac-
count of his own force and loss, and I should
do so now if it were not that the British ac-
counts differ among themselves, and whenever
they relate to the Americans, are flatly contra-
dicted by the affidavits of the latter's officers.
The British first handicap themselves by the
statement that the surgeon of the Constitution
was an Irishman and lately an assistant
surgeon in the British navy (" Naval Chron-
icle," xxix, 452) ; which draws from Surgeon
Amos A. Evans a solemn statement in the
Boston Gazette that he was born in Maryland
and was never in the British navy in his life.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 169

Then Surgeon Jones of the Java, in his official
report, after giving his own killed and mor-
tally wounded at 24, says that the Americans
lost in all about 60, and that 4 of their am-
putations perished under his own eyes ; where-
upon Surgeon Evans makes the statement
(Niks' Register, vi, p. 35), backed up by af-
fidavits of his brother officers, that in all he
had but five amputations, of whom only one
died, and that one, a month after Surgeon
Jones had left the ship. To meet the asser-
tions of Lieutenant Chads that he began action
with but 377 men, the Constitution's officers
produced the Java's muster-roll, dated Nov.
17th, or five days after she had sailed, which
snowed 446 persons, of whom 20 had been
put on board a prize. The presence of this
large number of supernumeraries on board is
explained by the fact that the Java was car-
rying out Lieutenant-General Hislop, the
newly-appointed Governor of Bombay, and his
suite, together with part of the crews for the
Comwallis, 74, and gun-sloops Chameleon and
Icarus ; she also contained stores for those
two ships.

Besides conflicting with the American
reports, the British statements contradict
one another. The official published report
gives but two midshipmen as killed ; while one
of the volumes of the " Naval Chronicle "
(vol. xxix, p. 452) contains a letter from one
of the Java's lieutenants, in which he states
that there were five. Finally, Commodore
Bainbridge found on board the Constitution,
after the prisoners had left, a letter from
Lieutenant H. D. Cornick, dated Jan. 1, 1S13,

170 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

and addressed to Lieutenant Peter V. Wood,
2 2d Regiment, foot, in which he states that
65 of their men were killed. James (" Naval
Occurrences ") gets around this by stating
that it was probably a forgery j but aside from
the improbability of Commodore Bainbridge
being a forger, this could not be so, for noth-
ing would have been easier than for the British
lieutenant to have denied having written it,
which he never did. On the other hand, it
would be very likely that in the heat of the
action, Commodore Bainbridge and the Java's
own officers should overestimate the latter's
loss.1

Taking all these facts into consideration,
we find 446 men on board the Java by her own
muster-list ; 378 of these were paroled by
Commodore Bainbridge at San Salvador; 24
men were acknowledged by the enemy to be
killed or mortally wounded; 20 were absent in
a prize, leaving 24 unaccounted for, who were
undoubtedly slain.

The British loss was thus 48 men killed and
mortally wounded, 102 wounded severely and
slightly. The Java was better handled and
more desperately defended than the Mace-
donian or even the Guernere, and the odds
against her were much smaller ; so she caused

1 For an account of the shameless corruption then
existing in the Naval Administration of Great Britain,
see Lord Dundonald's " Autobiography of a seaman."
The letters of the commanders were often garbled,
as is mentioned by Brenton. Among numerous
cases that he gives, may be mentioned the cutting out
of the Ckevrette, where he distinctly says, " our loss
was much greater than was ever acknowledged." (Vol.
i, p. 505, edition of 1837.)

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 171

her opponent greater loss, though her gunnery
was no better than theirs.

Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the Java,
removed all the prisoners and baggage to the
Constitution, and reported the prize to be in a
very disabled state ; owing partly to this, but
more to the long distance from home and the
great danger there was of recapture, Com-
modore Bainbridge destroyed heron the 31st,
and then made sail for San Salvador. " Our
gallant enemy," reports Lieutenant Chads,
" has treated us most generously " ; and
Lieutenant-General Hislop presented the
Commodore with a very handsome sword as
a token of gratitude for the kindness with
which he had treated the prisoners.

Partly in consequence of his frigate's in-
juries, but especially because of her decayed
condition, Commodore Bainbridge sailed from
San Salvador on Jan. 6, 18 13, reaching Boston
Feb. 27th, after his four months' cruise. At
San Salvador he left the Hornet still block-
ading the Bonne Citqyenne.

In order " to see ourselves as others see
us," I shall again quote from Admiral Jurien
de la Graviere,1 as his opinions are certainly
well worthy of attention both as to these first
three battles, and as to the lessons they teach.
11 When the American Congress declared war
on England in 18 12," he says, " it seemed as
if this unequal conflict would crush her navy
in the act of being born ; instead, it but fertil-
ized the germ. It is only since that epoch
that the United States has taken rank among
maritime powers. Some combats of frigates,

1 " Guerres Maritimes," ii, 284 (Paris, 1881).

172 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

corvettes, and brigs, insignificant without
doubt as regards material results, sufficed to
break the charm which protected the standard
of St. George, and taught Europe what she
could have already learned from some of our
combats, if the louder noise of our defeats
had not drowned the glory, that the only
invincibles on the sea are good seamen and
good artillerists.

" The English covered the ocean with their
cruisers when this unknown navy, composed
of six frigates and a few small craft hitherto
hardly numbered, dared to establish its
cruisers at the mouth of the Channel, in the
very centre of the British power. But already
the Constitution had captured the Guerriere
and Java, the United States had made a prize
of the Macedonian, the Wasp of the Frolic, and
the Hornet of the Peacock. The honor of the
new flag was established. England, humili-
ated, tried to attribute her multiplied reverses
to the unusual size of the vessels which Con-
gress had had constructed in 1799, and which
did the fighting in 18 12. She wished to refuse
them the name of frigates, and called them,
not without some appearance of reason, dis-
guised line-of-battle ships. Since then all
maritime powers have copied these gigantic
models, as the result of the war of 181 2
obliged England herself to change her naval
material ; but if they had employed, instead of
frigates, cut-down 74's (vaisseaux rases), it
would still be difficult to explain the prodigious
success of the Americans. * * *

" In an engagement which terminated in
less than half an hour, the English frigate

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 173

Guerriere, completely dismasted, had fifteen
men killed, sixty-three wounded, and more
than thirty shot below the water-line. She
sank twelve hours after the combat. The
Constitution, on the contrary, had but seven
men killed and seven wounded, and did not
lose a mast. As soon as she had replaced a
few cut ropes and changed a few sails, she
was in condition, even by the testimony of the
British historian, to take another Guerriere.
The United States took an hour and a half to
capture the Macedonian, and the same differ-
ence made itself felt in the damage suffered
by the two ships. The Macedonian had her
mast shattered, two of her main-deck and all
her spar-deck guns disabled ; more than a
hundred shot had penetrated the hull, and
over a third of the crew had suffered by the
hostile fire. The American frigate, on the
contrary, had to regret but five men killed and
seven wounded ; her guns had been fired each
sixty-six times to the Macedonian's thirty-six.
The combat of the Constitution and the /ava
lasted two hours, and was the most bloody of
these three engagements. The Java only
struck when she had been razed like a sheer
hulk ; she had twenty-two men killed and one

hundred and two wounded.

******

" This war should be studied with unceas-
ing diligence ; the pride of two peoples to
whom naval affairs are so generally familiar
has cleared all the details and laid bare all
the episodes, and through the sneers which
the victors should have spared, merely out of
care for their own glory, at every step can be

*74

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

seen that great truth, that there is only suc-
cess for those who know how to prepare it.

* * # * * *

" It belongs to us to judge impartially these
marine events, too much exalted perhaps by a
national vanity one is tempted to excuse.
The Americans showed, in the War of 1812, a
great deal of skill and resolution. But if, as
they have asserted, the chances had always
been perfectly equal between them and their
adversaries, if they had only owed their tri-
umphs to the intrepidity of Hull, Decatur,
and Bainbridge, there would be for us but
little interest in recalling the struggle. We
need not seek lessons in courage outside of
our own history. On the contrary, what is to
be well considered is that the ships of the
United States constantly fought with the
chances in their favor, and it is on this that
the American government should found its
true title to glory. * * * The Americans
in 18 1 2 had secured to themselves the advan-
tage of a better organization [than the Eng-
lish]."

The fight between the Constitution and the
Java illustrates best the proposition, " that
there is only success for those who know how
to prepare it." Here the odds in men and
metal were only about as 10 to 9 in favor of
the victors, and it is safe to say that they
might have been reversed without vitally af-
fecting the result. In the fight Lambert
handled his ship as skilfully as Bainbridge
did his ; and the Java's men proved by their
indomitable courage that they were excellent
material. The Java's crew was new shipped

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 175

for the voyage, and had been at sea but six
weeks ; in the Constitution's first fight her
crew had been aboard of her but five weeks.
So the chances should have been nearly equal,
and the difference in fighting capacity that
was shown by the enormous disparity in the
loss, and still more in the damage inflicted,
was due to the fact that the officers of one
ship had, and the officers of the other had not,
trained their raw crews. The Constitution s
men were not "picked," but simply average
American sailors, as the Java's were average
British sailors. The essential difference was
in the training.

During the six weeks the Java was at sea,
her men had fired but six broadsides, of blank
cartridges; during the first five weeks the
Constitution cruised, her crew were incessantly
practised at firing with blank cartridge, and
also at a target.1 The Java's crew had only
been exercised occasionally, even in pointing
the guns, and when the captain of a gun was
killed the effectiveness of the piece was tem-
porarily ruined, and, moreover, the men did
not work together. The Constitutions crew
were exercised till they worked like machines,
and yet with enough individuality to render it
impossible to cripple a gun by killing one
man. The unpractised British sailors fired at
random ; the trained Americans took aim.

1 In looking through the logs of the Constitution^
Hornet, etc., we continually find such entries as " beat
to quarters, exercised the men at the great guns," " ex-
ercised with musketry," " exercised the boarders,"
" exercised the great guns, blank cartridges, and after-
ward firing at mark."

176 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12.

The British marines had not been taught any
thing approximating to skirmishing or sharp-
shooting ; the Americans had. The British
sailors had not even been trained enough in
the ordinary duties of seamen ; while the
Americans in five weeks had been rendered
almost perfect. The former were at a loss
what to do in an emergency at all out of their
own line of work ; they were helpless when
the wreck fell over their guns, when the Amer-
icans would have cut it away in a jiffy. As
we learn from Commodore Morris' " Autobio-
graphy," each Yankee sailor could, at need,
do a little carpentering or sail-mending, and
so was more self-reliant. The crew had been
trained to act as if guided by one mind, yet
each man retained his own individuality. The
petty officers were better paid than in Great
Britain, and so were of a better class of men,
thoroughly self-respecting; the Americans
soon got their subordinates in order, while the
British did not. To sum up : one ship's crew
had been trained practically and thoroughly,
while the other crew was not much better off
than the day it sailed ; and, as far as it goes, this
is a good test of the efficiency of the two navies.

The U. S. brig Vixen, 12, Lieutenant George
U. Read, had been cruising off the southern
coast; on Nov. 2 2d she fell in with the South-
ampton, 32, Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, and
was captured after a short but severe trial of
speed. Both vessels were wrecked soon after-
ward.

The Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, left
the Delaware on Oct. 28th, two days afte*

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 177

Commodore Bainbridge had left Boston. She
expected to make a very long cruise and so
carried with her an unusual quantity of stores
and sixty more men than ordinarily, so that
her muster-roll contained 319 names. Being
deep in the water she reached San Iago after
Bainbridge had left. Nothing was met with
until after the Essex had crossed the equator
in latitude 300 W. on Dec. nth. On the
afternoon of the next day a sail was made out
to windward, and chased. At nine in the
evening it was overtaken, and struck after
receiving a volley of musketry which killed
one man. The prize proved to be the British
packet Norton, of 10 guns and 31 men, with
$55,000 in specie aboard. The latter was
taken out, and the Norton sent home with
Lieutenant Finch and a prize crew of 17 men,
but was recaptured by a British frigate.

The next appointed rendezvous was the
Island of Fernando de Noronha, where Cap-
tain Porter found a letter from Commodore
Bainbridge, informing him that the other ves-
sels were off Cape Frio. Thither cruised
Porter, but his compatriots had left. On the
29th he captured an English merchant vessel ;
and he was still cruising when the year closed.

The year 181 2, on the ocean, ended as
gloriously as it had begun. In four victorious
rights the disparity in loss had been so great
as to sink the disparity of force into insig-
nificance. Our successes had been unaccom-
panied by any important reverse. Nor was
it alone by the victories, but by the cruises,
that the year was noteworthy. The Yankee
12

178 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12.

men-of-war sailed almost in sight of the Brit-
ish coast and right in the track of the mer-
chant fleets and their armed protectors. Our
vessels had shown themselves immensely
superior to their foes.

The reason of these striking and unexpected
successes was that our navy in 18 12 was the
exact reverse of what our navy is now, in
1882. I am not alluding to the personnel,
which still remains excellent ; but, whereas
we now have a large number of worthless ves-
sels, standing very low down in their respective
classes, we then possessed a few vessels, each
unsurpassed by any foreign ship of her class.
To bring up our navy to the condition in
which it stood in 18 12 it would not be neces-
sary (although in reality both very wise and
in the end very economical) to spend any
more money than at present ; only instead of
using it to patch up a hundred antiquated
hulks, it should be employed in building half
a dozen ships on the most effective model.
If in 1812 our ships had borne the same rela-
tion to the British ships that they do now, not
all the courage and skill of our sailors would
have won us a single success. As it was, we
could only cope with the lower rates, and had
no vessels to oppose to the great " liners " ;
but to-day there is hardly any foreign ship,
no matter how low its rate, that is not supe-
rior to the corresponding American ones.
It is too much to hope that our political short-
sightedness will ever enable us to have a navy
that is first-class in point of size ; but there
certainly seems no reason why what ships we
have should not be of the very best quality.
The effect of a victory is twofold, moral and

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

179

material. Had we been as roughly handled
on water as we were on land during the first
year of the war, such a succession of disasters
would have had a most demoralizing effect on
the nation at large. As it was, our victorious
sea-fights, while they did not inflict any ma-
terial damage upon the colossal sea-might of
England, had the most important results in
the feelings they produced at home and even
abroad. Of course they were magnified ab-
surdly by most of our writers at the time;
but they do not need to be magnified, for as
they are any American can look back upon
them with the keenest national pride. For a
hundred and thirty years England had had
no equal on the sea ; and now she suddenly
found one in the untried navy of an almost
unknown power.

BRITISH VESSELS CAPTURED OR DE-
STROYED IN 1812.

Name

Guns.

Tonnage.

Remarks.

Guerriire

Macedonian

Java

Frolic

Alert

49
49
49
19
20

1,340

I,325
1,340

477

325

Recaptured.

186
19

4,807
477

Deducting Frolic*

~^7

4,330

AMERICAN VESSELS CAPTURED OR
DESTROYED.

Name.

Guns.

Tonnage.

Wasp

Nautilus

Vixen

18
14
14

450

'I5

185

180 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

VESSELS BUILT IN 1812.

Name. Rig. Guns. Tonnage. Where Built. Cost.

Nonsuch Schooner 14 148 Charleston $ic,ooo
Carolina Schooner 14 230 " 8,743

Louisiana Ship 16 341 New Orleans 15,500

PRIZES made;

Ship.

No. of Prizes.

President

United States

Constitution

Congress

Chesapeake

Essex

Wasp

Hornet

Argus

Small Craft

1 These can only be approximately given ; the rec-
ords are often incomplete or contradictory, especially
as regards the small craft. Most accounts do not give
by any means the full number.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 181

CHAPTER IV.
1812.

ON THE LAKES.

Preliminary — The combatants starting nearly on
an equality — Difficulties of creating a naval force —
Difficulty of comparing the force of the rival squad-
rons— Meagreness of the published accounts — Unre-
liability of James — Ontario — Extraordinary nature of
the American squadron — Canadian squadron forming
only a kind of water militia — Sackett's Harbor feebly
attacked by Commodore Earle — Commodore Chauncy
bombards York— Erie — Lieutenant Elliott captures
the Detroit and Caledonia — Unsuccessful expedition of
Lieutenant Angus-

AT the time we are treating of, the State
of Maine was so sparsely settled, and
covered with such a dense growth of forest,
that it was practically impossible for either
of the contending parties to advance an army
through its territory. A continuation of the
same wooded and mountainous district pro-
tected the northern parts of Vermont and
New Hampshire, while in New York the
Adirondack region was an impenetrable wilder-
ness. It thus came about that the northern
boundary was formed, for military purposes,
by Lake Huron, Lake Erie, the Niagara, Lake
Ontario, the St. Lawrence, and, after an
interval, by Lake Champlain. The road into

182 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

the States by the latter ran close along shore,
and without a naval force the invader would
be wholly unable to protect his flanks, and
would probably have his communications cut.
This lake, however, was almost wholly within
the United States, and did not become of
importance till toward the end of the war.
Upon it were two American gunboats, reg-
ularly officered and manned, and for such
smooth water sufficiently effective vessels.

What was at that time the western part of
the northern frontier became the main theatre
of military operations, and as it presented
largely a water front, a naval force was an in-
dispensable adjunct, the command of the
lakes being of the utmost importance. As
these lakes were fitted for the manoeuvring of
ships of the largest size, the operations upon
them were of the same nature as those on the
ocean, and properly belong to naval and not
to military history. But while on the ocean
America started with too few ships to enable
her really to do any serious harm to her an-
tagonist, on the inland waters the two sides
began very nearly on an equality. The chief
regular forces either belligerent possessed
were on Lake Ontario. Here the United
States had a man-of-war brig, the Oneida, of
240 tons, carrying 16 24-pound carronades,
manned by experienced seamen, and com-
manded by Lieutenant M. T. Woolsey.
Great Britain possessed the Royal George, 22,
Prince Regent, 16, Earl of Moira, 14, Glouces-
ter, 10, Seneca, 8, and Simco, 8, all under the
command of a Commodore Earle ; but though
this force was so much the more powerful it

NAVAL WAR OF 1S12. 183

was very inefficient, not being considered as
belonging to the regular navy, the sailors
being undisciplined, and the officers totally
without experience, never having been really
trained in the British service. From these
causes it resulted that the struggle on the
lakes was to be a work as much of creat-
ing as of using a navy. On the seaboard
success came to those who made best use of
the ships that had already been built ; on the
lakes the real contest lay in the building.
And building an inland navy was no easy
task. The country around the lakes, espe-
cially on the south side, was still very sparsely
settled, and all the American naval supplies
had to be brought from the seaboard cities
through the valley of the Mohawk. There
was no canal or other means of communica-
tion, except very poor roads intermittently re-
lieved by transportation on the Mohawk and
on Oneida Lake, when they were navigable.
Supplies were thus brought up at an enormous
cost, with tedious delays and great difficulty ;
and bad weather put a stop to all travel.
Very little indeed, beyond timber, could be
procured at the stations on the lakes. Still a
few scattered villages and small towns had
grown up on the shores, whose inhabitants
were largely engaged in the carrying trade.
The vessels used for the purpose were gener-
ally small sloops or schooners, swift and fairly
good sailors, but very shallow and not fitted
for rough weather. The frontiersmen them-
selves, whether Canadian or American, were
bold, hardy seamen, and when properly
trained and led made excellent man-of-war's

1 84 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

men ; but on the American side they were too
few in number, and too untrained to be made
use of, and the seamen had to come from the
coast. But the Canadian shores had been
settled longer, the inhabitants were more
numerous, and by means of the St. Lawrence
the country was easy of access to Great
Britain ; so that the seat of war, as regards
getting naval supplies, and even men, was
nearer to Great Britain than to us. Our
enemies also possessed in addition to the
squadron on Lake Ontario another on Lake
Erie, consisting of the Queefi Charlotte,ij , Lady
Prevost, 13, Hunter, 10, Caledonia, 2, Little
Belt, 2, and Chippeway, 2. These two squad-
rons furnished training schools for some five
hundred Canadian seamen, whom a short
course of discipline under experienced officers
sufficed to render as good men as their British
friends or American foes. Very few British
seamen ever reached Lake Erie (according to
James, not over fifty) ; but on Lake Ontario,
and afterward on Lake Champlain, they
formed the bulk of the crews, " picked seamen,
sent out by government expressly for service
on the Canada lakes." ' As the contrary has
sometimes been asserted it may be as well to
mention that Admiral Codrington states that
no want of seamen contributed to the British
disasters on the lakes, as their sea-ships at
Quebec had men drafted from them for that
service till their crews were utterly depleted.2
I am bound to state that while I think that

1 James, vi, 353.

2 Memoirs, i, 322, referring especially to battle of
Lake Champlain.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 1S5

on the ocean our sailors showed themselves
superior to their opponents, especially in gun
practice, on the lakes the men of the rival
fleets were as evenly matched, in skill and
courage, as could well be. The difference,
when there was any, appeared in the officers,
and, above all, in the builders ; which was the
more creditable to us, as in the beginning we
were handicapped by the fact that the British
already had a considerable number of war
vessels, while we had but one.

The Falls of Niagara interrupt navigation
between Erie and Ontario ; so there were three
independent centres of naval operations on
the northern frontier. The first was on Lake
Champlain, where only the Americans pos-
sessed any force, and, singularly enough, this
was the only place where the British showed
more enterprise in ship-building than we did.
Next came Lake Ontario, where both sides
made their greatest efforts, but where the re-
sult was indecisive, though the balance of suc-
cess was slightly inclined toward us. Our
naval station was at Sackett's Harbor ; that
of our foes at Kingston. The third field of
operations was Lake Erie and the waters above
it. Here both sides showed equal daring and
skill in the fighting, and our advantage must
be ascribed to the energy and success with
which we built and equipped vessels. Orig-
inally we had no force at all on these waters,
while several vessels were opposed to us. It
is a matter of wonder that the British and
Canadian governments should have been so
supine as to permit their existing force to go
badly armed, and so unenterprising as to build

1 86 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

but one additional ship, when they could
easily have preserved their superiority.

It is very difficult to give a full and fair ac-
count of the lake campaigns. The inland na-
vies were created especially for the war, and,
after it were allowed to decay, so that the rec-
ords of the tonnage, armament, and crews are
hard to get at. Of course, where everything
had to be created, the services could not have
the regular character of those on the ocean.
The vessels employed were of widely different
kinds, and this often renders it almost impos-
sible to correctly estimate the relative force
of two opposing squadrons. While the Amer-
icans were building their lake navy, they, as
make-shifts, made use of some ordinary mer-
chant schooners, which were purchased and
fitted up with one or two long, heavy guns
each. These gun-vessels had no quarters, and
suffered under all the other disadvantages
which make a merchant vessel inferior to a
regularly constructed man-of-war. The chief
trouble was that in a heavy sea they had a
strong tendency to capsize, and were so un-
steady that the guns could not be aimed when
any wind was blowing. Now, if a few of these
schooners, mounting long 32's, encountered
a couple of man-of-war brigs, armed with car-
ronades, which side was strongest ? In smooth
water the schooners had the advantage, and
in rough weather they were completely at
the mercy of the brigs ; so that it would be
very hard to get at the true worth of such a
contest as each side would be tolerably sure
to insist that the weather was such as to give
a great advantage to the other. In all

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 187

the battles and skirmishes on Champlain,
Erie, and Huron, at least there was no room
left for doubt as to who were the victors. But
on Lake Ontario there was never any decisive
struggle, and whenever an encounter occurred,
each commodore always claimed that his ad-
versary had " declined the combat " though
" much superior in strength. " It is, of course,
almost impossible to find out which really
did decline the combat, for the official letters
flatly contradict each other ; and it k often
almost as difficult to discover where the supe-
riority in force lay, when the fleets differed so
widely in character as was the case in 18 13.
Then Commodore Chauncy's squadron con-
sisted largely of schooners ; their long, heavy
guns made his total foot up in a very imposing
manner, and similar gun-vessels did very good
work on Lake Erie ; so Commodore Yeo, and
more especially Commodore Yeo's admirers,
exalted these schooners to the skies, and con-
veyed the impression that they were most
formidable craft, by means of which Chauncy
ought to have won great victories. Yet when
Yeo captured two of them he refused to let
them even cruise with his fleet, and they were
sent back to act as coast gunboats and trans-
ports, which certainly would not have been
done had they been fitted to render any effec-
tual assistance. Again, one night a squall
came on and the two largest schooners went
to the bottom, which did not tend to increase
the confidence felt in the others. So there
can be no doubt that in all but very smooth
water the schooners could almost be counted
out of the fight. Then the question arises in

188 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

any given case, was the water smooth ? And
the testimony is as conflicting as ever.

It is not too easy to reconcile the official
letters of the commanders, and it is still harder
to get at the truth from either the American
or British histories. Cooper is very inexact,
and, moreover, paints everything couleur de
rose, paying no attention to the British side of
the question, and distributing so much praise
to everybody that one is at a loss to know
where it really belongs. Still, he is very use-
ful, for he lived at the time of the events he
narrates, and could get much information
about them at first hand, from the actors them-
selves. James is almost the only British
authority on the subject ; but he is not nearly
as reliable as when dealing with the ocean
contests, most of this part of his work being
being taken up with a succession of acrid
soliloquies on the moral defects of the Amer-
ican character. The British records for this
extraordinary service on the lakes were not at
all carefully kept, and so James is not ham-
pered by the necessity of adhering more or less
closely to official documents, but lets his im-
agination run loose. On the ocean and sea-
board his account of the British force can
generally be relied upon ; but on the lakes his
authority is questionable in every thing relat-
ing either to friends or foes. This is the more
exasperating because it is done wilfully, when,
if he had chosen, he could have written an
invaluable history; he must of ten have known
the truth when, as a matter of preference, he
chose either to suppress or alter it. Thus he
ignores all the small " cutting out " expedi-

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 189

tions in which the Americans were successful,
and where one would like to hear the British
side. For example, Captain Yeo captured two
schooners, the Julia and Growler, but Chaun-
cy recaptured both. We have the American
account of this recapture in full, but James
does not even hint at it, and blandly puts
down both vessels in the total " American
loss " at the end of his smaller work. Worse
still, when the Growler again changed hands,
he counts it in again, in the total, as if it were
an entirely different boat, although he inva-
riably rules out of the American list all recap-
tured vessels. A more serious perversion of
facts are his statements about comparative
tonnage. This was at that time measured ar-
bitrarily, the depth of hold being estimated at
half the breadth of beam ; and the tonnage of
our lake vessels was put down exactly as if
they were regular ocean cruisers of the same
dimensions in length and breadth. But on
these inland seas the vessels really did not
draw more than half as much water as on the
ocean, and the depth would of course be much
less. James, in comparing the tonnage, gives
that of the Americans as if they were regular
ocean ships, but in the case of the British ves-
sels, carefully allows for their shallowness,
although professing to treat the two classes in
the same way ; and thus he makes out a most
striking and purely imaginary difference. The
best example is furnished by his accounts of
the fleets on Lake Erie. The captured vessels
were appraised by two captains and the ship-
builder, Mr. Henry Eckford ; their tonnage
being computed precisely as the tonnage of

190 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

the American vessels. The appraisement was
recorded in the Navy Department, and was
first made public by Cooper, so that it could
not have been done for effect. Thus meas-
ured it was found that the tonnage was in round
numbers as follows : Detroit, 490 tons ;
Queen Charlotte, 400 ; Lady Prevost, 230 ;
Hunter, 180; Little Belt, 90 ; Chippeway, 70.
James makes them measure respectively 305,
280, 120, 74, 54, and 32 tons, but carefully
gives the American ships the regular sea ton-
nage. So also he habitually deducts about
25 per cent, from the real number of men on
board the British ships ; as regards Lake Erie
he contradicts himself so much that he does
not need to be exposed from outside sources.
But the most glaring and least excusable mis-
statements are made as to the battle of Lake
Champlain, where he gives the American as
greatly exceeding the British force. He
reaches this conclusion by the most marvel-
lous series of garblings and misstatements.
First, he says that the Conjiance and the
Saratoga were of nearly equal tonnage. The
Conjiance being captured was placed on our
naval lists, where for years she ranked as a
36-gun frigate, while the Saratoga ranked
among the 24-gun corvettes; and by actual
measurement the former was half as large
again as the latter. He gives the Conjiance
but 270 men ; one of her officers, in a letter
published in the London Naval Chro?iicle,x
gives her over 300 ; more than that number
of dead and prisoners were taken out of her.

1 Vol. xxxii, p. 272. The letter also says that hard-
ly five of her men remained unhurt.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 191

He misstates the calibre of her guns, and
counts out two of them because they were
used through the bow-ports ; whereas, from
the method in which she made her attack,
these would have been peculiarly effective.
The guns are given accurately by Cooper, on
the authority of an officer ' who was on board
the Confiance within 15 minutes after the Lin-
net struck, and who was in charge of her for
two months.

Then James states that there were but 10
British gallies, while Sir George Prevost's of-
ficial account, as well as all the American
authorities, state the number to be 12. He
says that the Finch grounded opposite an
American battery before the engagement
began, while in reality it was an hour after-
ward, and because she had been disabled by
the shot of the American fleet. The gallies
were largely manned by Canadians, and
James, anxious to put the blame on these
rather than the British, says that they acted
in the most cowardly way, whereas in reality
they caused the Americans more trouble than
Downie's smaller sailing vessels did. His ac-
count of the armament of these vessels dif-
fers widely from the official reports. He gives
the Linnet and Chubb a smaller number of men
than the number of prisoners that were actually
taken out of them, not including the dead.
Even misstating Downie's force in guns,
underestimating the number of his men,
and leaving out two of his gunboats, did not
content James ; and to make the figures show
a proper disproportion, he says (vol. vi, p.

1 Lieutenant E. A. F. Lavallette.

192 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

504) that he shall exclude the Finch from the
estimate, because she grounded, and half of
the gunboats, because he does not think they
acted bravely. Even were these assertions
true, it would be quite as logical for an Amer-
ican writer to put the Chesapeake' s crew down
as only 200, and say he should exclude the
other men from the estimate because they
flinched ; and to exclude all the guns that
were disabled by shot, would be no worse than
to exclude the Finch. James' manipulation of
the figures is a really curious piece of audacity.
Naturally, subsequent British historians have
followed him without inquiry. James' ac-
count of this battle, alone, amply justifies our
rejecting his narrative entirely, as far as af-
fairs on the lakes go, whenever it conflicts
with any other statement, British or Amer-
ican. Even when it does not conflict, it must
be followed with extreme caution, for when-
ever he goes into figures the only thing certain
about them is that they are wrong. He gives
no details at all of most of the general actions.
Of these, however, we already possess ex-
cellent accounts, the best being those in the
11 Manual of Naval Tactics,'' by Commander
J. H. Ward, U. S. N. (1859), and in Lossing's
"Field-Book of the War of 1812," and
Cooper's " Naval History." The chief dif-
ficulty occurs in connection with matters on
Lake Ontario, ' where I have been obliged to

1 The accounts of the two commanders on Lake
Ontario are as difficult to reconcile as are those of the
contending admirals in the battles which the Dutch
waged against the English and French during the years
1672-167 5. In every one of De Ruyter's last six bat-

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

have recourse to a perfect patchwork of
authors and even newspapers, for the details,
using Nile's Register and James as mutual cor-
rectives. The armaments and equipments
being so irregular I have not, as in other
cases, made any allowance for the short weight
of the American shot, as here the British may-
have suffered under a similar disadvantage ;
and it may be as well to keep in mind that on
these inland waters the seamen of the two
navies seem to have been as evenly matched
in courage and skill as was possible. They
were of exactly the same stock, with the sole
exception that among and under, but entirely
distinct from, the Canadian-English, fought
the descendants of the conquered Canadian-
French ; and even these had been trained by
Englishmen, were led by English captains,
fought on ships built by English gold, and
with English weapons and discipline.

ON LAKE ONTARIO.

There being, as already explained, three
independent centres of inland naval opera-
tions, the events at each will be considered
separately.

At the opening of the war Lieutenant Wool-
sey, with the Oneida, was stationed at Sackett's

ties each side regularly claimed the victory, although
there can be but little doubt that on the whole the
strategical, and probably the tactical, advantage re-
mained with De Ruyter. Every historian ought to
feel a sense of the most lively gratitude toward Nelson ;
in his various encounters he never left any possible
room for dispute as to which side had come out first
best.

194 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Harbor, which was protected at the entrance
by a small fort with a battery composed of
one long 32. The Canadian squadron of six
ships, mounting nearly 80 guns, was of course
too strong to be meddled with. Indeed, had
the Royal George, 22, the largest vessel, been
commanded by a regular British sea-officer,
she would have been perfectly competent to
take both the Oneida and Sackett's Harbor ;
but before the Canadian commodore, Earle,
made up his mind to attack, Lieut. Woolsey
had time to make one or two short cruises,
doing some damage among the merchant ves-
sels of the enemy.

On the 19th of July Earle's ships appeared
off the Harbor ; the Oneida was such a dull
sailor that it was useless for her to try to es-
cape, so she was hauled up under a bank
where she raked the entrance, and her off
guns landed and mounted on the shore, while
Lieut. Woolsey took charge of the "battery,"
or long 32, in the fort. The latter was the
only gun that was of much use, for after a
desultory cannonade of about an hour, Earle
withdrew, having suffered very little damage,
inflicted none at all, and proved himself and
his subordinates to be grossly incompetent.

Acting under orders, Lieut. Woolsey now
set about procuring merchant schooners to be
fitted and used as gun-vessels until more
regular cruisers could be built. A captured
British schooner was christened the Julia,
armed with a long 32 and two 6's, manned
with 30 men, under Lieut. Henry Wells, and
sent down to Ogdensburg. " On her way
thither she encountered and actually beat off,

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 195

without losing a man, the Moira, of 14, and
Gloucester, of 10 guns." ' Five other schooners
were also purchased ; the Hamilton, of 10
guns, being the largest, while the other four,
the Governor Tompkms, Growler, Conquest,
and Pert had but 11 pieces between them.
Nothing is more difficult than to exactly de-
scribe the armaments of the smaller lake ves-
sels. The American schooners were mere
make-shifts, and their guns were frequently
changed ; a as soon as they could be dispensed
with they were laid up, or sold, and forgotten.

It was even worse with the British, who
manifested the most indefatigable industry in
intermittently changing the armament, rig,
and name of almost every vessel, and, the
records being very loosely kept, it is hard to
find what was the force at any one time. A
vessel which in one conflict was armed with
long i8's, in the next would have replaced
some of them with 68-pound carronades ; or,
beginning life as a ship, she would do most of
her work as a schooner, and be captured as a
brig, changing her name even oftener than
anything else.

On the first of September Commodore Isaac
Chauncy was appointed commander of the
forces on the lakes (except of those on Lake

1 James, vi, 350.

2 They were always having accidents happen to them
that necessitated some alteration. If a boat was armed
with a long 32, she rolled too much, and they substi-
tuted a 14; if she also had an 18-pound carronade, it
upset down the hatchway in the middle of a fight, and
made way for a long 12, which burst as soon as it was
used, and was replaced by two medium 6's. So a regu-
lar gamut of changes would be rung.

196 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12.

Champlain), and he at once bent his energies
to preparing an effective flotilla. A large
party of ship-carpenters were immediately
despatched to the Harbor ; and they were
soon followed by about a hundred officers and
seamen, with guns, stores, etc. The keel of a
ship to mount 24 32-pound carronades, and to
be called the Madison, was laid down, and she
was launched on the 26th of November, just
when navigation had closed on account of the
ice. Late in the autumn, four more schooners
were purchased, and named the Ontario,
Scourge, Fair American, and Asft, but these
were hardly used until the following spring.
The cruising force of the Americans was com-
posed solely of the Oneida and the six
schooners first mentioned. The British squad-
ron was of nearly double this strength, and had
it been officered and trained as it was during-
the ensuing summer, the Americans could not
have stirred out of port. But as it was, it
merely served as a kind of water militia, the
very sailors, who subsequently did well, being
then almost useless, and unable to oppose
their well-disciplined foes, though the latter
were so inferior in number and force. For
the reason that it was thus practically a con-
test of regulars against militia, I shall not
give numerical comparisons of the skirmishes
in the autumn of 18 12, and shall touch on
them but slightly. They teach the old lesson
that, whether by sea or land, a small, well-
officered, and well-trained force, can not, ex-
cept very rarely, be resisted by a greater
number of mere militia ; and that in the end
it is true economy to have the regular force

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 197

prepared beforehand, without waiting until we
have been forced to prepare it by the disasters
happening to the irregulars. The Canadian
seamen behaved badly, but no worse than the
American land-forces did at the same time ;
later, under regular training, both nations re-
trieved their reputations.

Commodore Chauncy arrived at Sackett's
Harbor in October, and appeared on the lake
on Nov. 8th, in the Oneida, Lieutenant Wool-
sey, with the six schooners Conquest, Lieu-
tenant Elliott ; Hamilton, Lieutenant McPher-
son ; Tompkins, Lieutenant Brown ; Pert,
Sailing-master Arundel ; Julia, Sailing-master
Trant; Growler, Sailing-master Mix. The
Canadian vessels were engaged in conveying
supplies from the westward. Commodore
Chauncy discovered the Royal George off the
False Duck Islands, and chased her under
the batteries of Kingston, on the 9th.
Kingston was too well defended to be taken
by such a force as Chauncy's ; but the latter
decided to make a reconnaissance, to discover
the enemy's means of defence and see if it
was possible to lay the Royal George aboard.
At 3 p.m. the attack was made. The Hamilton
and Tompkins were absent chasing, and did
not arrive until the fighting had begun. The
other four gunboats, Conquest, Julia, Pert,
and Growlery led, in the order named, to open
the attack with their heavy guns, and prepare
the way for the Oneida, which followed. At
the third discharge the Pcrfs gun burst, put-
ting her nearly hors de combat, badly wound-
ing her gallant commander, Mr. Arundel
(who shortly afterward fell overboard and was

198 NAVAL WAR OF 1812,

drowned), and slightly wounding four of her
crew. The other gunboats engaged the five
batteries of the enemy, while the Oneida
pushed on without firing a shot till at 3.40 she
opened on the Royal George, and after 20
minutes' combat actually succeeded in com-
pelling her opponent, though of double her
force, to cut her cables, run in, and tie herself
to a wharf, where some of her people de-
serted her ; here she was under the protection
of a large body of troops, and the Americans
could not board her in face of the land forces.
It soon began to grow dusk, and Chauncy's
squadron beat out through the channel,
against a fresh head-wind. In this spirited
attack the American loss had been confined
to half a dozen men, and had fallen almost
exclusively on the Oiieida. The. next day
foul weather came on, and the squadron sailed
for Sackett's Harbor. Some merchant vessels
were taken, and the Simco, 8, was chased, but
unsuccessfully.

The weather now became cold and tempes-
tuous, but cruising continued till the middle
of November. The Canadian commanders,
however, utterly refused to fight ; the Royal
George even fleeing from the Oneida, when
the latter was entirely alone, and leaving the
American commodore in undisputed command
of the lake. Four of the schooners continued
blockading Kingston till the middle of No-
vember ; shortly afterward navigation closed.1

1 These preliminary events were not very important,
and the historians on both sides agree almost exactly,
sc that I have not considered it necessary to quote
authorities.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 199

LAKE ERIE.

On Lake Erie there was no American naval
force ; but the army had fitted out a small
brig, armed with six 6-pounders. This fell into
the hands of the British at the capture of
Detroit, and was named after that city, so
that by the time a force of American officers
and seamen arrived at the lake there was not
a vessel on it for them to serve in, while their
foes had eight. But we only have to deal
with two of the latter at present. The Detroit,
still mounting six 6-pounders, and with a
crew of 56 men, under the command of Lieu-
tenant of Marines Rolette, of the Royal Navy,
assisted by a boatswain and gunner, and con-
taining also 30 American prisoners, and
the Caledonia, a small brig mounting two
4-pounders on pivots, with a crew of 12 men,
Canadian-English, under Mr. Irvine, and
having aboard also 10 American prisoners,
and a very valuable cargo of furs worth about
$200,000, moved down the lake, and on Oct.
7th anchored under Fort Erie.1

Commander Jesse D. Elliott had been sent
up to Erie some time before with instructions
from Commodore Chauncy to construct a
naval force, partly by building two brigs of
300 tons each,' and partly by purchasing

1 Letter of Captain Jesse D. Elliott to Secretary of
Navy, Black Rock, Oct. 5, 181 2.

2 That is, of 300 tons actual capacity ; measured as
if they had been ordinary sea vessels they each tonned
480. Their opponent, the ship Detroit, similarly
tonned 30$, actual measurement, or 490, computing it
in the ordinary manner.

200 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

schooners to act as gunboats. No sailors
had yet arrived ; but on the very day on
which the two brigs moved down and an-
chored under Fort Erie, Captain Elliott re-
ceived news that the first detachment of the
promised seamen, 51 in number, including
officers,1 was but a few miles distant. He at
once sent word to have these men hurried up,
but when they arrived they were found to
have no arms, for which application was
made to the military authorities. The latter
not only gave a sufficiency of sabres, pistols,
and muskets to the sailors, but also detailed
enough soldiers, under Captain N. Towson
and Lieutenant Isaac Roach, to make the
total number of men that took part in the
expedition 124. This force left Black Rock
at one o'clock on the morning of the 8th in
two large boats, one under the command of
Commander Elliott, assisted by Lieutenant
Roach, the other under Sailing-master George
Watts and Captain Towson. After two
hours' rowing they reached the foe, and the
attack was made at three o'clock. Elliott
laid his boat alongside the Detroit before he
was discovered, and captured her after a very
brief struggle, in which he lost but one man
killed, and Midshipman J. C. Cummings
wounded with a bayonet in the leg. The
noise of the scuffle roused the hardy provin-
cials aboard the Caledonia, and they were
thus enabled to make a far more effectual

1 The number of men in this expedition is taken
from Lossing's "Field-book of the War of 1812," by
Benson L. Lossing, New York, 1869, P- 3^5> note,
where a complete list of the names is given.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 201

resistance to Sailing-master Watts than the
larger vessel had to Captain Elliott. As
Watts pulled alongside he was greeted with a
volley of musketry, but at once boarded and
carried the brig, the twelve Canadians being
cut down or made prisoners ; one American
was killed and four badly wounded. The
wind was too light and the current too strong
to enable the prizes to beat out and reach the
lake, so the cables were cut and they ran
down stream. The Caledonia was safely
beached under the protection of an American
battery near Black Rock. The Detroit, how-
ever, was obliged to anchor but four hundred
yards from a British battery, which, together
with some flying artillery, opened on her.
Getting all his guns on the port side, Elliott
kept up a brisk cannonade till his ammunition
gave out, when he cut his cable and soon
grounded on Squaw Island. Here the Detroit
was commanded by the guns of both sides,
and which ever party took possession of her
was at once driven out by the other. The
struggle ended in her destruction, most of her
guns being taken over to the American side.
This was a very daring and handsome exploit,
reflecting great credit on Commander Elliott,
and giving the Americans, in the Caledonia,
the nucleus of their navy on Lake Erie ; soon
afterward Elliott returned to Lake Ontario, a
new detachment of seamen under Commander
S. Angus having arrived.

On the 28th of November, the American
general, Smith, despatched two parties to
make an attack on some of the British bat-
teries. One of these consisted of 10 boats,

202 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

under the command of Captain King of the
15th infantry, with 150 soldiers, and with him
went Mr. Angus with 82 sailors, including
officers. The expedition left at one o'clock in
the morning, but was discovered and greeted
with a warm fire from a field battery placed in
front of some British barracks known as the
Red House. Six of the boats put back ; but
the other four, containing about a hundred
men, dashed on. While the soldiers were
forming line and firing, the seamen rushed in
with their pikes and axes, drove off the British,
captured their commander, Lieut. King, of
the Royal Army, spiked and threw into the
river the guns, and then took the barracks
and burned them, after a desperate fight.
Great confusion now ensued, which ended in
Mr. Angus and some of the seamen going off
in the boats. Several had been killed ; eight,
among whom were Midshipmen Wragg, Dud-
ley, and Holdup, all under 20 years old, re-
mained with the troops under Captain King,
and having utterly routed the enemy found
themselves deserted by their friends. After
staying on the shore a couple of hours some
of them found two boats and got over ; but
Captain King and a few soldiers were taken
prisoners. Thirty of the seamen, including
nine of the twelve officers, were killed or
wounded — among the former being Sailing-
masters Sisson and Watts, and among the
latter Mr. Angus, Sailing-master Carter, and
Midshipmen Wragg, Holdup, Graham, Brailes-
ford, and Irvine. Some twenty prisoners
were secured and taken over to the American
shore ; the enemy's loss was more severe than

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 203

ours, his resistance being very stubborn, and
a good many cannon were destroyed, but the
expedition certainly ended most disastrously.
The accounts of it are hard to reconcile, but
it is difficult to believe that Mr. Angus acted
correctly.

Later in the winter Captain Oliver Hazard
Perry arrived to take command of the forces
on Lake Erie.

204 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

CHAPTER V.
1813.

ON THE OCEAN.

Blockade of the American coast — The Essex in the
South Pacific — The Hornet captures the Peacock —
American privateers cut out by British boats — Unsuc-
cessful cruise of Commodore Rodgers — The Chesapeake
is captured by the Shannon — Futile gunboat actions —
Defence of Craney Island — Cutting out expeditions —
The Argus is captured by the Pelican — The Enterprise
captures the Boxer — Summary.

BY the beginning of the year 18 13 the British
had been thoroughly aroused by the
American successes, and active measures were
at once taken to counteract them. The force
on the American station was largely increased,
and a strict blockade begun, to keep the
American frigates in port. The British frigates
now cruised for the most part in couples, and
orders were issued by the Board of Admiralty
that an 18-pounder frigate was not to engage
an American 24-pounder. Exaggerated ac-
counts of the American 44/s being circulated,
a new class of spar-deck frigates was con-
structed to meet them, rating 50 and mounting
60 guns ; and some 74's were cut down for
the same purpose.1 These new ships were all
much heavier than their intended opponents.
As New England's loyalty to the Union was,

1 James, vi, p. 206.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 205

not unreasonably, doubted abroad, her coasts
were at first troubled but little. A British
squadron was generally kept cruising off the
end of Long Island Sound, and another off
Sandy Hook. Of course America had no
means of raising a blockade, as each squadron
contained generally a 74 or a razee, vessels
too heavy for any in our navy to cope with.
Frigates and sloops kept skirting the coasts of
New Jersey, the Carolinas, and Georgia.
Delaware Bay no longer possessed the impor-
tance it had during the Revolutionary War,
and as the only war vessels in it were some
miserable gunboats, the British generally kept
but a small force on that station. Chesapeake
Bay became the principal scene of their opera-
tions ; it was there that their main body
collected, and their greatest efforts were
made. In it a number of line-of-battle ships,
frigates, sloops, and cutters had been col-
lected, and early in the season Admiral Sir
John Warren and Rear-Admiral Cockburn
arrived to take command. The latter made
numerous descents on the coast, and fre-
quently came into contact with the local militia,
who generally fled after a couple of volleys.
These expeditions did not accomplish much,
beyond burning the houses and driving off the
live-stock of the farmers along shore, and
destroying a few small towns — one of them,
Hampton, being sacked with revolting brutal-
ity.1 The government of the United States
was, in fact, supported by the people in its

1 James (vi, 340) says : The conduct of the British
troops on this occasion was " revolting to human na-
ture " and " disgraceful to the flag."

206 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

war policy very largely on account of these
excesses, which were much exaggerated by
American writers. It was really a species of
civil war, and in such a contest, at the begin-
ning of this century, it was impossible that
some outrages should not take place.

The American frigate Co7istellatio?i had by
this time got ready for sea, and, under the
command of Captain Stewart, she prepared to
put out early in January. As the number of
blockaders rendered a fight almost certain
within a few days of her departure, her crew
were previously brought to the highest state
of discipline, the men being exercised with
especial care in handling the great guns and
in firing at a target.1 However, she never got
out ; for when she reached Hampton Roads
she fell in with a British squadron of line-of-
battle ships and frigates. She kedged up
toward Norfolk, and when the tide rose ran
in and anchored between the forts ; and a few
days later dropped down to cover the forts
which were being built at Craney Island.
Here she was exposed to attacks from the
great British force still lying in Hampton
Roads, and, fearing they would attempt to
carry her by surprise, Captain Stewart made
every preparation for defence. She was
anchored in the middle of the narrow channel,
flanked by gunboats, her lower ports closed,
not a rope left hanging over the sides ; the
boarding nettings, boiled in half-made pitch till
they were as hard as wire, were triced out-
board toward the yard-arms, and loaded with

1 Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jones (Savan-
nah, 1878), p. 15.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 207

kentledge to fall on the attacking boats when
the tricing lines were cut, while the carronades
were loaded to the muzzle with musket balls,
and depressed so as to sweep the water near
the ship.1 Twice, a force of British, estimated
by their foes to number 2,000 men, started off
at night to carry the Constellation by surprise ;
but on each occasion they were discovered and
closely watched by her guard-boats, and they
never ventured to make the attack. How-
ever, she was unable to get to sea, and re-
mained blockaded to the close of the war.

At the beginning of the year several frigates
and smaller craft were at sea. The C/iesa-
peake, Captain Evans, had sailed from Boston
on Dec. 13, 18 12.2 She ran down past Ma-
deira, the Canaries, and Cape de Verde,
crossed the equator, and for six weeks cruised
to the south of the line between longitudes
1 6° and 250. Thence she steered to the west,
passing near Surinam, over the same spot on
which the Hornet had sunk the Peacock but
a day previous. Cruising northward through
the West Indies, she passed near the Ber-
mudas, where she was chased by a 74 and a
frigate ; escaping from them she got into
Boston on April 9th, having captured five
merchantmen, and chased unsuccessfully for
two days a brig-sloop. The term of two
years for which her crew were enlisted now
being up, they, for the most part, left, in con-
sequence of some trouble about the prize-

1 For an admirable account of these preparations, as
well as of the subsequent events, see Cooper, ii, 242.

a Statistical " History of the U. S. Navy," by Lieuten-
ant C. E. Emmons.

208 NAVAL WAR OF 1S12.

money. Captain Evans being in ill health,
Captain James Lawrence was appointed to
command her. He reached Boston about the
middle of May 1 and at once set about enlist-
ing a new crew, and tried, with but partial
success, to arrange matters with the old
sailors, who were now almost in open mutiny.

When the year 18 12 had come to an end,
the Essex, $2, was in the South Atlantic, and
Captain Porter shortly afterward ran into St.
Catherines to water. Being at a loss where
to find his consorts, he now decided to adopt
the exceedingly bold measure of doubling Cape
Horn and striking at the British whalers in
the Pacific. This was practically going into
the enemy's waters, the Portuguese and Span-
ish countries being entirely under the influence
of Britain, while there were no stations where
Porter could revictual or repair in safety.
However, the Essex started, doubled the Horn,
and on March 13th anchored in the harbor of
Valparaiso. Her adventurous cruise in the
Pacific was the most striking feature of the war ;
but as it has been most minutely described by
Commodore Porter himself, by his son, Ad-
miral Porter, by Admiral Farragut, and by
Cooper, I shall barely touch upon it.

On March 20th the Essex captured the
Peruvian corsair Nereyda, 16, hove her guns
and small arms overboard, and sent her into

1 He was still on the Hornet at New York on May
10th, as we knew from a letter of Biddle's, written on
that date (in letters of " Masters' Commandant," 1813,
No. 58), and so could hardly have been with the Chesa-
peake two weeks before he put out ; and had to get his
crew together and train them during that time.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 209

port. She made the island of San Gallan,
looked into Cailao, and thence went to the
Gallipagos, getting everything she wanted
from her prizes. Then she went to Tumbez,
and returned to the Gallipagos ; thence to the
Marquesas, and finally back to Valparaiso
again. By this year's campaign in the Pacific,
Captain Porter had saved all our ships in
those waters, had not cost the government a
dollar, living purely on the enemy, and had
taken from him nearly 4,000 tons of shipping
and 400 men, completely breaking up his
whaling trade in the South Pacific.

The cruise was something sui ge?uris in
modern warfare, recalling to mind the cruises
of the early English and Dutch navigators.
An American ship was at a serious disadvan-
tage in having no harbor of refuge away from
home ; while on almost every sea there were
British, French, and Spanish ports into which
vessels of those nations could run for safety.
It was an unprecedented thing for a small
frigate to cruise a year and a half in enemy's
waters, and to supply herself during that time,
purely from captured vessels, with everything
— cordage, sails, guns, anchors, provisions,
and medicines, and even money to pay the
officers and men ! Porter's cruise was the
very model of what such an expedition should
be, harassing the enemy most effectually at
no cost whatever. Had the Essex been de-
cently armed with long guns, instead of car-
ronades, the end might have been as successful
as it was glorious. The whalers were many of
them armed letters-of-marque, and, though of
course unable to oppose the frigate, several
14

2io NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

times smart skirmishes occurred in attacking
them with boats, or in captured ships ; as when
Lieutenant Downs and 20 men in the prize
Georgiana after a short brush captured the
Hector, with 25 men, two of whom were killed
and six wounded ; and when, under similar
circumstances, the prize Greenwich, of 25
men, captured the Seri?igapatam of 40. The
cruise of the Essex, the first American man-
of-war ever in the Pacific, a year and a half
out and many thousand miles away from home,
was a good proof of Porter's audacity in
planning the trip and his skill and resource in
carrying it out.

To return now to the Hornet This vessel
had continued blockading the Bonne Citoyemie
until January 24th, when the Montagu, 74, ar-
rived toward evening and chased her into
port. As the darkness came on the Hornet
wore, stood out to sea, passing into the open
without molestation from the 74, and then
steered toward the northeast, cruising near the
coast, and making a few prizes, among which
was a brig, the Resolution, with $23,000 in
specie aboard, captured on February 14th.
On the 24th of February, while nearing the
mouth of the Demerara River, Captain Law-
rence discovered a brig to leeward, and chased
her till he ran into quarter less five, when,
having no pilot, he hauled off-shore. Just
within the bar a man-of-war brig was lying at
anchor ; and while beating round Caroband
Bank, in order to get at her, Captain Law-
rence discovered another sail edging down on
his weather-quarter. ' The brig at anchor was

1 Letter of Captain Lawrence, March 29, 1813.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 211

the Espiegle, of 18 guns, 32-pound carronades,
Captain John Taylor ; ' and the second brig
seen was the Peacock, Captain William Peake,a
which, for some unknown reason, had ex-
changed her 32-pound carronades for 24's.
She had sailed from the Espiegle's anchorage
the same morning at 10 o'clock. At 4.20 p. m.
the Peacock hoisted her colors ; then the Hor-
net beat to quarters and cleared for action.
Captain Lawrence kept close by the wind, in
order to get the weather-gage ; when he was
certain he could weather the enemy, he tacked,
at 5.10, and the Hornet hoisted her colors.
The ship and the brig now stood for each other,
both on the wind, the Hornet being on the
starboard and the Peacock on the port tack,
and at 5.25 they exchange broadsides, at half
pistol-shot distance, while going in opposite
directions, the Americans using their lee and
the British their weather battery. The guns
were fired as they bore, and the Peacock suf-
fered severely, while her antagonist's hull was
uninjured, though she suffered slightly aloft
and had her pennant cut off by the first shot
fired.' One of the men in the mizzen-top was
killed by a round shot, and two more were
wounded in the main-top.4 As soon as they
were clear, Captain Peake put his helm hard
up and wore, firing his starboard guns ; but
the Hornet had watched him closely, bore up
as quickly, and coming down at 5. 35, ran him
close aboard on the starboard quarter. Cap-

1 James, vi. 278. 2 Do. 8 Cooper, p. 200.

4 See entry in her log for the day (In ,4 Log- Book of
Hornet, Wasp, and Argus, from July 20, 1809, to Octo-
ber 6, 18 1 3,") in the Bureau of Navigation, at Wash-
ington-

212 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

tain Peake fell at this moment, together with
many of his crew, and, unable to withstand
the Hornefs heavy fire, the Peacock surren-
dered at 5.39, just 14 minutes after the first
shot; and directly afterward hoisted her en-
sign union down in the forerigging as a signal
of distress. Almost immediately her main-
mast went by the board. Both vessels then
anchored, and Lieutenant J. T. Shubrick,
being sent on board the prize, reported her
sinking. Lieutenant D. Connor was then
sent in another boat to try to save the vessel ;
but though they threw the guns overboard,
plugged the shot holes, tried the pumps, and
even attempted bailing, the water gained so
rapidly that the Hornefs officers devoted them-
selves to removing the wounded and other
prisoners ; and while thus occupied the short
tropical twilight left them. Immediately after-
ward the prize settled, suddenly and easily, in
$Yz fathoms water, carrying with her three
of the Hornefs people and nine of her own,
who were rummaging below ; meanwhile four
others of her crew had lowered her damaged
stern boat, and in the confusion'got off un-
observed and made their way to the land.
The foretop still remained above water, and
four of the prisoners saved themselves by run-
ning up the rigging into it. Lieutenant Con-
nor and Midshipman Cooper (who had also
come on board) saved themselves, together
with most of their people and the remainder of
the Peacock's crew, by jumping into the launch,
which was lying on the booms, and paddling
her toward the ship with pieces of boards in
default of oars.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 213

The Hornets complement at this time was
150, of whom she had 8 men absent in a prize
and 7 on the sick list,1 leaving 135 fit for duty
in the action ; a of these one man was killed,
and two wounded, all aloft. Her rigging and
sails were a good deal cut, a shot had gone
through the foremast, and the bowsprit was
slightly damaged ; the only shot that touched
her hull merely glanced athwart her bows,
indenting a plank beneath the cat-head. The
Peacock's crew had amounted to 134, but 4
were absent in a prize, and but 122' fit for
action ; of these she lost her captain, and
seven men killed and mortally wounded, and
her master, one midshipman, and 28 men
severely and slightly wounded, — in all 8 killed
and 30 wounded, or about 13 times her antago-
nist's loss. She suffered under the disadvan-
tage of light metal, having 24/s opposed to
32's; but judging from her gunnery this was
not much of a loss, as 6-pounders would have
inflicted nearly as great damage. She was
well handled and bravely fought ; but her
men showed a marvellous ignorance of gun-
nery. It appears that she had long been
known as ** the yacht," on account of the
tasteful arrangement of her deck ; the breech-
ings of the carronades were lined with white
canvas, and nothing could exceed in brilliancy
the polish upon the traversing bars and ele-
vating screws.4 In other words, Captain

1 Letter of Captain Lawrence.

2 Letter of Lieutenant D. Conner, April 26, 1813.

8 Letter of Lieutenant F. W. Wright (of the Peacock),
April 17, 1813.
4 James, vi, 280.

214 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Peake had confounded the mere incidents of
good discipline with the essentials.1

The Hornefs victory cannot be regarded in
any other light than as due, not to the heavier
metal, but to the far more accurate* firing of
the Americans ; " had the guns of the Peacock
been of the largest size they could not have
changed the result, as the weight of shot that
do not hit is of no great moment." Any mer-
chant-ship might have been as well handled
and bravely defended as she was ; and an
ordinary letter-of-marque would have made as
creditable a defence.

During the entire combat the Espiegle was
not more than 4 miles distant and was plainly
visible from the Hornet; but for some reason
she did not come out, and her commander
reported that he knew nothing of the action
till the next day. Captain Lawrence of course
was not aware of this, and made such exer-
tions to bend on new sails, stow his boats,
and clear his decks that by nine o'clock he
was again prepared for action,2 and at 2 p. m.
got under way for the N. W. Being now over-
crowded with people and short of water he
stood for home, anchoring at Holmes' Hole
in Martha's Vineyard on the 19th of March.

On their arrival at New York the officers of
the Peacock published a card expressing in the
warmest terms their appreciation of the way
they and their men had been treated. Say
they : " We ceased to consider ourselves pris-
oners ; and everything that friendship could

1 Codrington ("Memoirs," i, 310) comments very
forcibly on the uselessness of a mere martinet.

2 Letter of Captain Lawrence.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 215

/ \

216 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

dictate was adopted by you and the officers of
the Hornet to remedy the inconvenience we
would otherwise have experienced from the
unavoidable loss of the whole of our property
and clothes owing to the sudden sinking of
the Peacock." ' This was signed by the first
and second lieutenants, the master, surgeon
and purser.

Weight
Tonnage. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss.

Hornet 480 10 279 135 3

Peacock 477 10 210 122 38

Relative Relative Loss

Force. Inflicted.

Hornet 1.00 1.00

Peacock .83 .08

That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is
to 11, the relative execution was about as 13
is to 1.

The day after the capture Captain Lawrence
reported 277 souls aboard, including the crew
of the English brig Resolution which he had
taken, and of the American brig Hunter, prize
to the Peacock. As James, very ingeniously,
tortures these figures into meaning what they
did not, it may be well to show exactly what
the 277 included. Of the Hornefs original
crew of 150, 8 were absent in a prize, t killed,
and 3 drowned, leaving (including 7 sick) 138 ;
of the Peacock's original 134, 4 were absent in
a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4 escaped,
leaving (including 8 sick and 3 mortally
wounded) 112; there were also aboard 16
other British prisoners, and the Hunter's crew

1 Quoted in full in " Niles' Register " and Lossing's
" Field Book."

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 217

of 11 men — making just 277.1 According to
Lieutenant Connor's letter, written in response
to one from Lieutenant Wright, there were in
reality 139 in the Peacock's crew when she
began action ; but it is, of course, best to take
each commander's account of the number of
men on board his ship that were fit for duty.
On Jan. 17th the Viper, 12, Lieutenant J.
D. Henly, was captured by the British frigate
Narcissus, 32, Captain Lumly.

On Feb. 8th, while a British squadron, con-
sisting of the four frigates Belvidera (Captain
Richard Byron), Maidstone, Junon, and Statira,
were at anchor in Lynhaven Bay, a schooner
was observed in the northeast standing down
Chesapeake Bay.2 This was the Lottery, let-
ter-of-marque, of six 12-pounder carronades
and 25 men, Captain John Southcomb, bound
from Baltimore to Bombay. Nine boats, with
200 men, under the command of Lieutenant
Kelly Nazer were sent against her, and, a
calm coming on, overtook her. The schooner
opened a well-directed fire of round and
grape, but the boats rushed forward and
boarded her, not carrying her till after a most
obstinate struggle, in which Captain South-
comb and 19 of his men, together with 13 of
the assailants, were killed or wounded. The
best war ship of a regular navy might be

1 The 277 men were thus divided into : Hornet's
crew, 118; Peacock's crew, 112; Resolution's crew, 16;
Hunters crew II. James quotes M 270" men, which
he divides as follows : Hornet, 160, Peacock, 101, Hunter,
9, — leaving out the Resolution's crew, 1 1 of the Peacock's
and 2 of the Hunter's.

2 James, vi, 325.

2i8 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

proud of the discipline and courage displayed
by the captain and crew of the little Lottery.
Captain Byron on this, as well as on many
another occasion, showed himself to be as
humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain
Southcomb, mortally wounded, was taken on
board Byron's frigate, where he was treated
with the greatest attention and most delicate
courtesy, and when he died his body was sent
ashore with every mark of the respect due to
so brave an officer. Captain Stewart (of the
Constellation) wrote Captain Byron a letter of
acknowledgment for his great courtesy and
kindness.1

On March 16th a British division of five
boats and 105 men, commanded by Lieutenant
James Polkinghorne, set out to attack the
privateer schooner Dolphin of 12 guns and 70
men, and the letters-of-marque, Racer, Arab,
and Lynx, each of six guns and 30 men.
Lieutenant Polkinghorne, after pulling 15
miles, found the four schooners all prepared
to receive him, but in spite of his great in-
feriority in force he dashed gallantly at them.
The Arab and Lynx surrendered at once ; the
Racer was carried after a sharp struggle in
which Lieutenant Polkinghorne was wounded,
and her guns turned on the Dolphin. Most
of the latter's crew jumped overboard; a few
rallied round their captain, but they were at
once scattered as the British seamen came
aboard. The assailants had 13, and the pri-

1 The correspondence between the two captains is
given in full in " Niles' Register," which also contains
fragmentary notes on the action, principally as to the
loss incurred.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 219

vateersmen 16 men killed and wounded in the
fight. It was certainly one of the most
brilliant and daring cutting-out expeditions
that took place during the war, and the victors
well deserved their success. The privateers-
men (according to the statement of the Dol-
phin's master, in " Niles' Register,") were
panic-struck, and acted in anything but a brave
manner. All irregular fighting-men do their
work by fits and starts. No regular cruisers
could behave better than did the privateers
Lottery, Chasseur, and General Armstrong ;
none would behave as badly as the Dolphin,
Lynx, and Arab. The same thing appears
on shore. Jackson's irregulars at New
Orleans did as well, or almost as well, as
Scott's troops at Lundy's Lane ; but Scott's
troops would never have suffered from such a
panic as overcame the militia at Bladensburg.

On April 9th the schooner Norwich, of 14
guns and 61 men, Sailing-master James Monk,
captured the British privateer Caledo?iia, of
10 guns and 41 men, after a short action in
which the privateer lost 7 men.

On April 30th Commodore Rodgers, in the
President, 44, accompanied by Captain Smith
in the Congress, 38, sailed on his third cruise.1
On May 2d he fell in with and chased the
British sloop Curlew, 18, Captain Michael
Head, but the latter escaped by knocking
away the wedges of her masts and using
other means to increase her rate of sailing.
On the 8th, in latitude 390 30' N., long. 6o°
W., the Congress parted company, and sailed
off toward the southeast, making four prizes,

1 Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 30, 1813.

220 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

of no great value, in the North Atlantic ; ■
when about in long. 35° W. she steered south,
passing to the south of the line. But she
never saw a man-of-war, and during the latter
part of her cruise not a sail of any kind ; and
after cruising nearly eight months returned to
Portsmouth Harbor on Dec. 14th, having cap-
tured but four merchantmen. Being unfit to
cruise longer, owing to her decayed condition,
she was disarmed and laid up ; nor was she
sent to sea again during the war.2

Meanwhile Rodgers cruised along the east-
ern edge of the Grand Bank until he reached
latitude 480, without meeting anything, then
stood to the southeast, and cruised off the
Azores till June 6th. Then he crowded sail
to the northeast after a Jamaica fleet of which
he had received news, but which he failed to
overtake, and on June 13th, in lat. 460, long.
280, he gave up the chase and shaped his
course toward the North Sea, still without
any good luck befalling him. On June 27th
he put into North Bergen in the Shetlands
for water, and thence passed the Orkneys and
stretched toward the North Cape, hoping to
intercept the Archangel fleet. On July 19th,

1 Letter of Captain Smith, Dec. 15, 1813.

2 James states that she was " blockaded " in port by
the Tenedos, during part of 1814; but was too much
awed by the fate of the Chesapeake to come out during
the " long blockade " of Captain Parker. Considering
the fact that she was too decayed to put to sea, had no
guns aboard, no crew, and was, in fact, laid up, the feat
of the Tenedos was not very wonderful ; a row-boat
could have " blockaded " her quite as well. It is worth
noticing, as an instance of the way James alters a fact
by suppressing half of it.

NAVAL IVAN OF 1812. 221

when off the North Cape, in lat. 710 52' N.,
long 200 18' E., he fell in with two sail of the
enemy, who made chase ; after four days'
pursuit the commodore ran his opponents out
of sight. According to his letter the two sail
were a line-of-battle ship and a frigate ; accord-
ing to James they were the 12-pounder frigate
Alexandria, Captain Cathcart, and Spitfire,
16, Captain Ellis. James quotes from the logs
of the two British ships, and it would seem
that he is correct, as it would not be possible
for him to falsify the logs so utterly. In case
he is true, it was certainly carrying caution to
an excessive degree for the commodore to re-
treat before getting some idea of what his
antagonists really were. His mistaking them
for so much heavier ships was a precisely
similar error to that made by Sir George
Collier and Lord Stuart at a later date about
the Cyanc and Levant. James wishes to
prove that each party perceived the force of
the other, and draws a contrast (p. 312) be-
tween the "gallantry of one party and pusil-
lanimity of the other." This is nonsense,
and, as in similar cases, James overreaches
himself by proving too much. If he had made
an 18-pounder frigate like the Congress flee
from another 18-pounder, his narrative would
be within the bounds of possibility and would
need serious examination. But the little 12-
pounder Alexandria, and the ship-sloop with
her 1 8- pound carronades, would not have
stood the ghost of a chance in the contest.
Any man who would have been afraid of them
would also have been afraid of the Little Belt,
the sloop Kodgers captured before the war.

222 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

As for Captains Cathcart and Ellis, had they
known the force of the President, and chased
her with a view of attacking her, their con-
duct would have only been explicable on the
ground that they were afflicted with emotional
insanity.

The President now steered southward and
got into the mouth of the Irish Channel ; on
August 2d she shifted her berth and almost
circled Ireland ; then steered across to New-
foundland, and worked south along the coast.
On Sept. 23d, a little south of Nantucket, she
decoyed under her guns and captured the
British schooner Highflyer, 6, Lieut. William
Hutchinson, and 45 men ; and went into
Newport on the 27th of the same month,
having made some 12 prizes.

On May 24th Commodore Decatur in the
United States, which had sent ashore six car-
ronades, and now mounted but 48 guns, ac-
companied by Captain Jones in the Macedo-
nian, 38, and Captain Biddle in the Wasp, 20,
left New York, passing through Hell Gate, as
there was a large blockading force off the Hook.
Opposite Hunter's Point the main-mast of the
States was struck by lightning, which cut off
the broad pendant, shot down the hatchway
into the doctor's cabin, put out his candle,
ripped up the bed, and entering between the
skin and ceiling of the ship tore off two or
three sheets of copper near the water-line, and
disappeared without leaving a trace ! The
Macedonian, which was close behind, hove all
aback, in expectation of seeing the States
blown up.

At the end of the sound Commodore De-

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 223

catur anchored to watch for a chance of getting
out. Early on June 1st he started ; but in a
couple of hours met the British Captain R. D.
Oliver's squadron, consisting of a 74, a razee,
and a frigate. These chased him back, and
all his three ships ran into New London.
Here, in the mud of the Thames river, the
two frigates remained blockaded till the close
of the war ; but the little sloop slipped out
later, to the enemy's cost.

We left the Chesapeake, 3%, being fitted out
at Boston by Captain James Lawrence, late of
the Hornet. Most of her crew, as already
stated, their time being up, left, dissatisfied
with the ship's ill luck, and angry at not hav-
ing received their due share of prize-money.
It was very hard to get sailors, most of the
men preferring to ship in some of the numerous
privateers where the discipline was less strict
and the chance of prize-money much greater.
In consequence of this an unusually large
number of foreigners had to be taken, includ-
ing about forty British and a number of Por-
tuguese. The latter were peculiarly trouble-
some ; one of their number, a boatswain's mate,
finally almost brought about a mutiny among
the crew, which was only pacified by giving
the men prize-checks. A few of the Constitu-
tions old crew came aboard, and these, together
with some of the men who had been on the
Chesapeake during her former voyage, made
an excellent nucleus. Such men needed very
little training at either guns or sails ; but the
new hands were unpractised, and came on
board so late that the last draft that arrived
still had their hammocks and bags lying in

224 NAVAL WAR OF 1812. ,

the boats stowed over the booms when the ship
was captured. The officers were largely new
to the ship, though the first lieutenant, Mr. A.
Ludlow, had been the third in her former
cruise ; the third and fourth lieutenants were
not regularly commissioned as such, but were
only midshipmen acting for the first time in
higher positions. Captain Lawrence himself
was of course new to all, both officers and
crew.1 In other words, the Chesapeake pos-
sessed good material, but in an exceedingly
unseasoned state.

Meanwhile the British frigate Shannon, 38,
Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, was cruising
off the mouth of the harbor. To give some
idea of the reason why she proved herself so
much more formidable than her British sister
frigates it may be well to quote, slightly con-
densing, from James :

" There was another point in which the
generality of British crews, as compared with
any one American crew, were miserably de-
ficient ; that is, skill in the art of gunnery.
While the American seamen were constantly
firing at marks, the British seamen, except in
particular cases, scarcely did so once in a year ;
and some ships could be named on board

1 On the day on which he sailed to attack the Shan-
non, Lawrence writes to the Secretary of the Navy as
follows : " Lieutenant Paige is so ill as to be unable to go
sea with the ship. At the urgent request of Acting-
Lieutenant Pierce I have granted him, also, permission
to go on shore \ one inducement for my granting his
request was his being at variance with every officer in
his mess." " Captains' Letters," vol. 29, No. 1, in the
Naval Archives at Washington. Neither officers nor
men had shaken together.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 225

which not a shot had been fired in this way
for upward of three years. Nor was the fault
wholly the captain's. The instructions under
which he was bound to act forbade him to use,
during the first six months after the ship had
received her armament, more shots per month
than amounted to a third in number of the
upper-deck guns ; and, after these six months,
only half the quantity. Many captains never
put a shot in the guns till an enemy appeared ;
they employed the leisure time of the men in
handling the sails and in decorating the ship.''
Captain Broke was not one of this kind.
" From the day on which he had joined her,
the 14th of September, 1806, the Shannon be-
gan to feel the effect of her captain's profi-
ciency as a gunner and zeal for the service.
The laying of the ship's ordnance so that it
may be correctly fired in a horizontal direction
is justly deemed a most important operation,
as upon it depends in a great measure the true
aim and destructive effect of the shot ; this
was attended to by Captain Broke in person.
By draughts from other ships, and the usual
means to which a British man-of-war is obliged
to resort, the Shannon got together a crew ;
and in the course of a year or two, by the
paternal care and excellent regulations of
Captain Broke, the ship's company became as
pleasant to command as it was dangerous to
meet." The Shannon1 s guns were all carefully
sighted, and, moreover, " every day, for about
an hour and a half in the forenoon, when not
prevented by chase or the state of the weather,
the men were exercised at training the guns,
and for the same time in the afternoon in the
15

226 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

use of the broadsword, pike, musket, etc.
Twice a week the crew fired at targets, both
with great guns and musketry ; and Captain
Broke, as an additional stimulus beyond the
emulation excited, gave a pound of tobacco
to every man that put a shot through the bull's
eye. " He would frequently have a cask thrown
overboard and suddenly order some one gun
to be manned to sink the cask. In short, the
Shannon was very greatly superior, thanks to
her careful training, to the average British
frigate of her rate, while the Chesapeake, owing
to her having a raw and inexperienced crew,
was decidedly inferior to the average American
frigate of the same strength.

In force the two frigates compared pretty
equally,1 the American being the superior in
just about the same proportion that the Wasp
was to the Frolic, or, at a later date, the Hornet
to the Pengui?t. The Chesapeake carried 50
guns (26 in broadside ), 28 long 18's on the
gun-deck, and on the spar-deck two long 12's,
one long 18, eighteen 32-pound carronades,
and one 12-pound carronade (which was not
used in the fight however). Her broadside, al-
lowing for the short weight of metal, was 542
lbs. ; her complement, 379 men. The Shannon
carried 52 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18's
on the gun-deck, and on the spar-deck four long
o/s, one long 6, 16 32-pound carronades, and
three 12-pound carronades (two of which were
not used in the fight). Her broadside was 550
lbs. ; her crew consisted of 330 men, 30 of
whom were raw hands. Early on the morning

1 Taking each commander's account for his own
force.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 227

of June 1st, Captain Broke sent in to Captain
Lawrence, by an American prisoner, a letter
of challenge, which for courteousness, manli-
ness, and candor is the very model of what
such an epistle should be. Before It reached
Boston, however, Captain Lawrence had
weighed anchor, to attack the Shannon, which
frigate was in full sight in the offing. It has
been often said that he engaged against his
judgment, but this may be doubted His ex-
perience with the Bonne Citoyenne, Espugle
and Peacock had not tended to give him a very
high idea of the navy to which he was opposed,
and there is no doubt that he was confident
of capturing the Shannon.1 It was most un-
fortunate that he did not receive Broke's letter,
as the latter in it expressed himself willing to
meet Lawrence in any latitude and longitude
he might appoint ; and there would thus have
been some chance of the American crew having
time enough to get into shape.

At midday of June 1, 18 12, the Chesapeake
weighed anchor, stood out of Boston Harbor,
and at 1 p. if. rounded the Light-house. The
Shannon stood off under easy sail, and at 3.40
hauled up and reefed top-sails. At 4 p. m.

1 In his letter written just before sailing (already
quoted on p. 224) he says : " An English frigate is now
in sight from our deck. • * ♦ I am in hopes to give
a good account of her before night." My account of
the action is mainly taken from James' "Naval I lis-;
tory"and Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral Broke''
(according to which the official letter of Captain Broke
was tampered with) ; see also the letter of Lieut.
George Budd, June 15, 1813; the report of the Court
of Inquiry, Commodore Bambridge presiding, and the
Court-martial held on hoard frigate United Statts% April
15, 1814, Commodore Decatur presiding.

228 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

she again bore away with her foresail brailed
up, and her main top-sail braced flat and
shivering, that the Chesapeake might overtake
her. An hour later, Boston Light-house bear-
ing west distant about six leagues, she again
hauled up, with her head to the southeast, and
lay to under top-sails, top-gallant sails, jib,
and spanker. Meanwhile, as the breeze
freshened the Chesapeake took in her studding-
sails, top-gallant sails, and royals, got her
royal yards on deck, and came down very fast
under top-sails and jib. At 5.30, to keep
under command and be able to wear if neces-
sary, the Shannon filled her main top-sail and
kept a close luff, and then again let the sail
shiver. At 5.25 the Chesapeake hauled up
her foresail, and, with three ensigns flying,
steered straight for the Shannon's starboard
quarter. Broke was afraid that Lawrence
would pass under the Shannon's stern, rake
her, and engage her on the quarter ; but either
overlooking or waiving this advantage, the
American captain luffed up within 50 yards
upon the Shannon's starboard quarter, and
squared his main-yard. • On board the Shan-
non the captain of the 14th gun, William
Mindham, had been ordered not to fire till it
bore into the second main-deck port forward ;
at 5.50 it was fired, and then the other guns in
quick succession from aft forward, the Ches-
apeake replying with her whole broadside. At
5.53 Lawrence, finding he was forging ahead,
hauled up a little. The Chesapeake's broad-
sides were doing great damage, but she her-
self was suffering even more than her foe ;
the men in the Shannon's tops could hardly see

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 229

the deck of the American frigate through the
cloud of splinters, hammocks, and other wreck
that was flying across it. Man after man was
killed at the wheel ; the fourth lieutenant, the
master, and the boatswain were slain ; and at
5.56, having had her jib sheet and foretop-sail
tie shot away, and her spanker brails loosened
so that the sail blew out, the Chesapeake came
up into the wind somewhat, so as to expose her
quarter to her antagonist's broadside, which
beat in her stern-ports and swept the men
from the after guns. One of the arm chests
on the quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-
grenade thrown from the Shannon.1 The
Chesapeake was now seen to have stern- way
on and to be paying slowly off ; so the Shan-
non put her helm a-starboard and shivered her
mizzen top-sail, so as to keep off the wind and
delay the boarding. But at that moment her
jib stay was shot away, and, her headsails

1 This explosion may have had more effect than is
commonly supposed in the capture of the Chesapeake.
Commodore Bainbridge, writing from Charleston,
Mass., on June 2, 18 13 (see "Captains' Letters," vol.
xxix, No. 10), says : " Mr. Knox, the pilot on board,
left the Chesapeake at 5 P. m., * * * At 6 P. M.,
Mr. Knox informs me, the fire opened, and at 12
minutes past six both ships were laying alongside
one another as if in the act of boarding; at that
moment an explosion took place on board the Chesa-
peake, which spread a fire on her upper deck from the
foremost to the mizzen-mast, as high as her tops, and
enveloped both ships in smoke for several minutes.
After it cleared away they were seen separate, with the
British flag hoisted on board the Chesapeake over the
American, James denies that the explosion was
caused by a hand-grenade, though he says there were
some of these aboard the Shannon. It is a point of
no interest.

230 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

becoming becalmed, she went off very slowly.
In consequence, at 6 p. m. the two frigates fell
aboard, the Chesapeake's quarter pressing upon
the Shannon's side just forward the starboard
main-chains, and the frigates were kept in this
position by the fluke of the Shannon's anchor
catching in the Chesapeake s quarter port.

The Shannon's crew had suffered severely,
but not the least panic or disorder existed
among them. Broke ran forward, and seeing
his foes flinching from the quarter-deck guns,
he ordered the ships to be lashed together,
the great guns to cease firing, and the boarders
to be called. The boatswain, who had fought
in Rodney's action, set about fastening the
vessels together, which the grim veteran suc-
ceeded in doing, though his right arm was
literally hacked off by a blow from a cutlass.
All was confusion and dismay on board the
Chesapeake. Lieutenant Ludlow had been
mortally wounded and carried below; Law-
rence himself, while standing on the quarter-
deck, fatally conspicuous by his full-dress
uniform and commanding stature, was shot
down, as the vessels closed, by Lieutenant Law
of the British marines. He fell dying, and was
carried below, exclaiming : " Don't give up the
ship " — a phrase that has since become pro-
verbial among his countrymen. The third
lieutenant, Mr W. S. Cox, came on deck, but
utterly demoralized by the aspect of affairs,
he basely ran below without staying to rally
the men, and was court-martialled afterward
for so doing. At 6. 02 Captain Broke stepped
from the Shannons gangway rail on to the
muzzle of the Chesapeake s aftermost carronade,

NAVAL WAR CF 1812. 231

and thence over the bulwark on to her
quarter-deck, followed by about 20 men. As
they came aboard, the Chesapeake s foreign
mercenaries and the raw natives of the crew
deserted their quarters ; the Portuguese boat-
swain's mate removed the gratings of the
berth-deck, and he ran below, followed by
many of the crew, among them one of the
midshipmen named Deforest. On the quarter-
deck almost the only man that made any re-
sistance was the chaplain, Mr. Livermore, who
advanced, firing his pistol at Broke, and in
return nearly had his arm hewed off by a
stroke from the latter's broad Toledo blade.
On the upper deck the only men who behaved
well were the marines, but of their original
number of 44 men, 14, including Lieutenant
James Broom and Corporal Dixon, were dead,
and 20, including Sergeants Twin and Harris,
wounded, so that there were left but one
corporal and nine men, several of whom had
been knocked down and bruised, though re-
ported unwounded. There was thus hardly
any resistance, Captain Broke stopping his
men for a moment till they were joined by the
rest of the boarders under Lieutenants Watt
and Falkiner. The Chesapeake's mizzen-top-
men began firing at the boarders, mortally
wounding a midshipman, Mr. Samwell, and
killing Lieutenant Watt ; but one of the Shan-
non's long nines was pointed at the top and
cleared it out, being assisted by the English
main-topmen, under Midshipman Coshnahan.
At the same time the men in the Chesapeake's
main-top were driven out of it by the fire of
the Shannon's foretopmen, under Midshipman

232 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Smith. Lieutenant George Budd, who was on
the main-deck, now for the first time learned
that the English had boarded, as the upper-
deck men came crowding down, and at once
called on his people to follow him ; but the
foreigners and novices held back, and only a
few of the veterans followed him up. As soon
as he reached the spar-deck, Budd, followed
by only a dozen men, attacked the British as
they came along the gangways, repulsing them
for a moment, and killing the British purser,
Aldham, and captain's clerk, Dunn ; but the
handful of Americans were at once cut down
or dispersed, Lieutenant Budd being wounded
and knocked down the main hatchway. " The
enemy," writes Captain Broke, "fought des-
perately, but in disorder. " Lieutenant Ludlow,
already mortally wounded, struggled up on
deck, followed by two or three men, but was
at once disabled by a sabre cut. On the fore-
castle a few seamen and marines turned to
bay. Captain Broke was still leading his men
with the same brilliant personal courage he
had all along shown. Attacking the first
American, who was armed with a pike, he
parried a blow from it, and cut down the man ;
attacking another he was himself cut down,
and only saved by the seaman Mindham,
already mentioned, who slew his assailant.
One of the American marines, using his
clubbed musket, killed an Englishman,- and so
stubborn was the resistance of the little group
that for a moment the assailants gave back,
having lost several killed and wounded ; but
immediately afterward they closed in and slew
their foes to the last man. The British fired a

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 233

volley or two down the hatchway, in response
to a couple of shots fired up; all resistance
was at an end, and at 6.05, just fifteen minutes
after the first gun had been fired, and not five
after Captain Broke had come aboard, the
colors of the CJicsapeake were struck. Of her
crew of 379 men, 61 were killed or mortally
wounded, including her captain, her first and
fourth lieutenants, the lieutenant of marines,
the master (White), boatswain (Adams), and
three midshipmen, and 85 severely and
slightly wounded, including both her other
lieutenants, five midshipmen, and the chap-
lain ; total, 148 ; the loss falling almost entirely
upon the American portion of the crew.

Of the Shannon's men, 2>Z were killed out-
right or died of their wounds, including her
first lieutenant, purser, captain's clerk, and one
midshipman, and 50 wounded, including the
captain himself and the boatswain ; total, 83.

The Chesapeake was taken into Halifax,
where Captain Lawrence and Lieutenant
Ludlow were both buried with military honors.
Captain Broke was made a baronet, very
deservedly, and Lieutenants Wallis and Fal-
kiner were both made commanders.

The British writers accuse some of the
American crew of treachery ; the Americans in
turn,- accuse the British of revolting brutality.
Of course in such a fight things are not
managed with urbane courtesy, and, more-
over, writers are prejudiced. Those who
would like to hear one side are referred to
James ; if they wish to hear the other, to the
various letters from officers published in
"Niles' Register," especially vol. v, p. 142.

234

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the
lower masts, especially the two mizzen-masts,
were badly wounded. The Americans at that
period were fond of using bar shot, which
were of very questionable benefit, being useless
against a ship's hull, though said to be some-
times of great help in unrigging an antagonist
from whom one was desirous of escaping, as
in the case of the President and Endymion.

...-V"

•t2J-

_--«3»'

fc-^fc. tfr

04 bo° ±r*

SHANNON

-*k -IB-

£.59 £.60

**CKKSAFZAKX" STRUCK. BY

" SHANNON " STRUCK BY

39 eighteen-pound shot,
25 thirty-two-pound shot,

2 nine-pound shot,
306 grape,

362 shot.

12 eighteen-pound shot,

13 thirty-wo-pound shot,

14 bar shot,
119 grape,

158 shot.

It is thus seen that the Shannon received
from shot alone only about half the damage
the Chesapeake did ; the latter was thoroughly
beaten at the guns, in spite of what some
American authors say to the contrary. And
her victory was not in the slightest degree to
be attributed to, though it may have been
slightly hastened by, accident. Training and

NAVAL V/AR OF 1812. 235

discipline won the victory, as often before ;
only in this instance the training and disci-
pline were against us.

It is interesting to notice that the Chesa-
peake battered the Shannon's hull far more
than either the Java, Guerriere, or Macedonian
did the hulls of their opponents, and that she
suffered less in return (not in loss but in
damage) than they did. The Chesapeake was
a better fighter than either ihe/ava, Guerriere,
or Macedonian, and could have captured any
one of them. The Shannon of course did
less damage than any of the American 44's,
probably just about in the proportion of the
difference in force.

Almost all American writers have treated
the capture of the Chesapeake as if it was due
simply to a succession of unfortunate ac-
cidents ; for example, Cooper, with his usual
cheerful optimism, says that the incidents of
the battle, excepting its short duration, are
" altogether the results of the chances of war,"
and that it was mainly decided by "fortuitous
events as unconnected with any particular
merit on the one side as they are with any
particular demerit on the other." ' Most
naval men consider it a species of treason to
regard the defeat as due to anything but ex-
traordinary ill fortune. And yet no disin-
terested reader can help acknowledging that

1 The worth of such an explanation is very aptly
gauged in General Alexander S. Webb's " The Penin
sula; McClellan's Campaign of 1862" (New York,
1881), p. 35, where he speaks of " those unforeseen or
uncontrollable agencies which are vaguely described as
the • fortune of war,' but which usually prove to be the
superior ability or resources of the antagonist."

236 NAVAL WAR OF 1812,

the true reason of the defeat was the very
simple one that the Shannon fought better
than the Chesapeake. It has often been said
that up to the moment when the ships came
together the loss and damage suffered by
each were about the same. This is not true,
and even if it was, would not affect the ques-
tion. The heavy loss on board the Shannon
did not confuse or terrify the thoroughly
trained men with their implicit reliance on
their leaders ; and the experienced officers
were ready to defend any point that was
menaced. An equal or greater amount of loss
aboard the Chesapeake disheartened and con-
fused the raw crew, who simply had not had
the time or chance to become well disciplined.
Many of the old hands, of course, kept their
wits and their pluck, but the novices and the
disaffected did not. Similarly with the offi-
cers ; some, as the Court of Inquiry found, had
not kept to their posts, and all being new to
each other and the ship, could not show to
their best. There is no doubt that the Chesa-
peake was beaten at the guns before she was
boarded. Had the ships not come together,
the fight would have been longer, the loss
greater, and more nearly equal ; but the result
would have been the same. Cooper says that
the enemy entered with great caution, and
so slowly that twenty resolute men could have
repulsed him. It was no proof of caution
for Captain Broke and his few followers to
leap on board, unsupported, and then they
only waited for the main body to come up ;
and no twenty men could have repulsed such
boarders as followed Broke. The fight was

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 237

another lesson, with the parties reversed, to
the effect that want of training and discipline
is a bad handicap. Had the Chesapeake's
crew been in service as many months as the
Shannon's had been years, such a captain as
Lawrence would have had his men perfectly
in hand ; they would not have been cowed by
their losses, nor some of the officers too de-
moralized to act properly, and the material
advantages which the Chesapeake possessed,
although not very great, would probably have
been enough to give her a good chance of
victory. It is well worth noticing that the
only thoroughly disciplined set of men aboard
(all according to James himself, by the way,
native Americans), namely, the marines, did
excellently, as shown by the fact that three-
tourths of their number were among the killed
and wounded. The foreigners aboard the
Chesapeake did not do as well as the Ameri-
cans, but it is nonsense to ascribe the defeat
in any way to them ; it was only rendered
rather more disastrous by their actions. Most
of the English authors give very fair accounts
of the battle, except that they hardly allude
to the peculiar disadvantages under which
the Chesapeake suffered when she entered into
it. Thus, James thinks the Java was unpre-
pared because she had only been to sea six
weeks ; but does not lay any weight on the
fact that the Chesapeake had been out only as
many hours.

Altogether the best criticism on the fight is
that written by M. de la Graviere.1 " It is
impossible to avoid seeing in the capture of
1 " Guerres Maritimes," ii, 272.

238 NAVAL WAR OF 18 1 2.

the Chesapeake a new proof of the enormous
power of a good organization, when it has
received the consecration of a few years' ac-
tual service on the sea. On this occasion, in
effect, two captains equally renowned, the
honor of two navies, were opposed to each
other on two ships of the same tonnage and
number of guns. Never had the chances
seemed better balanced, but Sir Philip Broke
had commanded the Shannon for nearly seven
years, while Captain Lawrence had only com-
manded the Chesapeake for a few days. The
first of these frigates had cruised for eighteen
months on the coast of America ; the second
was leaving port. One had a crew long ac-
customed to habits of strict obedience ; the
other was manned by men who had just been
engaged in mutiny. The Americans were
wrong to accuse fortune on this occasion.
Fortune was not fickle, she was merely logical.
The Shannon captured the Chesapeake on the
first of June, 1813, but on the 14th of Sep-
tember, 1806, the day when he took command
of his frigate, Captain Broke had begun to
prepare the glorious termination to this bloody
affair."

Hard as it is to breathe a word against such
a man as Lawrence, a very Bayard of the seas,
who was admired as much for his dauntless
bravery as he was loved for his gentleness
and uprightness, it must be confessed that he
acted rashly. And after he had sailed, it was,
as Lord Howard Douglass has pointed out, a
tactical error, however chivalric, to neglect
the chance of luffing across the Shannon's
stern to rake her ; exactly as it was a tactical

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 239

error of his equally chivalrous antagonist to
have let him have such an opportunity. Hull
would not have committed either error, and
would, for the matter of that, have been an
overmatch for either commander. But it must
always be remembered that Lawrence's en-
counters with the English had not been such
as to give him a high opinion of them. The
only foe he had fought had been inferior in
strength, it is true, but had hardly made any
effective resistance. Another sloop, of equal,
if not superior force, had tamely submitted to
blockade for several days, and had absolutely
refused to fight. And there can be no doubt
that the Chesapeake, unprepared though she
was, would have been an overmatch for the
Guerriere, Macedonian, ox Java. Altogether it
is hard to blame Lawrence for going out, and
in every other respect his actions never have
been, nor will be, mentioned, by either friend
or foe, without the warmest respect. But
that is no reason for insisting that he was
ruined purely by an adverse fate. We will do
far better to recollect that as much can be
learned from reverses as from victories. In-
stead of flattering ourselves by saying the de-
feat was due to chance, let us try to find out
what the real cause was, and then take care
that it does not have an opportunity to act
again. A little less rashness would have
saved Lawrence's life and his frigate, while a
little more audacity on one occasion would
have made Commodore Chauncy famous for
ever. And whether a lesson is to be learned
or not, a historian should remember that his
profession is not that of a panegyrist. The facts

240 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

of the case unquestionably are that Captain
Broke, in fair fight, within sight of the enemy's
harbor, proved conqueror over a nominally
equal and in reality slightly superior force ;
and that this is the only single-ship action of
the war in which the victor was weaker in
force than his opponent. So much can be
gathered by reading only the American ac-
counts. Moreover accident had little or noth-
ing to do with the gaining of the victory.
The explanation is perfectly easy ; Lawrence
and Broke were probably exactly equal in
almost everything that goes to make up a first-
class commander, but one had trained his
crew for seven years, and the other was new
to the ship, to the officers, and to the men,
and the last to each other. The Chesapeake's
crew must have been of fine material, or they
would not have fought so well as they did.

So much for the American accounts. On
the other hand, the capture of the Chesapeake
was, and is, held by many British historians
to " conclusively prove " a good many differ-
ent things; such as, that if the odds were
anything like equal, a British frigate could
always whip an American, that in a hand-to-
hand conflict such would invariably be the
case, etc. ; and as this was the only single-
ship action of the war in which the victor was
the inferior in force, most British writers
insist that it reflected more honor on them
than all the frigate actions of 1812 put to-
gether did on the Americans.

These assertions can be best appreciated
by reference to a victory won by the French
in the year of the Battle of the Nile. On

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 241

the 14th of December, 1798, after two hours'
conflict, the French 24-gun corvette Bayon-
naise captured, by boarding, the English 32-gun
frigate Ambuscade. According to James the
Ambuscade threw at a broadside 262 pounds
of shot, and was manned by 190 men, while
the Bayonnaise threw 150 pounds, and had on
board supernumeraries and passenger soldiers
enough to make in all 250 men. According
to the French historian Rouvier ' the broad-
side force was 246 pounds against 80 pounds ;
according to Troude3 it was 270 pounds
against 112. M. Leon Guenn, in his volu-
minous but exceedingly prejudiced and one-
sided work,8 makes the difference even greater.
At any rate the English vessel was vastly the
superior in force, and was captured by board-
ing, after a long and bloody conflict in which
she lost 46, and her antagonist over 50, men.
During all the wars waged with the Republic
and the Empire, no English vessel captured a
French one as much superior to itself as the
Ambuscade was to the Bayonnaise, precisely
as in the war of 18 12 no American vessel
captured a British opponent as much superior
to itself as the Chesapeake was to the Shannon.
Yet no sensible man can help acknowledging,
in spite of these and a few other isolated in-
stances, that at that time the French were

1 " Histoire des Marins Francais sous la Republique,"
par Charles Rouvier, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Paris,
1868.

2 " Batailles Navales."

8 " Histoire Maritime de France " (par Leon Guerin,
Historien titulaire de la Marine, Membre de la Legion
d* Ilonneur), vi, 142 (Paris, 1852).
16

242 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

inferior to the English, and the latter to the
Americans.

It is amusing to compare the French his-
tories of the English with the English histories
of the Americans, and to notice the similar-
ity of the arguments they use to detract from
their opponents' fame. Of course I do not
allude to such writers as Lord Howard Doug-
lass or Admiral de la Graviere, but to men
like William James and Leon Guerin, or even
O. Troude. James is always recounting how
American ships ran away from British ones,
and Guerin tells as many anecdotes of British
ships who fled from French foes. James re-
proaches the Americans for adopting a " Par-
thian " mode of warfare, instead of " bringing
to in a bold and becoming manner." Pre-
cisely the same reproaches are used by the
French writers, who assert that the English
would not fight " fairly," but acquired an ad-
vantage by manoeuvring. James lays great
stress on the American long guns ; so does
Lieutenant Rouvier on the British carronades.
James always tells how the Americans avoided
the British ships, when the crews of the latter
demanded to be led aboard ; Troude says the
British always kept at long shot, while the
French sailors " demanderent a grands cris,
l'abordage." James says the Americans " hes-
itated to grapple " with their foes " unless
they possessed a twofold superiority ; n Guerin
that the English " never dared attack " except
when they possessed " une superiority
enorme." The British sneer at the M mighty
dollar " ; the French at the " eternal guinea."
The former consider Decatur's name as

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 243

" sunk " to the level of Porter's or Bain-
bridge's ; the latter assert that the " pre-
sumptuous Nelson " was inferior to any of
the French admirals of the time preceding
the Republic. Says James : " The Americans
only fight well when they have the superiority
of force on their side ; " and Lieutenant Rou-
vier : " Never have the English vanquished
us with an undoubted inferiority of force."

On June 12, 18 13, the small cutter Surveyor,
of six 12-pound carronades, was lying in
York River, in the Chesapeake, under the
command of Mr. William S. Travis ; her crew
consisted of but 15 men.1 At nightfall she
was attacked by the boats of the Narcissus
frigate, containing about 50 men, under the
command of Lieutenant John Creerie.8 None
of the carronades could be used ; but Mr.
Travis made every preparation that he could
for defence. The Americans waited till the
British were within pistol shot before they
opened their fire ; the latter dashed gallantly
on, however, and at once carried the cutter.
But though brief, the struggle was bloody ; 5
of the Americans were wounded, and of the
British 3 were killed and 7 wounded. Lieu-
tenant Creerie considered his opponents to
have shown so much bravery that he returned
Mr. Travis his sword, with a letter as com-
plimentary to him as it was creditable to the

1 Letter of W. S. Travis, June 16, 1813.

2 James, vi, 374.

8 The letter, dated June 13th, is as follows : " Your
gallant and desperate attempt to defend your vessel

244 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

As has been already mentioned, the Amer-
icans possessed a large force of gunboats at
the beginning of the war. Some of these
were fairly seaworthy vessels, of 90 tons
burden, sloop or schooner-rigged, and armed
with one or two long, heavy guns, and some-
times with several light carronades to repel
boarders.1 Gunboats of this kind, together
with the few small cutters owned by the gov-
ernment, were serviceable enough. They
were employed all along the shores of Georgia
and the Carolinas, and in Long Island Sound,
in protecting the coasting trade by convoying
parties of small vessels from one port to an-
other, and preventing them from being mo-
lested by the boats of any of the British frig-
ates. They also acted as checks upon the
latter in their descents upon the towns and

against more than double your number, on the night
of the 1 2th instant, excited such admiration on the
part of your opponents as I have seldom witnessed,
and induced me to return you the sword you had so
nobly used, in testimony of mine. Our poor fellows
have suffered severely, occasioned chiefly, if not solely,
by the precautions you had taken to prevent sur-
prise. In short, I am at a loss which to admire most,
the previous arrangement aboard the Sni"veyor, or the
determined manner in which her deck was disputed inch
by inch. I am, sir," etc.

1 According to a letter from Captain Hugh G. Camp-
bell (in the Naval Archives, " Captains' Letters," 1812,
vol. ii, Nos. 21 and 192), the crews were distributed as
follows : ten men and a boy to a long 32, seven men
and a boy to a long 9, and five men and a boy to a car-
ronade, exclusive of petty officers. Captain Campbell
complains of the scarcity of men, and rather naively re-
marks that he is glad the marines have been withdrawn
from the gunboats, as this may make the commanders
of the latter keep a brighter lookout than formerly.

NAVAL WAR OF 18 12. 245

plantations, occasionally capturing their boats
and tenders, and forcing them to be very
cautious in their operations. They were very
useful in keeping privateers off the coast, and
capturing them when they came too far in.
The exploits of those on the southern coast
will be mentioned as they occurred. Those
in Long Island Sound never came into col-
lision with the foe, except for a couple of
slight skirmishes at very long range; but in
convoying little fleets of coasters, and keep-
ing at bay the man-of-war boats sent to molest
them, they were invaluable ; and they also
kept the Sound clear of hostile privateers.

Many of the gunboats were much smaller
than those just mentioned, trusting mainly to
their sweeps for motive power, and each re-
lying for offence on one long pivot gun, a 12
or 18-pounder. In the Chesapeake there was
quite a large number of these small gallies,
with a few of the larger kind, and here it was
thought that by acting together in flotillas the
gunboats might in fine weather do consider-
able damage to the enemy's fleet by destroy-
ing detached vessels, instead of confining
themselves to the more humble tasks in
which their brethren elsewhere were fairly
successful. At this period Denmark, having
lost all her larger ships of war, was confining
herself purely to gun-brigs. These were stout
little crafts, with heavy guns, which, acting
together, and being handled with spirit and
skill, had on several occasions in calm
weather captured small British sloops, and
had twice so injured frigates as to make their
return to Great Britain necessary ; while they

246 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

themselves had frequently been the object of
successful cutting-out expeditions. Congress
hoped that our gunboats would do as well as
the Danish ; but for a variety of reasons they
failed utterly in every serious attack that
they made on a man-of-war, and were worse
than useless for all but the various subordi-
nate employments above mentioned. The
main reason for this failure was in the gun-
boats themselves. They were utterly useless
except in perfectly calm weather, for in any
wind the heavy guns caused them to careen
over so as to make it difficult to keep them
right side up, and impossible to fire. Even
in smooth water they could not be fought at
anchor, requiring to be kept in position by
means of sweeps ; and they were very un-
stable, the recoil of the guns causing them to
roll so as to make it difficult to aim with any
accuracy after the first discharge, while a
single shot hitting one put it hors de combat.
This last event rarely happened, however, for
they were not often handled with any approach
to temerity, and, on the contrary, usually
made their attacks at a range that rendered it
as impossible to inflict as to receive harm. It
does not seem as if they were very well man-
aged ; but they were such ill-conditioned
craft that the best officers might be pardoned
for feeling uncomfortable in them. Their
operations throughout the war offer a pain-
fully ludicrous commentary on Jefferson's re-
markable project of having our navy com-
posed exclusively of such craft.

The first aggressive attempt made with the
gunboats was characteristically futile. On

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 247

June 20th 15 of them, under Captain Tarbell,
attacked the Jution, 38, Captain Sanders, then
lying becalmed in Hampton Roads, with the
Barossa, 36, and Laurestinus, 24, near her.
The gunboats, while still at very long range,
anchored, and promptly drifted round so that
they couldn't shoot. Then they got under
way, and began gradually to draw nearer to
the Jiuwn. Her defence was very feeble;
after some hasty and ill-directed vollies she
endeavored to beat out of the way. But
meanwhile, a slight breeze having sprung up,
the Barossa, Captain Sherriff, approached
near enough to take a hand in the affair, and
at once made it evident that she was a more
dangerous foe than the Junon, though a lighter
ship. As soon as they felt the effects of the
breeze the gunboats became almost useless,
and, the Barossa' s fire being animated and
well aimed, they withdrew. They had suffered
nothing from the Junon, but during the short
period she was engaged, the Barossa had
crippled one boat and slightly damaged an-
other ; one man was killed and two wounded.
The Barossa escaped unscathed and the Junon
was but slightly injured. Of the combatants,
the Barossa was the only one that came off
with credit, the Junon behaving, if anything,
rather worse than the gunboats. There was
no longer any doubt as to the amount of reli-
ance to be placed on the latter.1

1 Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats,
they acted with the most stubborn bravery at the bat-
tle of Bladensburg. The British Lieutenant Graig
himself a spectator, thus writes of their deeds on that
occasion ("Campaign at Washington," p. 119). "Of

248 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

On June 20, 1813, a British force of three
74's, one 64, four frigates, two sloops, and
three transports was anchored off Craney
Island. On the northwest side of this island
was a battery of 18-pounders, to take charge
of which Captain Cassin, commanding the
naval forces at Norfolk, sent ashore one hun-
dred sailors of the Constellation, under the
command of Lieutenants Neale, Shubrick,
and Saunders, and fifty marines under Lieu-
tenant Breckenridge.1 On the morning of the
2 2d they were attacked by a division of 15
boats, containing 700 men,2 seamen, marines,
chasseurs, and soldiers of the io2d regiment,
the whole under the command of Captain
Pechell, of the San Domingo, 74. Captain
Hanchett led the attack in the Diadem's
launch. The battery's guns were not fired
till the British were close in, when they
opened with destructive effect. While still
some seventy yards from the guns the Dia-
dem's launch grounded, and the attack was
checked. Three of the boats were now sunk
by shot, but the water was so shallow that
they remained above water; and while the

the sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak
in the terms which their conduct merits. They were
employed as gunners, and not only did they serve their
guns with a quickness and precision which astonished
their assailants, but they stood till some of them were
actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands ; nor was
it till their leader was wounded and taken, and they
saw themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers,
that they quitted the field." Certainly such men could
not be accused of lack of courage. Something else is
needed to account for the failure of the gunboat system.

1 Letter of Captain John Cassin, June 23, 1813.

2 James, vi, 337.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 249

fighting was still at its height, some of the
Constellation's crew, headed by Midshipman
Tatnall, waded out and took possession of
them. * A few of their crew threw away their
arms and came ashore with their captors ;
others escaped to the remaining boats, and
immediately afterward the flotilla made off in
disorder, having lost 91 men. The three cap-
tured barges .were large, strong boats, one
called the Centipede being fifty feet long, and
more formidable than many of the American
gun-vessels. The Constellation 's men deserve
great credit for their defence, but the British
certainly did not attack with their usual obsti-
nacy. When the foremost boats were sunk,
the water was so shallow and the bottom so
good that the Americans on shore, as just
stated, at once waded out to them ; and if in
the heat of the fight Tatnall and his seamen
could get out to the boats, the 700 British
ought to have been able to get in to the bat-
tery, whose 150 defenders would then have
stood no chance.2

1 " Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall," by Charles
C. Jones, Jr. (Savannah, 187S), p. 17.

2 James comments on this repulse as "a defeat as
discreditable to those that caused it as honorable to
those that suffered in it." " U nlike most other nations,
the Americans in particular, the British, when engaged
in expeditions of this nature, always rest their hopes of
success upon valor rather than on numbers." These
Comments read particularly well when it is remembered
that the assailants outnumbered the assailed in the
proportion of 5 to 1. It is monotonous work to have
to supplement a history by a running commentary on
James' mistakes and inventions ; but it is worth while
to prove once for all the utter unreliability of the author
who is accepted in Great Britain as the great authority

250 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

On July 14, 1813, the two small vessels
Scorpion and Asp, the latter commanded by
Mr. Sigourney, got under way from out of the
Yeocomico Creek,1 and at 10 a. m., discovered
in chase the British brig-sloops Contest, Cap-
tain James Rattray, and Mohawk, Captain
Henry D. Byng.2 The Scorpion beat up the
Chesapeake, but the dull-sailing Asp had to
re-enter the creek; the two brigs anchored off
the bar and hoisted out their boats, under the
command of Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry ;
whereupon the Asp cut her cable and ran up
the creek some distance. Here she was at-
tacked by three boats, which Mr. Sigourney
and his crew of twenty men, with two light
guns, beat off ; but they were joined by two
others, and the five carried the Asp, giving no
quarter. Mr. Sigourney and 10 of his men
were killed or wounded, while the British also
suffered heavily, having 4 killed and 7 (includ-
ing Lieutenant Curry) wounded. The surviv-
ing Americans reached the shore, rallied under
Midshipman H. McClintock (second in com-
mand), and when the British retired after set-
ting the Asp on fire, at once boarded her, put
out the flames, and got her in fighting order ;
but they were not again molested.

On July 29th, while the Junon, 38, Captain
Sanders, and Martin, 18, Captain Senhouse,
were in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded on

about the war. Still, James is no worse than his com-
peers. In the American Coggeshall's " History of
Privateers," the misstatements are as gross and the
sneers in as poor taste — the British, instead of the
Americans, being the objects.

1 Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July 15, 1813.

2 James, vi, 343.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 251

the outside of Crow's Shoal ; the frigate
anchored within supporting distance, and
while in this position the two ships were
attacked by the American flotilla in those
waters, consisting of eight gunboats, carrying
each 25 men and one long 32, and two heavier
block-sloops,1 commanded by Lieutenant
Samuel Angus. The flotilla kept at such a
distance that an hour's cannonading did no
damage whatever to anybody; and during
that time gunboat No. 121, Sailing-master
Shead, drifted a mile and a half away from
her consorts. Seeing this the British made a
dash at her in 7 boats, containing 140 men,
led by Lieutenant Philip Westphal. Mr.
Shead anchored and made an obstinate de-
fence, but at the first discharge the gun's
pintle gave way, and the next time it was fired
the gun-carriage was almost torn to pieces.
He kept up a spirited fire of small arms, in
reply to the boat-carronades and musketry of
the assailants ; but the latter advanced steadily
and carried the gunboat by boarding, 7 of her
people being wounded, while 7 of the British
were killed and 13 wounded.3 The defence of
No. 121 was very creditable, but otherwise
the honor of the day was certainly with the
British ; whether because the gunboats were
themselves so worthless or because they were
not handled boldly enough, they did no dam-
age, even to the grounded sloop, that would
seem to have been at their mercy.8

1 Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813.

2 Letter of Mr. Shead, Aug. 5, 181 3.

8 The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the
gun-boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Ar-

252 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

On June 18th the American brig-sloop
Argus, commanded by Lieutenant William
Henry Allen, late first of the United States,
sailed from New York for France, with Mr.
Crawford, minister for that country, aboard,
and reached L'Orient on July nth, having
made one prize on the way. On July 14th
she again sailed, and cruised in the chops of
the Channel, capturing and burning ship
after ship, and creating the greatest conster-
nation among the London merchants ; she
then cruised along Cornwall and got into St.
George's Channel, where the work of destruc-
tion went on. The labor was very severe and
harassing, the men being able to get very
little rest.1 On the night of August 13th, a
brig laden with wine from Oporto was captured
and burnt, and unluckily many of the crew
succeeded in getting at some of the cargo.
At 5 a. m. on the 14th a large brig-of-war was
discovered standing down under a cloud of
canvas.* This was the British brig-sloop
Pelican, Captain John Fordyce Maples, which,
from information received at Cork three days
previous, had been cruising especially after
the Argus, and had at last found her; St.
David's Head bore east five leagues (lat. 520
150 N. and 5° 50' W.).

chives there is a letter from Mr. Angus (" Masters' Com-
mandant Letters," 1813, No. 3; see also No. 91), in
■which he says that the frigate's shot passed over them,
while theirs could not even reach the sloop. He also
encloses a copy of a paper, signed by the other gun-
boat officers, which runs : " We, the officers of the ves-
sels comprising the Delaware flotilla, protest against
the powder as being unfit for service."

1 Court of Inquiry into loss of Argus, 1815.

2 Letter of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 181 5.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 253

The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with
her lofty masts and long spars, could easily
have escaped from her heavier antagonist ;
but Captain Allen had no such intention, and,
finding he could not get the weather-gage,
he shortened sail and ran easily along on the
starboard tack, while the Pelican came down
on him with the wind (which was from the
south) nearly aft. At 6 a. m. the Argus wore
and fired her port guns within grape distance,
the Pelican responded with her starboard
battery, and the action began with great spirit
on both sides.1 At 6.04 a round shot carried
off Captain Allen's leg, inflicting a mortal
wound, but he stayed on deck till he fainted
from loss of blood. Soon the British fire
carried away the main-braces, mainspring-stay,
gaff, and try-sail mast of the Argus ; the first
lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was wounded in the
head by a grape-shot and carried below ; the
second lieutenant, Mr. U. H. Allen (no rela-
tion of the captain), continued to fight the
ship with great skill. The Pclicaji's fire con-
tinued very heavy, the Argus losing her
spritsail-yard and most of the standing rig-
ging on the port side of the foremast. At
6.14 Captain Maples bore up to pass astern
of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen luffed
into the wind and threw the main-top-sail
aback, getting into a beautiful raking posi-
tion a ; had the men at the guns done their
duty as well as those on the quarter-deck did
theirs, the issue of the fight would have been

1 Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral Thornbo rough,
Aug. 14, 1813.

2 Letter of Lieutenant Watson.

254 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

very different ; but, as it was, in spite of her
favorable position, the raking broadside of the
Argus did little damage. Two or three
minutes afterward the Argus lost the use of
her after-sails through having her preventer-
main-braces and top-sail tie shot away, and
fell off before the wind, when the Pelican at
6.18 passed her stern, raking her heavily, and
then ranged up on her starboard quarter. In
a few minutes the wheel-ropes and running-
rigging of every description were shot away,
and the Argus became utterly unmanageable.
The Pelican continued raking her with perfect
impunity, and at 6.35 passed her broadside
and took a position on her starboard bow,
when at 6.45 the brigs fell together, and the
British " were in the act of boarding when the
Argus struck her colors," 1 at 6.45 a. m. The
Pelican carried, besides her regular armament,
two long 6's as stern-chasers, and her broad-
side weight of metal was thus : 3

1x6
1x6
1 x 12

8 x 32

or 280 lbs. against the Argus\-

1 x 12

9 x 24

or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent, for light
weight of metal, 210 lbs. The Pelican's crew
consisted of but 116 men, according to the
British account, though the American reports
make it much larger. The Argus had started

1 Letter of Captain Maples.

2 James, vi, 320.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 255

from New York with 137 men, but having
manned and sent in several prizes, her crew
amounted, as near as can be ascertained, to
104. Mr. Low in his "Naval History," pub-
lished just after the event, makes it but 99.
James makes it 121 ; as he placed the crew of
the Enterprise at 125, when it was really 102 ;
that of the Hornet at 162, instead of 135 ; of
the Peacock at 185, instead of 166 ; of the
Nautilus at 106 instead of 95, etc., etc., it is
safe to presume that he has over-estimated it
by at least 20, which brings the number pretty
near to the American accounts. The Pelican
lost but two men killed and five wounded.
Captain Maples had a narrow escape, a spent
grape-shot striking him in the chest with some
force, and then falling on the deck. One shot
had passed through the boatswain's and one
through the carpenter's cabin ; her sides were
filled with grape-shot, and her rigging and
sails much injured ; her foremast, main-top-
mast, and royal masts were slightly wounded,
and two of her carronades dismounted.

The injuries of the Argus have already been
detailed ; her hull and lower masts were also
tolerably well cut up. Of her crew, Captain
Allen, two midshipmen, the carpenter, and
six seamen were killed or mortally wounded ;
her first lieutenant and 13 seamen severely
and slightly wounded ; total, 10 killed and 14
wounded.

In reckoning the comparative force, I
include the Englishman's six-pound stern-
chaser, which could not be fired in broadside
with the rest of the guns, because I include
the Argus' 12-pound bow-chaser, which also

256

NAVAL WAR OF 18 12.

could not be fired in broadside, as it was
crowded into the bridle-port. James, of
course, carefully includes the latter, though
leaving out the former.

Argus
Pelican

467

A r gits
Pelican

COMPARISON.

Tons. No. Guns.

10
II

Comparative
Force.

.82
1. 00

Weight
Metal. Men.

210
280

104
Il6

Loss.

Comparative Loss
Inflicted.

.29
1. 00

Of all the single-ship actions fought in the
war this is the least creditable to the Amer-
icans. The odds in force, it is true, were
against the Argus, about in the proportion of
10 to 8, but this is neither enough to account
for the loss inflicted being as 10 to 3, nor for
her surrendering when she had been so little
ill used. It was not even as if her antagonist
had been an unusually fine vessel of her class.
The Pelican did not do as well as either the
Frolic previously, or the Reindeer afterward,
though perhaps rather better than the Avon,
Penguin, or Peacock. With a comparatively
unmanageable antagonist, in smooth water,
she ought to have sunk her in three quarters
of an hour. But the Pelican's not having done

NAVAL WAR OF 1S12. 257

particularly well merely makes the conduct of
the Americans look worse ; it is just the
reverse of the Chesapeake's case, where, paying
the highest credit to the British, we still thought
the fight no discredit to us. Here we can
indulge no such reflection. The officers did
well, but the crew did not. Cooper says :
" The enemy was so much heavier that it may
be doubted whether the Argus would have
captured her antagonist under any ordinary
circumstances. " This I doubt; such a crew
as the Wasp's or Hornefs probably would
have been successful. The trouble with the
guns of the Argiis was not so much that they
were too small, as that they did not hit ; and
this seems all the more incomprehensible
when it is remembered that Captain Allen is
'the very man to whom Commodore Decatur,
in his official letter, attributed the skilful gun-
practice of the crew of the frigate United
States. Cooper says that the powder was bad ;
and it has also been said that the men of the
Argus were over-fatigued and were drunk, in
which case they ought not to have been
brought into action. Besides unskilfulness,
there is another very serious count against the
crew. Had the Pelican been some distance
from the Argus, and in a position where she
could pour in her fire with perfect impunity
to herself, when the surrender took place, it
would have been more justifiable. But, on the
contrary, the vessels were touching, and the
British boarded just as the colors were hauled
down ; it was certainly very disgraceful that
the Americans did not rally to repel them, for
they had still four fifths of their number
i7

258 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

absolutely untouched. They certainly ought
to have succeeded, for boarding is a difficult
and dangerous experiment ; and if they had
repulsed their antagonists they might in turn
have carried the Pelican. So that, in summing
up the merits of this action, it is fair to say
that both sides showed skilful seamanship
and unskilful gunnery ; that the British fought
bravely and that the Americans did not.

It is somewhat interesting to compare this
fight, where a weaker American sloop was
taken by a stronger British one, with two or
three others, where both the comparative force
and the result were reversed. Comparing it,
therefore, with the actions between the
Hornet and Peacock (British), the Wasp and
Avon, and the Peacock (American) and Eper-
vier, we get four actions, in one of which, the
first-named, the British were victorious, and
in the other three the Americans.

Comparative
Force.

Comparative
Loss Inflicted.

Per cent.
Loss.

Pelican (British)
Argus (American)

I. OO

.82

2.00
.29

.06
•23

Hornet (American)
Peacock (British)

1.00

.83

1,00

.07

.02
.81

Wasp (American)
Avon (British)

1.00

.80

I. OO

.07

.02

-33

Peacock (American)
Epervier (British)

1.00

.81

I. OO
.08

.01
.20

It is thus seen that in these sloop actions
the superiority of force on the side of the
victor was each time about the same. The
Argus made a much more effectual- resistance
than did either the Peacock, Avon, or Epervier,

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 259

while the Pelican did her work in poorer form
than either of the victorious American sloops ;
and, on the other hand, the resistance of the
Argus did not by any means show as much
bravery as was shown in the defence of the
Peacock or Avon, although rather more than in
the case of the Epervier.

This is the only action of the war where it
is almost impossible to find out the cause of
the inferiority of the beaten crew. In almost
all other cases we find that one crew had been
carefully drilled, and so proved superior to a
less-trained antagonist ; but it is incredible
that the man, to whose exertions when first
lieutenant of the States Commodore Decatur
ascribes the skilfulness of that ship's men,
should have neglected to train his own crew ;
and this had the reputation of being composed
of a fine set of men. Bad powder would not
account for the surrender of the Argus when
so little damaged. It really seems as if the
men must have been drunk or over-fatigued,
as has been so often asserted. Of course
drunkenness would account for the defeat, al-
though not in the least altering its humiliating
character.

" Et tu quoque " is not much of an argument ;
still it may be as well to call to mind here two
engagements in which British sloops suffered
much more discreditable defeats than the
Argus did. The figures are taken from James ;
as given by the French historians they make
even a worse showing for the British.

A short time before our war the British brig
Carnation, 18, had been captured, by boarding,
by the French brig Pa/inure, 16, and the British

260 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

brig Alacrity, 18, had been captured, also by
boarding, by the corvette Abeille, 20.

The following was the comparative force,
etc., of the combatants :

Weight Metal. No. Crew. Loss.
Carnation 262 117 40

Palinnre 174 100 20

Alacrity 262 100 1 8

Abeille 260 130 19

In spite of the pride the British take in their
hand-to-hand prowess both of these ships were
captured by boarding. The Carnation was
captured by a much smaller force, instead of
by a much larger one, as in the case of the
Argus ; and if the Argus gave up before she
had suffered greatly, the Alacrity surrendered
when she had suffered still less. French his-
torians asserted that the capture of the two
brigs proved that u French valor could conquer
British courage " ; and a similar opinion was
very complacently expressed by British histo-
rians after the defeat of the Argus. All that
the three combats really " proved " was, that
in eight encounters between British and
American sloops the Americans were defeated
once: and in a far greater number of en-
counters between French and British sloops
the British were defeated twice. No one
pretends that either navy was invincible ; the
question is, which side averaged best ?

At the opening of the war we possessed
several small brigs ; these had originally been
fast, handy little schooners, each armed with

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 261

12 long sixes, and with a crew of 60 men. As
such they were effective enough ; but when
afterward changed into brigs, each armed with
a couple of extra guns, and given 40 additional
men, they became too slow to run, without
becoming strong enough to fight. They car-
ried far too many guns and men for their size,
and not enough to give them a chance with
any respectable opponent ; and they were al-
most all ignominiously captured. The single
exception was the brig Enterprise. She man-
aged to escape capture, owing chiefly to good
luck, and once fought a victorious engagement,
thanks to the fact that the British possessed a
class of vessels even worse than our own. She
was kept near the land and finally took up
her station off the eastern coast, where she
did good service in chasing away or capturing
the various Nova Scotian or New Brunswick
privateers, which were smaller and less for-
midable vessels than the privateers of the
United States, and not calculated for fighting.
By crowding guns into her bridle-ports, and
over-manning herself, the Enterprise, now un-
der the command of Lieutenant William Bur-
rows, mounted 14 eighteen-pound carronades
and 2 long cj's, with 102 men. On September
5th, while standing along shore near Penguin
Point, a few miles to the eastward of Portland,
Men she discovered, at anchor inside, a man-
of-war brig1 which proved to be H.M. S. Boxer,
Captain Samuel Blyth, of 12 carronades,
eighteen-pounders and two long sixes, with
but 66 men aboard, 12 of her crew being

1 Letter from Lieutenant Edward K. McCall to Com-
modore Hull, September 5, 1813.

262 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

absent.1 The Boxer at once hoisted three
British ensigns and bore up for the Enterprise,
then standing in on the starboard tack ; but
when the two brigs were still 4 miles apart it
fell calm. At midday a breeze sprang up from
the southwest, giving the American the weath-
er-gage, but the latter manoeuvred for some
time to windward to try the comparative rates
of sailing of the vessels. At 3 p. m. Lieutenant
Burrows hoisted three ensigns, shortened sail
and edged away toward the enemy, who came
gallantly on. Captain Blyth had nailed his
colors to the mast, telling his men they should
never be struck while he had life in his body.a
Both crews cheered loudly as they neared each
other, and at 3.15, the two brigs being on the
starboard tack not a half pistol-shot apart,
they opened fire, the American using the port,
and the English the starboard, battery. Both
broadsides were very destructive, each of the
commanders falling at the very beginning of
the action. Captain Blyth was struck by an
eighteen-pound shot while he was standing on
the quarter-deck ; it passed completely through
his body, shattering his left arm and killing
him on the spot. The command, thereupon,
devolved on Lieutenant David McCreery. At
almost the same time his equally gallant an-
tagonist fell. Lieutenant Burrows, while en-
couraging his men, laid hold of a gun-tackle

1 James, " Naval Occurrences," 264. The American
accounts give the Boxer 104 men, on very insufficient
grounds. Similarly, James gives the Enterprise 123
men. Each side will be considered authority for its
own force and loss.

2 " Naval Chronicle," vol. xxxii, p. 462.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 263

fall to help the crew of a carronade run out
the gun ; in doing so he raised one leg against
the bulwark, when a canister shot struck his
thigh, glancing into his body and inflicting a
fearful wound.1 In spite of the pain he re-
fused to be carried below, and lay on the deck,
crying out that the colors must never be struck.
Lieutenant Edward McCall now took com-
mand. At 3.30 the Enterprise ranged ahead,
rounded to on the starboard tack, and raked
the Boxer with the starboard guns. At 3.35
the Boxer lost her main-top-mast and top-sail
yard, but her crew still kept up the fight bravely
with the exception of four men who deserted
their quarters and were afterward court-mar-
tialed for cowardice.' The Enterprise now

LXZUfKISC

set her fore-sail and took position on the ene-
my's starboard bow, delivering raking fires ;
and at 3.45 the latter surrendered, when en-
tirely unmanageable and defenceless. Lieu-
tenant Burrows would not go below until he
had received the sword of his adversary, when
he exclaimed, "I am satisfied, I die con-
tented."

1 Cooper, " Naval History," vol. ii, p. 259.

2 Minutes of court-martial held aboard H.M.S. Sur-
prise^ January 8, 18 14.

264 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Both brigs had suffered severely, especially
the Boxer, which had been hulled repeatedly,
had three eighteen-pound shot through her
foremast, her top-gallant forecastle almost cut
away, and several of her guns dismounted.
Three men were killed and seventeen wounded,
four mortally. The Enterprise had been hulled
by one round and many grape j one 18-pound
ball had gone through her foremast, and an-
other through her main-mast, and she was
much cut up aloft. Two of her men were
killed and ten wounded, two of them (her
commander and Midshipman Kervin Waters)
mortally. The British court-martial attributed
the defeat of the Boxer "to a superiority in
the enemy's force, principally in the number
of men, as well as to a greater degree of skill
in the direction of her fire, and to the destrue-
tive effects of the first broadside." But the
main element was the superiority in force, the
difference in loss being very nearly propor-
tional to it; both sides fought with equal
bravery and equal skill. This fact was ap-
preciated by the victors, for at a naval dinner
given in New York shortly afterward, one of
the toasts offered was : " The crew of the
Boxer; enemies by law, but by gallantry
brothers." The two commanders were both
buried at Portland, with all the honors of war.
The conduct of Lieutenant Burrows needs no
comment- He was an officer greatly beloved
and respected in the service. Captain Blyth,
on the other side, had not only shown himself
on many occasions to be a man of distin-
guished personal courage, but was equally
noted for his gentleness and humanity. He

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 265

had been one of Captain Lawrence's pall-
bearers, and but a month previous to his
death had received a public note of thanks
from an American colonel, for an act of great
kindness and courtesy.1

The Enterprise, under Lieut. -Com. Ren-
shaw, now cruised off the southern coast,
where she made several captures. One of
them was a heavy British privateer, the Mart,
of 14 long nines and 75 men, which struck
after receiving a broadside that killed and
wounded 4 of her crew. The Enterprise was
chased by frigates on several occasions ; being
once forced to throw overboard all her guns
but two, and escaping only by a shift in the
wind. Afterward, as she was unfit to cruise,
she was made a guardship at Charlestown ;
for the same reason the Boxer was not pur-
chased into the service.

On October 4th some volunteers from the
Newport flotilla captured, by boarding, the
British privateer Dart? after a short struggle
in which two of the assailants were wounded
and several of the privateersmen, including
the first officer, were killed.

On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers,
still in command of the President, sailed again
from Providence, Rhode Island. On the 25th,
in lat. 190 N. and long. 350 W., the President,
during the night, fell in with two frigates, and
came so close that the headmost fired at her,
when she made off. These were thought to
be British, but were in reality the two French

1 " Naval Chronicle," xxxii, 466.

2 Letter of Mr. Joseph Nicholson, Oct. 5, 1S13.

266 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

40-gun frigates Nytnphe and Meduse, one
month out of Brest. After this little encoun-
ter Rodgers headed toward the Barbadoes,
and cruised to windward of them.

On the whole the ocean warfare of 18 13
was decidedly in favor of the British, except
during the first few months. The Hornefs
fight with the Peacock was an action similar to
those that took place in 18 12, and the cruise
of Porter was unique in our annals, both for
the audacity with which it was planned, and
the success with which it was executed. Even
later in the year the Argus and the President
made bold cruises in sight of the British
coasts, the former working great havoc among
the merchant-men. But by that time the tide
had turned strongly in favor of our enemies.
From the beginning of summer the blockade
was kept up so strictly that it was with diffi-
culty any of our vessels broke through it;
they were either chased back or captured. In
the three actions that occurred, the British
showed themselves markedly superior in two,
and in the third the combatants fought equally
well, the result being fairly decided by the
fuller crew and slightly heavier metal of the
Enterprise. The gunboats, to which many
had looked for harbor defence, proved nearly
useless, and were beaten off with ease when-
ever they made an attack.

The lessons taught by all this were the
usual ones. Lawrence's victory in the Hornet
showed the superiority of a properly trained
crew to one that had not been properly
trained ; and his defeat in the Chesapeake

NAVAL WAR OF i3i2. 267

pointed exactly the same way, demonstrating
in addition the folly of taking a raw levy out
of port, and, before they have had the slight-
est chance of getting seasoned, pitting them
against skilled veterans. The victory of the
Enterprise showed the wisdom of having the
odds in men and metal in our favor, when our
antagonist was otherwise our equal ; it proved,
what hardly needed proving, that, whenever
possible, a ship should be so constructed as
to be superior in force to the foes it would be
likely to meet. As far as the capture of the
Argus showed anything, it was the advantage
of heavy metal and the absolute need that a
crew should fight with pluck. The failure of
the gunboats ought to have taught the lesson
(though it did not) that too great economy in
providing the means of defence may prove
very expensive in the end, and that good offi-
cers and men are powerless when embarked
in worthless vessels. A similar point was
emphasized by the strictness of the blockade,
and the great inconvenience it caused ;
namely, that we ought to have had ships
powerful enough to break it.

We had certainly lost ground during this
year ; fortunately we regained it during the
next two.

BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN.

Name.

Guns.

Tonnage.

Peacock

477

Boxer

181

Highflyet

40 754

268 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN.

Name. Guns. Tonnage.

Chesapeake 50 15265

Argus 20 298

Fi/ter 10 148

80 1,711

VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED.

Name. Rig. Guns. Tonnage. Where Built. Cost.

Rattlesnake Brig 14 278 Medford, Pa. $18,000

Alligator Sch'r 4 80

Asp Sloop 3 56 2,600

PRIZES MADE.
Name of Ship. No. of Prizes.

President 13

Congress 4

Chesapeake 6

Essex T4

Hornet 3

Argus 21

»S>//tf// trro/? 18

NAVAL WAR OF i3l2. 269

CHAPTER VI.
1S13.

ON THE LAKES.

Ontario — Comparison of the rival squadrons —
Chauncy takes York and Fort George — Veo is repulsed
at Sackett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake
— Chauncy sails — Yeo's partial victory off Niagara —
Indecisive action off the Genesee — Chauncy 's partial
victory off Burlington, which gives him the command
of the lake — Erie — Perry's success in creating a rleet
— His victory — CHAMPLAIN — Loss of the Growler and
EagU — Summary.

ONTARIO.

Winter had almost completely stopped
preparations on the American side. Had
weather put an end to all communication with
Albany or New York, and so prevented the
transit of stores, implements, etc. It was
worse still with the men, for the cold and ex-
posure so thinned them out that the new ar-
rivals could at first barely keep the ranks
filled. It was, moreover, exceedingly diffi-
cult to get seamen to come from the coast to
serve on the lakes, where work was hard,
sickness prevailed, and there was no chance
of prize-money. The British government
had the great advantage of being able to move
its sailors where it pleased, while in the
American service, at that period, the men en-
listed for particular ships, and the only way

270 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12.

to get them for the lakes at all was by induc-
ing portions of crews to volunteer to follow
their officers thither.1 However, the work
went on in spite of interruptions. Fresh
gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, largely
owing to the energy and capacity of the head
builder, Mr. Henry Eckford (who did as
much as any naval officer in giving us an ef-
fective force on Ontario) the Madiso?i was
equipped, a small despatch sloop, The Lady
of the Lake prepared, and a large new ship,
the General Pike, 28, begun, to mount 13
guns in each broadside and 2 on pivots.

Meanwhile Sir George Prevost, the British
commander in Canada, had ordered two 24-
gun ships to be built, and they were begun ;
but he committed the mistake of having one
laid down in Kingston and the other in York,
at the opposite end of the lake. Earle, the
Canadian commodore, having proved himself
so incompetent, was removed ; and in the be-
ginning of May Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo
arrived, to act as commander-in-chief of the
naval forces, together with four captains, eight
lieutenants, twenty -four midshipmen, and
about 450 picked seamen, sent out by the

1 Cooper, ii, 357. One of James' most comical mis-
statements is that on the lakes the American sailors
were all " picked men," On p. 367, for example, in
speaking of the battle of Lake Erie he says : " Com-
modore Perry had picked crews to all his vessels."
As a matter of fact Perry had once sent in his resigna-
tion solely on account of the very poor quality of his
crews, and had with difficulty been induced to with-
draw it. Perry's crews were of hardly average excel-
lence, but' then the average American sailor was a very
good specimen.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 271

home government especially for service on
the Canada lakes.'

The comparative force of the two fleets or
squadrons it is hard to estimate. I have al-
ready spoken of the difficulty in finding out
what guns were mounted on any given ship at
a particular time, and it is even more perplex-
ing with the crews. A schooner would make
one cruise with but thirty hands ; on the next
it would appear with fifty, a number of militia
having volunteered as marines. Finding the
militia rather a nuisance, they would be sent
ashore, and on her third cruise the schooner
would substitute half a dozen frontier seamen
in their place. It was the same with the
larger vessels. The Madison might at one
time have her full complement of 200 men ; a
month's sickness would ensue, and she would
sail with butor 50 effectives. The Pike's crew
of 300 men at one time would shortly after-
ward be less by a third in consequence of a
draft of sailors being sent to the upper lakes.
So it is almost impossible to be perfectly ac-
curate ; but, making a comparison of the vari-
ous authorities from Lieutenant Emmons to
James, the following tables of the forces may
be given as very nearly correct. In broad-
side force I count every pivot gun, and half
of those that were not on pivots.

chauncy's SQUADRON.

Name.

Broadside
Riff. Tonnage. Crew. Metal; lbs.

Armament.

Pike,

Madison,

Oneida.

ship 875 300 360

5Q3 200 364

brig 243 100 172

28 long 24's
24 short 32's
16 " 24*8

1 James,

v»> 353-

272

NAVAL WAR OF 18 12.

Name.

Rig.

Tonnage.

Crew.

Broadside

Metal; lbs. Armament.

Hamilton,

schooner

112

[ long 32
t " 24
3 " 6's

Scourge,
Conquest,

50
40

80
56

I " J2

3 short 12 's
I long 32
[ " 12
[ " 6's

Tompkins,

" 32
' 12

'■> " 6's

Julia,

' " 32
1 12

Growler,

1 " 32
1 12

07ttario,

{

r " 32
1 12

Fair A merican,

■tl

1 " 24
1 12

Pert,
Asp,
Lady of the

Lake, "

57
89

25
25
«

I " 24
r 24

' ' 9

14 2,576 980 1,399 "2

This is not materially different from James*
account (p. 356), which gives Chauncy 114
guns, 1,193 men, and 2,121 tons. The Lady
of the Lake, however, was never intended for
anything but a despatch boat, and the Scourge
and Hamilton were both lost before Chauncy
actually came into collision with Yeo. De-
ducting these, in order' to compare "the two
foes, Chauncy had left 11 vessels of 2,265
tons, with 865 men and 92 guns throwing a
broadside of 1,230 pounds.

Name.

Wolfe,

YEO'S SQUADRON.

Rig. Tonnage.

ship

Royal George,

637

510

Crew.

Metal;

lbs. Armament.
( 1 long 24
J 8 " i8's
1 4 short 68's
I.10 " 32's
( 3 long 18's
•< 2 short 68's
16 " 32's

220

200

392
360

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 273

Broadside
Name. Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal; lbs. Armament.

MelvilU, brig 279 100 2,0 jjJSrtiS

**- " *<" "*> '« I^JK^.

*<*■*.&««, school 2,6 80 x72 ],*Jh™rt$

i 1 long 24
Btres/ord, 187 70 87 ■< 1 " 9

/ 6 short 18's

6 2,091 770 j, 374 92

This differs but slightly from James, who
gives Yeo 92 guns throwing a broadside of
1,374 pounds, but only 717 men. As the
evidence in the court-martial held on Captain
Barclay, and the official accounts (on both
sides) of Macdonough's victory, convict him
of very much underrating the force in men of
the British on Erie and Champlain, it can be
safely assumed that he has underestimated
the force in men on Lake Ontario. By com-
paring the tonnage he gives to Barclay's and
Downie's squadrons with what it really was,
we can correct his account of Yeo's tonnage.

The above figures would apparently make
the two squadrons about equal, Chauncy hav-
ing 95 men more, and throwing at a broadside
144 pounds shot less than his antagonist
But the figures do not by any means show all
the truth. The Americans greatly excelled
in the number and calibre of their long guns.
Compared thus, they threw at one discharge
694 pounds of long-gun metal and 536 pounds
of carronade metal; while the British only
threw from their long guns 180 pounds, and
from their carronades 1,194. This unequal
distribution of metal was very much in favor
of the Americans. Nor was this all. The

274 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Pike, with her 15 long 24's in battery, was an
overmatch for any one of the enemy's vessels,
and bore the same relation to them that the
Coniiance, at a later date, did to Macdonough's
squadron. She should certainly have been a
match for the Wolfe and Melville together,
and the Madison and Oneida for the Royal
George and Sydney Smith. In fact, the three
heavy American vessels ought to have been
an overmatch for the four heaviest of the
British squadron, although these possessed
the nominal superiority. And in ordinary
cases the eight remaining American gun-ves-
sels would certainly seem to be an overmatch
for the two British schooners, but it is just
here that the difficulty of comparing the forces
comes in. When the water was very smooth
and the wind light, the long 32's and 24^ of
the Americans could play havoc with the
British schooners, at a distance which would
render the carronades of the latter useless.
But the latter were built for war, possessed
quarters and were good cruisers, while
Chauncy's schooners were merchant vessels,
without quarters, crank, and so loaded down
with heavy metal that whenever it blew at all
hard they could with difficulty be kept from
upsetting, and ceased to be capable even of
defending themselves. When Sir James Yeo
captured two of them he would not let them
cruise with his other vessels at all, but sent
them back to act as gunboats, in which capa-
city they were serving when recaptured ; this
is a tolerable test of their value compared to
their opponents. Another disadvantage that
Chauncy had to contend with, was the differ-

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 275

ence in the speed of the various vessels. The
Pike and Madison were fast, weather ly ships ;
but the Oneida was a perfect slug, even going
free, and could hardly be persuaded to beat
to windward at all. In this respect Yeo was
much better off ; his six ships were regular
men-of-war, with quarters, all of them sea-
worthy, and fast enough to be able to act
with uniformity, and not needing to pay much
regard to the weather. His force could act
as a unit; but Chauncy's could not. Enough
wind to make a good working breeze for his
larger vessels put all his smaller ones hors de
combat ; and in weather that suited the latter,
the former could not move about at all. When
speed became necessary the two ships left the
brig hopelessly behind, and either had to do
without her, or else perhaps let the critical
moment slip by while waiting for her to come
up. Some of the schooners sailed quite as
slowly ; and finally it was found out that the
only way to get all the vessels into action at
once was to have one half the fleet tow the
other half. It was certainly difficult to keep
the command of the lake when, if it came on
to blow, the commodore had to put into port
under penalty of seeing a quarter of his fleet
founder before his eyes. These conflicting
considerations render it hard to pass judg-
ment ; but on the whole it would seem as if
Chauncy was the superior in force, for even
if his schooners were not counted, his three
square-rigged vessels were at least a match
for the four square-rigged British vessels, and
the two British schooners would not have
counted very much in such a conflict. In calm

276 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

weather he was certainly the superior. This
only solves one of the points in which the
official letters of the two commanders differ :
after every meeting each one insists that he
was inferior in force, that the weather suited
his antagonist, and that the latter ran away,
and got the worst of it ; all of which will be
considered further on.

In order to settle toward which side the
balance of success inclined, we must remember
that there were two things the combatants
were trying to do, viz. :

(1) To damage the enemy directly by cap-
turing or destroying his vessels. This was
the only object we had in view in sending out
ocean cruisers, but on the lakes it was subor-
dinated to : —

(2) Getting the control of the lake, by
which invaluable assistance could be rendered
to the army. The most thorough way of
accomplishing this, of course, was by destroy-
ing the enemy's squadron ; but it could also
be done by building ships too powerful for
him to face, or by beating him in some en-
gagement which, although not destroying his
fleet, would force him to go into port. If one
side was stronger, then the weaker party by
skilful manoeuvring might baffle the foe, and
rest satisfied by keeping the sovereignty of the
lake disputed j for, as long as one squadron
was not undisputed master it could not be of
much assistance in transporting troops, attack-
ing forts, or otherwise helping the military.

In 1813 the Americans gained the first point
by being the first to begin operations. They
were building a new ship, afterward the Pike,

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 277

at Sackett's Harbor ; the British were building
two new ships, each about two thirds the force
of the Pike, one at Toronto (then called York),
one at Kingston. Before these were built the
two fleets were just on a par ; the destruction
of the Pike would give the British the suprem-
acy ; the destruction of either of the British
ships, provided the Pike were saved, would
give the Americans the supremacy. Both
sides had already committed faults. The
Americans had left Sackett's Harbor so poorly
defended and garrisoned that it invited attack,
while the British had fortified Kingston very
strongly, but had done little for York, and,
moreover, ought not to have divided their
forces by building ships in different places.

Commodore Chauncy's squadron was ready
for service on April 19th, and on the 25th he
made sail with the Madison, Lieutenant-
Commander Elliott, floating his own broad
pennant, Oneida, Lieutenant Woolsey, HamU-
ton, Lieutenant McPherson, Scourge, Mr.
Osgood, Tompkins, Lieutenant Brown, Con-
quest, Lieutenant Pettigrew, Growler, Mr.
Mix, Julia, Mr. Trant, Asp, Lieutenant Smith,
Pert, Lieutenant Adams, American, Lieutenant
Chauncy, Ontario, Mr. Stevens, Lady of tlie
Lake, Mr. Hinn, and Raven, transport, having
on board General Dearborn and 1700 troops,
to attack York, which was garrisoned by
about 700 British regulars and Canadian
militia under Major-General Sheafe. The
new 24-gun ship was almost completed, and
the Gloucester 10-gun brig was in port ; the
guns of both vessels were used in defence of
the port. The fleet arrived before York early

278 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

on April 27th, and the debarkation began at
about 8 a. m. The schooners beat up to the
fort under a heavy cannonade, and opened a
spirited fire from their long guns ; while the
troops went ashore under the command of
Brigadier-General Pike. The boats were
blown to leeward by the strong east wind, and
were exposed to a galling fire, but landed the
troops under cover of the grape thrown by
the vessels. The schooners now beat up to
within a quarter of a mile from the principal
work, and opened heavily upon it, while at
the same time General Pike and the main
body of the troops on shore moved forward to
the assault, using their bayonets only. The
British regulars and Canadian militia, out-
numbered three to one (including the American
sailors) and with no very good defensive
works, of course had to give way, having lost
heavily, especially from the fire of the vessels.
An explosion immediately afterward killed or
wounded 250 of the victors, including General
Pike. The Americans lost, on board the
fleet, 4 killed, including midshipmen Hatfield
and Thompson, and 8 wounded x ; and of the
army,2 14 killed and 32 wounded by the
enemy's fire, and 52 killed and 180 wounded
by the explosion : total loss, 288. The
British regulars lost 130 killed and wounded,
including 40 by the explosion 3 ; together with
50 Canadians and Indians, making a total of

1 Letter of Commodore Chauncy, April 28, 1813,

2 James, " Military Occurrences " (London, 1818) vol.
i, p. 151.

3Lossing's " Field-Book of the War of 1812," p. 581.
The accounts vary somewhat.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 279

180, besides 290 prisoners. The 24-gun ship
was burned, her guns taken away, and the
Gloucester sailed back to Sackett's Harbor
with the fleet. Many military and naval
stores were destroyed, and much more shipped
to the Harbor. The great fault that the
British had committed was in letting the
defences of so important a place remain so
poor, and the force in it so small. It was
impossible to resist very long when Pike's
troops were landed, and the fleet in position.
On the other hand, the Americans did the
work in good style ; the schooners were finely
handled, firing with great precision and com-
pletely covering the troops, who, in turn, were
disembarked and brought into action very
handsomely.

After being detained in York a week by
bad weather the squadron got out, and for
the next fortnight was employed in convey-
ing troops and stores to General Dearborn.
Then it was determined to make an at-
tack on Fort George, where the British
General Vincent was stationed with from
1,000 ! to 1,800 a regulars, 600 militia, and
about 100 Indians. The American troops
numbered about 4,500, practically under the
command of Colonel Scott. On May 26th
Commodore Chauncy carefully reconnoitred
the place to be attacked, and in the night
made soundings along the coast, and laid
buoys so as to direct the small vessels, who
were to do the fighting. At 3 a. m. on the
27th the signal was made to weigh, the heavy

1 James, " Military Occurrences," i, p. 151.
aLossing, 596.

280 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

land artillery being on the Madison, and the
other troops on the Oneida, the Lady of the
Lake, and in batteaux, many of which had
been captirred at York. The Julia, Growler,
and Ontario moved in and attacked a battery
near the light-house, opening a cross-fire
which silenced it. The troops were to be
disembarked farther along the lake, near a
battery of one long 24, managed by Canadian
militia. The Conquest and Tompkins swept
in under fire to this battery, and in 10 minutes
killed or drove off the artillerymen, who left
the gun spiked, and then opened on the
British. "The American ships with their
heavy discharges of round and grape too well
succeeded in thinning the British ranks." '
Meanwhile the troop-boats, under Captain
Perry and Colonel Scott dashed in, com-
pletely covered by a heavy fire of grape
directed point-blank at the foe by the Ham-
ilton, Scourge, and Asp. "The fire from the
American shipping committed dreadful havoc
among the British, and rendered their ef-
forts to oppose the landing of the enemy
ineffectual." 2 Colonel Scott's troops, thus
protected, made good their landing and
met the British regulars ; but the latter
were so terribly cut up by the tremendous
discharges of grape and canister from the
schooners, that in spite of their gallantry and
discipline they were obliged to retreat, blow-
ing up and abandoning the fort. One sailor
was killed and two wounded ; 3 seventeen sol-

1 James, " Military Occurrences," i, p. 151.

2 Loc. cit.

3 Letter of Commodore Chauncy, May 29, 1813.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 281

diers were killed and forty-five wounded;1
making the total American loss sixty-five. Of
the British regulars 52 were killed, 44 wounded
and 262 M wounded and missing," s in addition
to about forty Canadians and Indians hors de
combat and nearly 500 militia captured ; so
that in this very brilliant affair the assailants
suffered hardly more than a fifth of the loss
in killed and wounded that the assailed did;
which must be attributed to the care with
which Chauncy had reconnoitred the ground
and prepared the attack, the excellent hand-
ling of the schooners, and the exceedingly
destructive nature of their fire. The British
batteries were very weak, and, moreover,
badly served. Their regular troops fought
excellently, it was impossible for them to
stand against the fire of the schooners, which
should have been engaged by the batteries on
shore ; and they were too weak in numbers to
permit the American army to land and then
attack it when away from the boats. The
Americans were greatly superior in force, and
yet deserve very much credit for achieving
their object so quickly, with such slight loss
to themselves, and at such a heavy cost to the
foe. The effect of the victory was most im-
portant, the British evacuating the whole
Niagara frontier, and leaving the river in
complete possession of the Americans for the
time being. This offered the opportunity for
despatching Captain Perry up above the falls
to take out one captured brig (the CaUdonia)
and four purchased schooners, which had

1 Letter of General Dearborn, May 27, 1813.

2 Letter of Brig.-Gen. Vincent, May 28, 1813.

282 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

been lying in the river unable to get past the
British batteries into Lake Erie. These five
vessels were now carried into that lake, being
tracked up against the current by oxen, to
become a most important addition to the
American force upon it.

While Chauncy's squadron was thus absent
at the west end of the lake the Wolfe, 24,
was launched and equipped at Kingston,
making the British force on the lake superior
to that of the Americans. Immediately Sir
George Prevost, and Sir James Lucas Yeo,
the commanders-in-chief of the land and water
forces in the Canadas, decided to strike a
blow at Sackett's Harbor and destroy the
General Pike, 28, thus securing to themselves
the superiority for the rest of the season.
Accordingly they embarked on May 27th, in
the Wolfe, Royal George, Moira, Prince Regent,
Simco, and Seneca, with a large number of
gunboats, barges, and batteaux; and on the
next day saw and attacked a brigade of 19
boats transporting troops to Sackett's Harbor,
under command of Lieutenant Aspinwall.
Twelve boats were driven ashore, and 70 of
the men in them captured ; but Lieutenant
Aspinwall and 100 men succeeded in reaching
the Harbor, bringing up the total number of
regulars there to 500 men, General Brown
having been summoned to take the chief com-
mand. About 400 militia also came in, but
were of no earthly service. There were, how-
ever, 200 Albany volunteers, under Colonel
Mills, who could be relied on. The defences
were miserably inadequate, consisting of a bat-
tery of one long gun, and a block-house.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 283

On the 29th Sir George Prevost and 800
regulars landed, being covered by the gun-
boats under Sir James Lucas Yeo. The
American militia fled at once, but the regulars
and volunteers held their ground in and around
the block-house. " At this point the further
energies of the [British] troops became un-
availing. The [American] block-house and
stockade could not be carried by assault nor
reduced by field-pieces, had we been provided
with them ; the fire of the gunboats proved
insufficient to attain that end ; light and ad-
verse winds continued, and our larger vessels
were still far off." ' The British reembarked
precipitately. The American loss amounted
to 23 killed and 114 wounded; that of the
British to 52 killed and 211 wounded,' most
of the latter being taken prisoners. During
the fight some of the frightened Americans
set fire to the store-houses, the Pike and
Gloucester; the former were consumed, but
the flames were extinguished before they did
any damage to either of the vessels. This
attack differed especially from those on Fort
George and York, in that the attacking force
was relatively much weaker ; still it ought to
have been successful. But Sir George could
not compare as a leader with Col. Scott or
Gen. Pike ; and Sir James did not handle the
gunboats by any means as well as the Ameri-
cans did their schooners in similar attacks.
The admirers of Sir James lay the blame on
Sir George, and vice versa; but in reality
neither seems to have done particularly well.

1 Letter of Adj.-Gen. Baynes, May 30, 1813.
2 James, "Military Occurrences," p. 173.

284 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12.

At any rate the affair was the reverse of credit-
able to the British.

The British squadron returned to Kingston,
and Chauncy, having heard that they were
out, came down the lake and went into port
about June 2d. So far the Americans had had
all the success, and had controlled the lake ;
but now Yeo's force was too formidable to be
encountered until the Pike was built, and the
supremacy passed undisputed into his hands,
while Chauncy lay in Sackett's Harbor. Of
course with the Pike soon to be built, Yeo's
uncontested superiority could be of but short
duration ; but he used his time most actively.
He sailed from Kingston on the 3d of June,
to cooperate with the British army at the head
of the lake, and intercept all supplies going to
the Americans. On the 8th he discovered a
small camp of the latter near Forty Mile Creek,
and attacked it with the Beresford, Sydney
Smith, and gunboats, obliging the Americans
to leave their camp, while their equipages,
provisions, stores, and batteaux fell into the
hands of the British, whose troops occupied
the post, thus assisting in the series of en-
gagements which ended in the humiliating
repulse of General Wilkinson's expedition into
Canada. On the 13th two schooners and
some boats bringing supplies to the Amer-
icans were captured, and on the 16th a depot
of provisions at the Genesee River shared the
same fate. On the 19th a party of British
soldiers were landed by the fleet at Great
Sodas, and took off 600 barrels of flour. Yeo
then returned to Kingston, where he anchored
on the 27th, having done good service in

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 2S5

assisting the land forces.1 As a small compen-
sation, on the 1 8th of the same month the
Lady of the Lake, Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy,
captured off Presqu' Isle the British schooner
Lady Murray, containing 1 ensign, 15 soldiers,
and 6 sailors, together with stores and am-
munition.*

During the early part of July neither squad-
ron put out in force ; although on the first of
the month Commodore Yeo made an abortive
attempt to surprise Sackett's Harbor, but
abandoned it when it was discovered. Mean-
while the Americans were building a new
schooner, the Sylph, and the formidable cor-
vette Pike was made ready to sail by July
21st. On the same day the entire American
squadron, or fleet, sailed up to the head of the
lake, and reached Niagara on the 27th. Here
Col. Scott and some of his regulars were
embarked, and on the 30th a descent was made
upon York, where 11 transports were des-
troyed, 5 cannon, a quantity of flour, and some
ammunition carried off, and the barracks
burned. On the 3d of August the troops were
disembarked at the Niagara, and 1 1 1 officers
and men were sent up to join Perry on Lake
Erie. As this left the squadron much deranged
150 militia were subsequently lent it by Gen-
eral Boyd, but they proved of no assistance
(beyond swelling the number of men Yeo
captured in the Growler and Julia from 70
individuals to 80), and were again landed.

1 Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo to Mr. Croker, June
29, 1813.

2 Letter of Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy to Com. Chauncy,
June 18, 1813.

286 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Commodore Yeo sailed with his squadron
from Kingston on Aug. 2d, and on the 7th the
two fleets for the first time came in sight of
one another, the Americans at anchor off Fort
Niagara, the British six miles to windward, in
the W. N. W. Chauncy's squadron contained
one corvette, one ship sloop, one brig sloop,
and ten schooners, manned by about 965 men,
and throwing at a broadside, 1,390 lbs. of shot,
nearly 800 of which were from long guns.
Yeo's included two ship sloops, two brig
sloops, and two schooners, manned by 770
men, and throwing at a broadside, 1,374 lbs.,
but 180 being from long guns. But Yeo's
vessels were all built with bulwarks, while ten
of Chauncy's had none ; and, moreover, his
vessels could all sail and manoeuvre together,
while, as already remarked, one half of the
American fleet spent a large part of its time
towing the other half. The Pike would at
ordinary range be a match for the Wolfe and
Melville together ; yet in actual weight of
metal she threw less than the former ship
alone. In calm weather the long guns of the
American schooners gave them a great ad-
vantage ; in rough weather they could not be
used at all. Still, on the whole, it could fairly
be said that Yeo was advancing to attack a
superior fleet.

All through the day of the 7th the wind
blew light and variable, and the two squadrons
went through a series of manoeuvres, nominal-
ly to bring on an action. As each side flatly
contradicts the other it is hard to tell pre-
cisely what the manoeuvres were ; each captain
says the other avoided him and that he made

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 287

all sail in chase. At any rate it was just the
weather for Chauncy to engage in.

That night the wind came out squally ; and
about 1 a. m. on the morning of the 8th a
heavy gust struck the Hamilton and Scourge,
forcing them to careen over till the heavy
guns broke loose, and they foundered, but 16
men escaping, — which accident did not open
a particularly cheerful prospect to the remain-
der of the schooners. Chauncy's force was,
by this accident, reduced to a numerical
equality with Yeo's, having perhaps a hundred
more men,1 and throwing 144 lbs. less shot at
a broadside, All through the two succeeding
days the same manoeuvring went on ; the
question as to which avoided the fight is
simply one of veracity between the two com-
manders, and of course each side, to the end
of time, will believe its own leader. But it is
not of the least consequence, as neither ac-
complished anything.

On the 10th the same tedious evolutions
were continued, but at 7 p. if. the two squad-
rons were tolerably near one another, Yeo to
windward, the breeze being fresh from the S.
W. Commodore Chauncy formed his force in

1 This estimate as to men is a mere balancing of pro-
babilities. If James underestimates the British force
on Ontario as much as he has on Erie and Champlain,
Yeo had as many men as his opponent. Chauncy, in
one of his letters (preserved with the other manuscript
letters in the Naval Archives), says: •* I enclose the
muster-rolls of all my ships," but I have not been able
to find them, and in any event the complements were
continually changing completely. The point is not
important, as each side certainly had plenty of men on
this occasion.

288 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

two lines on the port tack, while Commodore
Yeo approached from behind and to wind-
ward, in single column, on the same tack.
Commodore Chauncy's weather line was
formed of the Julia, Growler, Pert, Ash, On-
tario, and American, in that order, and the
lee line of the Pike, Oneida, Madison, Tomp-
kins, and Conquest. Chauncy formed his
weather line of the smaller vessels, directing
them, when the British should engage, to
edge away and form to leeward of the second
line, expecting that Sir James would follow
them down. At n the weather line opened
fire at very long range; at 11.15 ^ was
returned, and the action became general and
harmless; at 11.30 the weather line bore up
and passed to leeward, except the Julia and
Growler, which tacked. The British ships
kept their luff and cut off the two that had
tacked ; while Commodore Chauncy's lee line
" edged away two points, to lead the enemy
down, not only to engage him to more ad-
vantage, but to lead him from the Julia and
Growler" 1 Of course the enemy did not
come down, and the Julia and Growler were
not saved. Yeo kept on till he had cut off the
two schooners, fired an ineffectual broadside at
the other ships, and tacked after the Growler
and Julia. Then, when too late, Chauncy
tacked also, and stood after him. The
schooners, meanwhile, kept clawing to wind-
ward till they were overtaken, and, after
making a fruitless effort to run the gauntlet
through the enemy's squadron by putting
before the wind, were captured. Yeo's ac-
1 Letter of Commodore Isaac Chauncy, Aug. 13, 181 3.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

289

290 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12.

count is simple : " Came within gunshot of
Pike and Madison, when they immediately
bore up, fired their stern-chase guns, and made
all sail for Niagara, leaving two of their
schooners astern, which we captured. " 1 The
British had acted faultlessly, and the honor
and profit gained by the encounter rested en-
tirely with them. On the contrary, neither
Chauncy nor his subordinates showed to ad-
vantage.

Cooper says that the line of battle was
" singularly well adapted to draw the enemy
down," and " admirable for its advantages and
ingenuity." In the first place it is an open
question whether the enemy needed drawing
down ; on this occasion he advanced boldly
enough. The formation may have been in-
genious, but it was the reverse of advanta-
geous. It would have been far better to have
had the strongest vessels to windward, and
the schooners, with their long guns, to lee-
ward, where they would not be exposed to
capture by any accident happening to them.
Moreover, it does not speak well for the dis-
cipline of the fleet, that two commanders
should have directly disobeyed orders. And
when the two schooners did tack, and it
was evident that Sir James would cut them
off, it was an extraordinary proceeding for
Chauncy to " edge away two points * * *
to lead the enemy from the Growler and
Julia" It is certainly a novel principle, that
if part of a force is surrounded the true way
to rescue it is to run away with the balance,
in hopes that the enemy will follow. Had
1 Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, Aug. 10, 181 3.

NA VAL WAR OF 1 8 1 2. 291

Chauncy tacked at once, Sir James would
have been placed between two fires, and it
would have been impossible for him to cap-
ture the schooners. As it was, the British
commander had attacked a superior force in
weather that had just suited it, and yet had
captured two of its vessels without suffering
any injury beyond a few shot holes in the
sails. The action, however, was in no way
decisive. All next day, the nth, the fleets
were in sight of one another, the British to
windward, but neither attempted to renew
the engagement. The wind grew heavier, and
the villainous little American schooners
showed such strong tendencies to upset, that
two had to run into Niagara Bay to anchor.
With the rest Chauncy ran down the lake to
Sackett's Harbor, which he reached on the
13th, provisioned his squadron for five weeks,
and that same evening proceeded up the lake
again.

The advantage in this action had been
entirely with the British, but it is simply non-
sense to say, as one British historian does,
that " on Lake Ontario, therefore, we at last
secured a decisive predominance, which we
maintained until the end of the war."1 This
"decisive " battle left the Americans just as
much in command of the lake as the British ;
and even this very questionable "predomi-

1,4 History of the British Navy," by Charles Duke
Vonge (London, 1866), vol. iii, p. 24, It is apparently
1 a work of any authority, hut I quote it as showing
probably the general feeling of British writers about the
action and its results, which can only proceed from ex-
treme partizanship and ignorance of the subject.

292 NAVAL WAR OF 18 12.

nance " lasted but six weeks, after which the
British squadron was blockaded in port most
of the time. The action has a parallel in that
fought on the 22 d of July, 1805, by Sir
Robert Calder's fleet of 15 sail of the line
against the Franco-Spanish fleet of 20 sail of
the line, under M. Villeneuve.1 The two
fleets engaged in a fog, and the English cap-
tured two ships, when both sides drew off,
and remained in sight of each other the next
day without either renewing the action.
" A victory therefore it was that Sir Robert
Calder had gained, but not a ' decisive '
nor a ' brilliant ' victory." a This is ex-
actly the criticism that should be passed on
Sir James Lucas Yeo's action of the 10th of
August.

From the 13th of August to the 10th of
September both fleets were on the lake most
of the time, each commodore stoutly main-
taining that he was chasing the other ; and
each expressing in his letters his surprise and
disgust that his opponent should be afraid of
meeting him "though so much superior in
force. " The facts are of course difficult to
get at, but it seems pretty evident that Yeo
was determined to engage in heavy, and
Chauncy in light, weather ; and that the party

1 " Batailles Navales de la France," par O. Troude,
iii, 352. It seems rather ridiculous to compare these
lake actions, fought between small flotillas, with the
gigantic contests which the huge fleets of Europe
waged in contending for the supremacy of the ocean ;
but the difference is one of degree and not of kind, and
they serve well enough for purposes of illustration or
comparison.

2 James' " Naval History," iv, 14.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 293

to leeward generally made off. The Americans
had been reinforced by the Sylph schooner, of
300 tons and 70 men, carrying four long 32^
on pivots, and six long 6's. Theoretically her
armament would make her formidable ; but
practically her guns were so crowded as to be
of little use, and the next year she was con-
verted into a brig, mounting 24-pound car-
ronades.

On the nth of September a partial engage-
ment, at very long range, in light weather,
occurred near the mouth of the Genesee
River ; the Americans suffered no loss what-
ever, while the British had one midshipman
and three seamen killed and seven wounded,
and afterward ran into Amherst Bay. One of
their brigs, the Melville, received a shot so
far under water that to get at and plug it, the
guns had to be run in on one side and out on
the other. Chauncy describes it as a running
fight of 7^/2. hours, the enemy then escaping
into Amherst Bay.1 James (p. 38) says that
" At sunset a breeze sprang up from the
westward, when Sir James steered for the
American fleet ; but the American commodore
avoided a close action, and thus the affair
ended." This is a good sample of James'
trustworthiness ; his account is supposed to be
taken from Commodore Yeo's letter,3 which
says : " At sunset a breeze sprang up from
the westward, when I steered for the False
Duck Islands, under which the enemy could
not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged to

1 Letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 13, 1813.

2 Letter to Admiral Warren, Sept. 12, 1813.

294 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

meet us on equal terms. This, however, he
carefully avoided doing." In other words
Yeo did not steer for but away from Chauncy.
Both sides admit that Yeo got the worst of it
and ran away, and it is only a question as to
whether Chauncy followed him or not. Of
course in such light weather Chauncy's long
guns gave him a great advantage. He had
present 10 vessels ; the Pike, Madison, Oneida,
Sylph, Tompkins, Conquest, Ontario, Pert, Amer-
ican, and Asp, throwing 1,288 lbs. of shot,
with a total of 98 guns. Yeo had 92 guns,
throwing at a broadside 1,374 lbs. Neverthe-
less, Chauncy told but part of the truth in
writing as he did : " I was much disappointed
at Sir James refusing to fight me, as he was
so much superior in point of force, both in
guns and men, having upward of 20 guns
more than w'e have, and heaves a greater
weight of shot." His inferiority in long guns
placed Yeo at a great disadvantage in such
a very light wind ; but in his letter he makes
a marvellous admission of how little able he
was to make good use of even. what he had.
He says : " I found it impossible to bring
them to close action. We remained in this
mortifying situation five hours, having only
six guns in all the squadron that would reach
the enemy (not a carronade being fired)."
Now according to James himself ("Naval
Occurrences," p. 297) he had in his squadron
2 long 24's, 13 long 18's, 2 long i2's, and 3
long 9's, and, in a fight of five hours, at very
long range, in smooth water, it was a proof of
culpable incompetency on his part that he did

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 295

not think of doing what Elliott and Perry did
in similar circumstances on Lake Erie — sub-
stitute all his long guns for some of the car-
ronades on the engaged side. Chauncy could
place in broadside 7 long 32^, 18 long 24's, 4
long i2's, 8 long 6's ; so he could oppose $7
long guns, throwing 752 lbs. of shot, to Yeo's
20 long guns, throwing t>Z$ lbs. of shot. The
odds were thus more than two to one against
the British in any case ; and their comman-
der's lack of resource made them still greater.
But it proved a mere skirmish, with no decisive
results.

The two squadrons did not come in con-
tact again till on the 28th, in York Bay. The
Americans had the weather-gage, the wind
being fresh from the east. Yeo tacked and
stretched out into the lake, while Chauncy
steered directly for his centre. When the
squadrons were still a league apart the British
formed on the port tack, with their heavy
vessels ahead ; the Americans got on the
same tack and edged down toward them, the
Pike ahead, towing the Asp; the Tompkins.
under Lieut. Bolton Finch, next ; the Madi-
son next, being much retarded by having a
schooner in tow ; then the Sylph, with another
schooner in tow, the Oneida, and the two
other schooners. The British, fearing their
sternmost vessels would be cut off, at 12.10
came round on the starboard tack, beginning
with the Wolfe, Commodore Yeo, and Royal
George, Captain William Howe Mulcaster,
which composed the van of the line. They
opened with their starboard guns as soon

296 NAVAL WAR OF 181 2.

as they came round. When the Pike was
a-beam of the Wolfe, which was past the centre
of the British line, the Americans bore up in
succession for their centre.

The Madison was far back, and so was the
Sylph, neither having cast off their tows ; so

ASP

TjOMPJCIHS j*^

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ROXAL GEOBGB

WQLOS

the whole brunt of the action fell on the Pike,
Asp, and Tompkins. The latter kept up a
most gallant and spirited fire till her foremast
was shot away. But already the Pike had
shot away the Wolfe's main-top-mast and
main yard, and inflicted so heavy a loss upon

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 297

her that Commodore Yeo, not very heroically,
put dead before the wind, crowding all the
canvas he could on her forward spars, and
she ran completely past all her own vessels,
who of course crowded sail after her. The re-
treat of the commodore was most ably covered
by the Royal George, under Captain Mulcaster,
who was unquestionably the best British of-
ficer on the lake. He luffed up across the
commodore's stern, and delivered broadsides
in a manner that won the admiration even of
his foes. The Madison and Sylph, having
the schooners in tow, could not overtake the
British ships, though the Sylph opened a dis-
tant fire ; the Pike kept on after them, but did
not cast off the Asp, and so did not gain ;
and at 3.15 the pursuit was relinquished,1
when the enemy were running into the entirely
undefended port of Burlington Bay, whence
escape would have been impossible. The
Tompkins had lost her foremast, and the Pike
her foretop- gallant mast, with her bowsprit
and main-mast wounded ; and of her crew five
men were killed or wounded, almost all by
the guns of the Royal George. These were
the only injuries occasioned by the enemy's
fire, but the Pikers starboard bow-chaser
burst, killing or wounding 22 men, besides
blowing up the top-gallant forecastle, so that
the bow pivot gun could not be used. Among
the British ships, the Wolfe lost her main-
top-mast, mizzen-top-mast, and main-yard,
and the Royal George her foretop-mast ; both
suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded,
1 Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Sept. 28, 1813.

29S NAVAL WAR OF 18 12.

according to the report of the British officers
captured in the transports a few days after-
ward.

As already mentioned, the British authori-
ties no longer published accounts of their
defeats, so Commodore Yeo's report on the
action was not made public. Brenton merely
alludes to it as follows (vol. ii, p. 503) : " The
action of the 28th of September, 1813, in
which Sir James Yeo in the Wolfe had his
main- and mizzen-top-masts shot away, and
was obliged to put before the wind, gave
Mulcaster an opportunity of displaying a trait
of valor and seamanship which elicited the
admiration of friends and foes, when he gal-
lantly placed himself between his disabled
commodore and a superior enemy." James
speaks in the vaguest terms. He first says,
" Commodore Chauncy, having the weather-
gage, kept his favorite distance," which he
did because Commodore Yeo fled so fast that
he could not be overtaken ; then James men-
tions the injuries the Wolfe received, and says
that " it was these and not, as Mr. Clark says,
1 a manoeuvre of the commodore's' that threw
the British in confusion." In other words, it
was the commodore's shot and not his ma-
noeuvring that threw the British into confusion
— a very futile distinction. Next he says that
" Commodore Chauncy would not venture
within carronade range," whereas he was
within carronade range of the Wolfe and
Royal George, but the latter did not wait for
the Madison and Oneida to get within range
with their carronades. The rest of his article

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 299

is taken up with exposing the absurdities of
some of the American writings, miscalled his-
tories, which appeared at the close of the war.
His criticisms on these are very just, but
afford a funny instance of the pot calling the
kettle black. This much is clear, that the
British were beaten and forced to flee, when
but part of the American force was engaged.
But in good weather the American force was
so superior that being beaten would have
been no disgrace to Yeo, had it not been for
the claims advanced both by himself and his
friends, that on the whole he was victorious
over Chauncy. The Wolfe made anything
but an obstinate fight, leaving almost all the
work to the gallant Mulcaster, in the Royal
George, who shares with Lieutenant Finch of
the Tompkins most of the glory of the day.
The battle, if such it may be called, com-
pletely established Chauncy's supremacy, Yeo
spending most of the remainder of the season
blockaded in Kingston. So Chauncy gained
a victory which established his control over
the lakes; and, moreover, he gained it by
fighting in succession, almost single-handed,
the two heaviest ships of the enemy. But
gaining the victory was only what should have
been expected from a superior force. The
question is, did Chauncy use his force to the
best advantage? And it cannot be said that
he did. When the enemy bore up it was a
great mistake not to cast off the schooners
which were being towed. They were small
craft, not of much use in the fight, and they
entirely prevented the Madison from taking

300 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

any part in the contest, and kept the Sylph
at a great distance ; and by keeping the Asp in
tow the Pike, which sailed faster than any of
Yeo's ships, was distanced by them. Had
she left the Asp behind and run in to engage
the Royal George she could have mastered, or
at any rate disabled, her ; and had the swift
Madison cast off her tow she could also have
taken an effective part in the engagement. If
the Pike could put the British to flight almost
single-handed, how much more could she not
have done when assisted by the Madison and
Oneida I The cardinal error, however, was
made in discontinuing the chase. The British
were in an almost open roadstead, from which
they could not possibly escape. Commodore
Chauncy was afraid that the wind would come
up to blow a gale, and both fleets would be
thrown ashore ; and, moreover, he expected
to be able to keep a watch over the enemy,
and to attack him at a more suitable time.
But he utterly failed in this last; and had the
American squadron cast off their tows and
gone boldly in, they certainly ought to have
been able to destroy or capture the entire
British force before a gale could blow up.
Chauncy would have done well to keep in
mind the old adage, so peculiarly applicable
to naval affairs : " L'audace ! toujours Pau-
dace ! et encore l'audace ! " Whether the
fault was his or that of his subordinates, it is
certain that while the victory of the 28th of
September definitely settled the supremacy of
the lake in favor of the Americans, yet this
victory was by no means so decided as it

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 301

should have been, taking into account his
superiority in force and advantage in position,
and the somewhat spiritless conduct of his foe.

Next day a gale came on to blow, which
lasted till the evening of the 31st. There was
no longer any apprehension of molestation
from the British, so the troop transports were
sent down the lake by themselves, while the
squadron remained to watch Yeo. On Oct.
2d he was chased, but escaped by his better
sailing ; and next day false information in-
duced Chauncy to think Yeo had eluded him
and passed down the lake, and he accordingly
made sail in the direction of his supposed
flight. On the 5th, at 3 p. m., while near the
False Ducks, seven vessels were made out
ahead, which proved to be British gunboats,
engaged in transporting troops. All sails was
made after them ; one was burned, another
escaped, and five were captured, the Mary,
£>rummondy Lady Gore, Confiance, and Ham-
ilton*— the two latter being the rechristened
Julia and Growler. Each gun-vessel had from
one to three guns, and they had aboard in all
264 men, including seven naval (three royal
and four provincial) and ten military officers.
These prisoners stated that in the action of
the 28th the Wolfe and Royal George had lost
very heavily.

After this Yeo remained in Kingston,
blockaded there by Chauncy for most of the
time; on Nov. 10th he came out and was at
once chased back into port by Chauncy, leav-
ing the latter for the rest of the season

1 Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Oct. 8, 1813.

302 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

entirely undisturbed. Accordingly, Chauncy
was able to convert his small schooners into
transports. On the 17th these transports
were used to convey 1,100 men of the army of
General Harrison from the mouth of the
Genesee to Sackett's Harbor, while Chauncy
blockaded Yeo in Kingston. The duty of
transporting troops and stores went on till
the 27th, when everything had been accom-
plished ; and a day or two afterward naviga-
tion closed.

As between the Americans and British, the
success of the season was greatly in favor of
the former. They had uncontested control
over the lake from April 19th to June 3d, and
from Sept. 28th to Nov. 29th, in all 107 days ;
while their foes only held it from June 3d to
July 2 1 st, or for 48 days; and from that date
to Sept. 28th, for 69 days, the two sides were
contending for the mastery. York and Fort
George had been taken, while the attack on
Sackett's Harbor was repulsed. The Amer-
icans lost but two schooners, both of which
were recaptured ; while the British had one
24-gun-ship nearly ready for launching des-
troyed, and one 10-gun brig taken, and the
loss inflicted upon each other in transports,
gunboats, store-houses, stores, etc., was
greatly in favor of the former. Chauncy's fleet,
moreover, was able to co-operate with the
army for over twice the length of time Yeo's
could (107 days to 48).

It is more difficult to decide between the
respective merits of the two commanders.
We had shown so much more energy than the

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 30*

Anglo-Canadians that at the beginning of the
year we had overtaken them in the building
race, and the two fleets were about equally
formidable. The Madison and Oneida were
not quite a match for the Royal George and
Sydney Smith (opposing 12 32-pound and 8
24-pound carronades to 2 long 18's, 1 long 12,
1 68-pound and 13 32-pound carronades) ;
and our ten gun-schooners would hardly be
considered very much of an overmatch for
the Melville, Moiray and Beresford. Had Sir
James Yeo been as bold and energetic as
Barclay or Mulcaster he would certainly not
have permitted the Americans, when the forces
were so equal, to hold uncontested sway over
the lake, and by reducing Fort George, to
cause disaster to the British land forces. It
would certainly have been better to risk a
battle with equal forces, than to wait till each
fleet received an additional ship, which ren-
dered Chauncy's squadron the superior by just
about the superiority of the Pike to the Wolfe,
Again, Yeo did not do particularly well in the
repulse before Sackett's Harbor ; in the skir-
mish off Genesee river he showed a marked
lack of resource ; and in the action of the 28th
of September (popularly called the " Burling-
ton Races " from the celerity of his retreat) he
evinced an amount of caution that verged
toward timidity, in allowing the entire brunt
of the fighting to fall on Mulcaster in the
Royal George, a weaker ship than the Wolfe.
On the other hand, he gave able co-operation
to the army while he possessed control of the
lake ; he made a most gallant and successful

304 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

attack on a superior force on the 10th of
August ; and for six weeks subsequently by
skilful manoeuvring he prevented this same
superior force from acquiring the uncontested
mastery. It was no disgrace to be subse-
quently blockaded ; but it is very ludicrous in
his admirers to think that he came out first best.
Chauncy rendered able and invaluable as-
sistance to the army all the while that he had
control of the water ; his attacks on York and
Fort George were managed with consummate
skill and success, and on the 28th of Septem-
ber he practically defeated the opposing force
with his own ship alone. Nevertheless he
can by no means be said to have done the
best he could with the materials he had. His
stronger fleet was kept two months in check by
a weaker British fleet. When he first encoun-
tered the foe, on August 10th, he ought to have
inflicted such a check upon him as would at
least have confined him to port and given the
Americans immediate superiority on the lake ;
instead of which he suffered a mortifying, al-
though not at all disastrous, defeat, which
allowed the British to contest the supremacy
with him for six weeks longer. On the 28th
of September, when he only gained a rather
barren victory, it was nothing but excessive
caution that prevented him from utterly des-
troying his foe. Had Perry on that day com-
manded the American fleet there would have
been hardly a British ship left on Ontario.
Chauncy was an average commander ; and
the balance of success inclined to the side of
the Americans only because they showed

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 305

greater energy and skill in shipbuilding, the
crews and commanders on both sides being
very nearly equal.

LAKE ERIE.

Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed
command of Erie and the upper lakes, acting
under Commodore Chauncy. With intense
energy heat once began creating a naval force
which should be able to contend successfully
with the foe. As already said, the latter in
the beginning had exclusive control of Lake
Erie ; but the Americans had captured the
Caledonia, brig, and purchased three schooners,
afterward named the Somers, Tigress, and
Ohio, and a sloop, the Trippe. These at first
were blockaded in the Niagara, but after the
fall of Fort George and retreat of the British
forces, Captain Perry was enabled to get
them out, tracking them up against the cur-
rent by the most arduous labor. They ran up
to Presque Isle (now called Erie), where two
20-gun brigs were being constructed under
the directions of the indefatigable captain.
Three other schooners, the Ariel, Scorpion, and
Porcupine, were also built.

The harbor of Erie was good and spacious,
but had a bar on which there was less than
seven feet of water. Hitherto this had pre-
vented the enemy from getting in ; now it
prevented the two brigs from getting out
Captain Robert Heriot Barclay had been ap-
pointed commander of the British forces
on Lake Erie ; and he was having built at
20

306 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Amherstburg a 20-gun ship. Meanwhile he
blockaded Perry's force, and as the brigs could
not cross the bar with their guns in, or except
in smooth water, they of course could not do
so in his presence. He kept a close blockade
for some time ; but on the 2d of August he
disappeared. Perry at once hurried forward
everything ; and on the 4th, at 2 p. M., one
brig, the Lawrence, was towed to that point of
the bar where the water was deepest. Her
guns were whipped out and landed on the
beach, and the brig got over the bar by a has-
tily improvised " camel."

" Two large scows, prepared for the purpose,
were hauled alongside, and the work of lift-
ing the brig proceeded as fast as possible.
Pieces of massive timber had been run through
the forward and after ports, and when the
scows were sunk to the water's edge, the ends
of the timbers were blocked up, supported by
these floating foundations. The plugs were
now put in the scows, and the water was
pumped out of them. By this process the
brig was lifted quite two feet, though when
she was got on the bar it was found that she
still drew too much water. It became neces-
sary, in consequence, to cover up everything,
sink the scows anew, and block up the timbers
afresh. This duty occupied the whole night." *

Just as the Lawrence had passed the bar, at
8 a. m. on the 5th, the enemy reappeared, but
too late ; Captain Barclay exchanged a few
shots with the schooners and then drew off.

1 Cooper, ii, 389. Perry's letter of Aug. 5th is very
brief.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 307

The Niagara crossed without difficulty. There
were still not enough men to man the vessels,
but a draft arrived from Ontario, and many of
the frontiersmen volunteered, while soldiers
also were sent on board. The squadron
sailed on the 18th in pursuit of the enemy,
whose ship was now ready. After cruising
about some time the Ohio was sent down the
lake, and the other ships went into Put-in Bay.
On the 9th of September Captain Barclay
put out from Amherstburg, being so short of
provisions that he felt compelled to risk an
action with the superior force opposed. On
the 10th of September his squadron was dis-
covered from the mast-head of the Lawrence
in the northwest. Before going into details of
the action we will examine the force of the two
squadrons, as the accounts vary considerably.
The tonnage of the British ships, as already
stated, we know exactly, they having been all
carefully appraised and measured by the
builder Mr. Henry Eckford, and two sea-cap-
tains. We also know the dimensions of the
American ships. The Lawrence and Niagara
measured 480 tons apiece. The Caledonia,
brig, was about the size of the Hunter, or 180
tons. The Tigress, Somers, and Scorpion
were subsequently captured by the foe and
were then said to measure, respectively, 96,
04, and 86 tons ; in which case they were
larger than similar boats on Lake Ontario.
The Ariel was about the size of the Hamilton ;
the Porcupine and Trippe about the size of the
Asp and Pert. As for the guns, Captain Bar-
clay in his letter gives a complete account of

308 NAVAL WAR OF i8j2.

those on board his squadron. He has also
given a complete account of the American
guns, which is most accurate, and, if any
thing, underestimates them. At least Emmons
in his " History " gives the Trippe a long 32,
while Barclay says she had only a long 24 ;
and Lossing in his " Field-Book " says (but I
do not know on what authority) that the Cal-
edonia had 3 long 24's, while Barclay gives her
2 long 24's and one 32-pound carronade ; and
that the Somers had two long 32's, while Bar-
clay gives her one long 32 and one 24-pound
carronade. I shall take Barclay's account,
which corresponds with that of Emmons ; the
only difference being that Emmons puts a 24-
pounder on the Scorpion and a 32 on the Trippe
while Barclay reverses this. I shall also fol-
low Emmons in giving the Scorpion a 32-pound
carronade instead of a 24.

It is more difficult to give the strength of
the respective crews. James says the Amer-
icans had 580, all "picked men." They
were just as much picked men as Barclay's
were, and no more ; that is, the ships had
" scratch " crews. Lieutenant Emmons gives
Perry 490 men ; and Lossing says he " had up-
on his muster-roll 490 names." In vol. xiv, p.
566, of the American State Papers, is a list of
the prize-monies owing to each man (or to the
survivors of the killed), which gives a grand
total of 532 men, including 136 on the
Lawrence and 155 on the Niagara, 45 of whom
were volunteers — frontiersmen. Deducting
these we get 487 men, which is pretty near
Lieutenant Emmons' 490. Possibly Lieu-

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 309

tenant Emmons did not include these volun-
teers ; and it may be that some of the men
whose names were down on the prize list had
been so sick that they were left on shore.
Thus Lieutenant Yarnall testified before a
Court of Inquiry in 18 15, that there were but
131 men and boys of every description on
board the Lawrence in the action ; and the
Niagara was said to have had but 140.
Lieutenant Yarnall also said that "but 103
men on board the Lawrence were fit for
duty " ; as Captain Perry in his letter said that
31 were unfit for duty, this would make a total
of 134. So I shall follow the prize-money
list ; at any rate the difference in number is so
slight as to be immaterial. Of the 532 men
whose names the list gives, 45 were volunteers,
or landsmen, from among the surrounding
inhabitants; 158 were marines or soldiers (I
do not know which, as the list gives marines,
soldiers, and privates, and it is impossible to
tell which of the two former heads include the
last) ; and 329 were officers, seamen, cooks,
pursers, chaplains, and supernumeraries. Of
the total number, there were on the day of
action, according to Perry's report, 116 men
unfit for duty, including 31 on board the
Lawrence, 28 on board the Niagara, and 57 on
the small vessels.

All the later American writers put the num-
ber of men in Barclay's fleet precisely at "502,"
but I have not been able to find out the
original authority. James ("Naval Occur-
rences," p. 289) says the British had but 345,
consisting of 50 seamen, 85 Canadians, and

310 NAVAL WAR OF 1S12.

210 soldiers. But the letter of Adjutant-
General E. Bayne, Nov. 24, 18 13, states that
there were 250 soldiers aboard Barclay's
squadron, of whom 23 were killed, 49 wounded,
and the balance (178) captured ; and James
himself on a previous page (284) states that
there were 102 Canadians on Barclay's vessels,
not counting the Detroit, and we know that
Barclay originally joined the squadron with
19 sailors from the Ontario fleet, and that
subsequently 50 sailors came up from the
Dover. James gives at the end of his " Naval
Occurrences " some extracts from the court-
martial held on Captain Barclay. Lieut.
Thomas Stokes, of the Queen Charlotte, there
testified that he had on board ''between 120
and 130 men, officers and all together," of
whom "16 came up from the Dover three days
before." James, on p. 284, says her crew
already consisted of no men; adding these
16 gives us 126 (almost exactly " between 120
and 130 "). Lieutenant Stokes also testified
that the Detroit had more men on account of
being a larger and heavier vessel ; to give her
150 is perfectly safe, as her heavier guns and
larger size would at least need 24 men more
than the Queen Charlotte. James gives the
Lady Prevost 76, Hunter^, Little Belt 15, and
Chippeway 13 men, Canadians and soldiers, a
total of 143 ; supposing that the number of
British sailors placed on them was proportional
to the amount placed on board the Queen
Charlotte, we could add 21. This would make
a grand total of 440 men, which must certainly
be near the truth. This number is corrobo-

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

rated otherwise : General Bayne, as already
quoted, says that there were aboard 250
soldiers, of whom 72 were killed or wounded.
Barclay reports a total loss of 135, of whom
63 must therefore have been sailors or Cana-
dians, and if the loss suffered by these bore
the same proportion to their whole number as
in the case of the soldiers, there ought to have
been 219 sailors and Canadians, making in all
469 men. It can thus be said with certainty
that there were between 440 and 490 men
aboard, and I shall take the former number,
though I have no doubt that this is too small.
But it is not a point of very much importance,
as the battle was fought largely at long range,
where the number of men, provided there
were plenty to handle the sails and guns, did
not much matter. The following statement
of the comparative force must therefore be
very nearly accurate :

PERRY'S SQUADRON'.

Total

Crew

Broad-

Name.

Rig.

Tons.

Crew

fit for
Duty.

side ;
lbs.

Armament.

Lawrence,

brig

480

«36

105

3~ \

3 long 12's
18 short 32's

Niagara,

480

»55

•27

,- :

2 long 12's
18 short 32's

Caledonia,

180

53l

So .

2 long 24's
1 short 32

A riel,

schooner

112

4 long i2's

Scorpion,

64 -

1 " 32

1 short 32

Sotners,

.84

56 .

1 long 24
1 short 32

Porcupine,

1 long 32

Tigress,

• " 32

Trippe,

sloop

35.

1 " 24

9 vessels,

1,671

532

(4ri)

936 lbs.

312

NAVAL WAR OF 1S12.

During the action, however, the Lawrence
and Niagara each fought a long 12 instead of
one of the carronades on the engaged side,
making a broadside of 896 lbs., 288 lbs. being
from long guns.

BARCLAY'S SQUADRON.

Broadside ;

Name.

Rig.

Tons.

Crew.

lbs.

Armament.

1 long 18

2 " 24's

Detroit,

ship

490

150

138

6 " 12's
8 " 9's
1 short 24
L 1 " 18
1 long 12

Queen Charlotte, "

400

126

189 •*

2 " 9's

14 short 24's

1 long 9

2 " 6's
10 short 12's

Lady Prevost,

schooner

230

4 long 6's

Hunter,

brig

180

2 - 4;s
2 " 2's

2 short 12's

Chippeway,

schooner

1 long 9

Little Belt,

sloop

1 " 12
1 2 " 6's

6 vessels,

1,460 440 459 lbs.

These six vessels thus threw at a broadside
459 lbs., of which 195 were from long guns.

The superiority of the Americans in long-
gun metal was therefore nearly as three is to
two, and in carronade metal greater than two
to one. The chief fault to be found in the
various American accounts is that they sedu-
lously conceal the comparative weight of metal,
while carefully specifying the number of guns.
Thus, Lossing says : " Barclay had 35 long
guns to Perry's 15, and possessed greatly the
advantage in action at a distance ; " which he

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 313

certainly did not. The tonnage of the fleets
is not so very important ; the above tables are
probably pretty nearly right. It is, I suppose,
impossible to tell exactly the number of men
in the two crews. Barclay almost certainly
had more than the 440 men I have given him,
but in all likelihood some of them were unfit
for duty, and the number of his effectives was
most probably somewhat less than Perry's.
As the battle was fought in such smooth
water, and part of the time at long range, this,
as already said, does not much matter. The
Niagara might be considered a match for the
Detroit, and the Lawrence and Caledonia for
the five other British vessels ; so the Ameri-
cans were certainly very greatly superior in
force.

At daylight on Sept. 10th Barclay's squad-
ron was discovered in the N. W., and Perry
at once got under weigh ; the wind soon
shifted to the N. E., giving us the weather-
gage, the breeze being very light. Barclay
lay to in a close column, heading to the S. W.
in the following order : Chippcway, Master's
Mate J. Campbell ; Detroit, Captain R. H.
Barclay; Hunter, Lieutenant G. Bignell;
Queen Charlotte, Captain R. Finnis ; Lady
Prevost, Lieutenant Edward Buchan ; and
Little Belt, by whom commanded is not said.
Perry came down with the wind on his port
beam, and made the attack in column ahead,
obliquely. First in order came the Ariel,
Lieut. John H. Packet, and Scorpion, Sailing-
Master Stephen Champlin, both being on the
weather bow of the Laurence, Captain O. H.

314 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Perry ; next came the Caledonia, Lieut. Daniel
Turner ; Niagara, Captain Jesse D. Elliott ;
Somers, Lieutenant A. H. M. Conklin ; Por-
cupine, Acting Master George Serrat ; Tigress,
Sailing-Master Thomas C. Almy, and Trippey
Lieutenant Thomas Holdup. 1

As, amid light and rather baffling winds,
the Amcsrican squadron approached the
enemy, Perry's straggling line formed an angle
of about fifteen degrees with the more com-
pact one of his foes. At 11.45 tne Detroit
opened the action by a shot from her long 24,
which fell short; at 11.50 she fired a second
which went crashing through the Lawrence,
and was replied to by the Scorpion's long 32.
At 11.55 tne Lawrence, having shifted her port
bow-chaser, opened with both the long i2's,
and at meridian began with her carronades,
but the shot from the latter all fell short. At
the same time the action became general on
both sides, though the rearmost American
vessels weve almost beyond the range of their
own guns, and quite out of range of the guns

1 The accounts of the two commanders tally almost
exactly. Barclay's letter is a model of its kind for can-
dor and generosity. Letter of Captain R. H. Barclay
to Sir James, Sept. 2, 1813; of Lieutenant Inglis to
Captain Barclay, Sept. 10th ; of Captain Perry to the
Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 10th and Sept. 13th, and
to General Harrison, Sept. nth and Sept. 13th. I have
relied mainly on Lossing's " Field-Book of the War of
181 2 " (especially for the diagrams furnished him by
Commodore Champlin), on Commander Ward's
" Naval Tactics," p. 76, and on Cooper's " Naval His-
tory." Extracts from the court-martial on Captain
Barclay are given in James' " Naval Occurrences,"
Ixxxiii.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 315

of their antagonists. Meanwhile the Law-
rence was already suffering considerably as
she bore down on the enemy. It was twenty
minutes before she succeeded in getting
within good carronade range, and during that
time the action at the head of the line was
between the long guns of the Chippeway and
Detroit, throwing 123 pounds, and those of
the Scorpion, Ariel, and Lawrence, throwing
104 pounds. As the enemy's fire was directed
almost exclusively at the Lawrence she suffered
a great deal. The Caledonia, Niagara, and
Somers were meanwhile engaging, at long
range, the Hunter and Queen Charlotte, op-
posing from their long guns 96 pounds to the
39 pounds of their antagonists, while from a
distance the three other American gun-vessels
engaged the Prevost and Little Belt. By 12.20
the Lawrence had worked down to close
quarters, and at 12.30 the action was going on
with great fury between her and her antago-
nists, within canister range. The raw and
inexperienced American crews committed the
same fault the British so often fell into on the
ocean, and overloaded their carronades. In
consequence, that of the Scorpion upset down
the hatchway in the middle of the action, and
the sides of the Detroit were dotted with
marks from shot that did not penetrate. One
of the Ariel's long 12's also burst. Barclay
fough* the Detroit exceedingly well, her guns
basing most excellently aimed, though they
actually had to be discharged by flashing pis-
tols at the touchholes, so deficient was the
ship's equipment. Meanwhile the Caledonia

316 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

came down too, but the Niagara was wretch-
edly handled, Elliott keeping at a distance
which prevented the use either of his carron-
ades or of those of the Queen Charlotte, his an-
tagonist ; the latter, however, suffered greatly
from the long guns of the opposing schooners,
and lost her gallant commander, Captain
Finnis, and first lieutenant, Mr. Stokes, who
were killed early in the action ; her next in
command, Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, per-
ceiving that he could do no good, passed the
Hunter and joined in the attack on the Law-
rence, at close quarters. The JViagara, the
most efficient and best-manned of the Ameri-
can vessels, was thus almost kept out of the
action by her captain's misconduct. At the
end of the line the fight went on at long range
between the Somers, Tigress, Porcupine, and
Trippe on one side, and Little Belt, and Lady
Prevost on the other ; the Lady Prevost mak-
ing a very noble fight, although her 12-pound
carronades rendered her almost helpless
against the long guns of the Americans. She
was greatly cut up, her commander, Lieu-
tenant Buchan, was dangerously, and her act-
ing first lieutenant, Mr. Roulette, severely
wounded, and she began falling gradually to
eeward.

The fighting at the head of the line was
fierce and bloody to an extraordinary degree.
The Scorpion, Ariel, Lawrence, and Caledonia,
all of them handled with the most determined
courage, were opposed to the Chippeway,
Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Hunter, which
were fought to the full as bravely. At such

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 317

close quarters the two sides engaged on about
equal terms, the Americans being superior in
■weight of metal, and inferior in number of
men. But the Lawrence had received such
damage in working down as to make the odds
against Perry. On each side almost the whole
fire was directed at the opposing large vessel
or vessels ; in consequence the Queen Char-
lotte was almost disabled, and the Detroit was
also frightfully shattered, especially by the
raking fire of the gunboats, her first lieuten-
ant, Mr. Garland, being mortally wounded,
and Captain Barclay so severely injured that
he was obliged to quit the deck, leaving his ship
in the command of Lieutenant George Inglis.
But on board the Lawrence matters had gone
even worse, the combined fire of her adver-
saries having made the grimmest carnage on
her decks. Of the 103 men who were fit for
duty when she began the action, 83, or over
four-fifths, were killed or wounded. The ves-
sel was shallow, and the ward-room, used as a
cock-pit, to which the wounded were taken,
was mostly above water, and the shot came
through it continually, killing and wounding
many men under the hands of the surgeon.

The first lieutenant, Yaraall, was three times
wounded, but kept to the deck through all ;
the only other lieutenant on board, Brooks,
of the marines, was mortally wounded. Every
brace and bowline was shot away, and the
brig almost completely dismantled ; her hull
was shattered to pieces, many shot going
completely through it, and the guns on the
engaged side were by degrees all dismounted.

318 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

Perry kept up the fight with splendid courage.
As the crew fell one by one, the commodore
called down through the skylight for one of
the surgeon's assistants ; and this call was
repeated and obeyed till none were left ; then
he asked, " Can any of the wounded pull a
rope ? " and three or four of them crawled up
on deck to lend a feeble hand in placing the
last guns. Perry himself fired the last effect-
ive heavy gun, assisted only by the purser
and chaplain. A man who did not possess
his indomitable spirit would have then struck.
Instead, however, although failing in the at-
tack so far, Perry merely determined to win
by new methods, and remodelled the line
accordingly. Mr. Turner, in the Caledonia,
when ordered to close, had put his helm up,
run down on the opposing line, and engaged
at very short range, though the brig was abso-
lutely without quarters. The Niagara had
thus become the next in line astern of the
Lawrence, and the sloop Trippe, having passed
the three schooners in front of her, was next
ahead. The Niagara now, having a breeze,
steered for the head of Barclay's line, passing
over a quarter of a mile to windward of the
Lawrence, on her port beam. She was almost
uninjured, having so far taken very little part
in the combat, and to her Perry shifted his
flag. Leaping into a row boat, with his
brother and four seamen, he rowed to the
fresh brig, where he arrived at 2.30, and at
once sent Elliott astern to hurry up the three
schooners. The Trippe was now very near
^he Caledonia. The Lawrence, having but 14

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 319

sound men left, struck her colors, but could
not be taken possession of before the action
re-commenced. She drifted astern, the Cale-
donia passing between her and her foes. At
2.45, the schooners having closed up. Perry,
in his fresh vessel, bore up to break Barclay's
line.

The British ships had fought themselves to
a standstill. The Lady Prevost was crippled
and sagged to leeward, though ahead of the
others. The Detroit and Queen Charlotte
were so disabled that they could not effectu-
ally oppose fresh antagonists. There could
thus be but little resistance to Perry, as the
Niagara stood down, and broke the British
line, firing her port guns into the Chippeway,
Little Belt, and Lady Prevost, and the star-
board ones into the Detroit, Queen Charlotte,
and Hunter, raking on both sides. Too dis-
abled to tack, the Detroit and Charlotte tried
to wear, the latter running up to leeward of
the former ; and, both vessels having every
brace and almost every stay shot away, they
fell foul. The Niagara luffed athwart their
bows, within half pistol-shot, keeping up a
terrific discharge of great guns and musketry,
while on the other side the British vessels
were raked by the Caledonia and the schooners
so closely that some of their grape shot, pass-
ing over the foe, rattled through Perry's spars.
Nothing further could be done, and Barclay's
flag was struck at 3 p. m., after three and a
quarter hours' most gallant and desperate
fighting. The Chippeway and Little Belt tried
to escape, but were overtaken and brought to

320 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

respectively by the Trippe and Scorpion, the
commander of the latter, Mr. Stephen Cham-
plin, firing the last, as he had the first, shot of
the battle. " Captain Perry has behaved in
the most humane and attentive manner, not
only to myself and officers, but to all the
wounded," writes Captain Barclay.

The American squadron had suffered se-
verely, more than two-thirds of the loss falling
upon the Lawrence, which was reduced to the
condition of a perfect wreck, her starboard
bulwarks being completely beaten in. She
had, as already stated, 22 men killed, includ-
ing Lieutenant of Marines Brooks and Mid-
shipman Lamb ; and 61 wounded, including
Lieutenant Yarnall, Midshipman (acting sec-
ond lieutenant) Forrest, Sailing-Master Taylor,
Purser Hambleton, and Midshipmen Swartout
and Claxton. ,The Niagara lost 2 killed and
25 wounded (almost a fifth of her effectives),
including among the latter the second lieu-
tenant, Mr. Edwards, and Midshipman Cum-
mings. The Caledonia had 3, the Somers 2,
and Trippe 2, men wounded. The Ariel had
1 killed and 3 wounded ; the Scorpion 2 killed,
including Midshipman Lamb. The total loss
was 123 ; 27 were killed and 96 wounded, of
whom 3 died.

The British loss, falling most heavily on
the Detroit and Queen Charlotte, amounted to
41 killed (including Capt. S. J. Garden, R. N.,
and Captain R. A. Finnis), and 94 wounded
(including Captain Barclay and Lieutenants
Stokes, Buchan, Roulette, and Bignall) : in all
135. The first and second in command on

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 321

every vessel were killed or wourded, a suffi-
cient proof of the desperate nature of the
defence.

The victory of Lake Erie was most impor-
tant, both in its material results and in its
moral effect. It gave us complete command
of all the upper lakes, prevented any fears of
invasion from that quarter, increased our pres-
tige with the foe and our confidence in our-
selves, and ensured the conquest of upper
Canada ; in all these respects its importance
has not been overrated. But the " glory "
acquired by it most certainly has been esti-
mated at more than its worth. Most Ameri-
cans, even the well educated, if asked which
was the most glorious victory of the war,
would point to this battle. Captain Perry's
name is more widely known than that of any
other commander. Every school-boy reads
about him, if of no other sea-captain ; yet he
certainly stands on a lower grade than either
Hull or Macdonough, and not a bit higher
than a dozen others. On Lake Erie our sea-
men displayed great courage and skill ; but
so did their antagonists. The simple truth is,
that, where on both sides the officers and men
were equally brave and skilful, the side which
possessed the superiority in force, in the pro-
portion of three to two, could not well help
winning. The courage with which the Law-
rence was defended has hardly ever been sur-
passed, and may fairly be called heroic ; but
equal praise belongs to the men on board the
Detroit, who had to discharge the great guns
by flashing pistols at the touchholes, and yet
21

322 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

The following diagrams will serve to explain the movements.

1> i

If #1 1

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 323

cvrrcytv >*>■ — ,

± ecnciT „.r, ~ cf~r

TCWJOM una

*& SOMffiT

JUSCAM

140 P.M.

£?r * \

*CW/tM

V""V* \

/ .cmuer.re V

>Sr \ T& UUJ""i , >«w«

"* \ „*«,<* **~

made such a terribly effective defence. Cour-
age is only one of the many elements which
go to make up the character of a first-class
commander; something more than bravery is

324 NAVAL WAR OF t8i2.

needed before a leader can be really called
great.

There happened to be circumstances which
rendered the bragging of our writers over the
victory somewhat plausible. Thus they could
say with an appearance of truth that the en*
emy had 63 guns to our 54, and outnumbered
us. In reality, as well as can be ascertained
from the conflicting evidence, he was inferior
in number ; but a few men more or less mat-
tered nothing. Both sides had men enough
to work the guns and handle the ships, espe-
cially as the fight was in smooth water, and
largely at long range. The important fact
was that though we had nine guns less, yet,
at a broadside, they threw half as much metal
again as those of our antagonist. With such
odds in our favor it would have been a dis-
grace to have been beaten. The water was
too smooth for our two brigs to show at their
best ; but this very smoothness rendered our
gunboats more formidable than any of the
British vessels, and the British testimony is
unanimous, that it was to them the defeat was
primarily due. The American fleet came into
action in worse form than the hostile squadron,
the ships straggling badly, either owing to
Perry having formed his line badly, or else to
his having failed to train the subordinate
commanders how to keep their places. The
Niagara was not fought well at first, Captain
Elliott keeping her at a distance that pre-
vented her from doing any damage to the
vessels opposed, which were battered to pieces
by the gunboats without the chance of re-

NAVAL WAR Of 1812. 325

plying. It certainly seems as if the small
vessels at the rear of the line should have
been closer up, and in a position to render
more effectual assistance ; the attack was
made in too loose order, and, whether it was
the fault of Perry or of his subordinates, it
fails to reflect credit on the Americans.
Cooper, as usual, praises all concerned ; but
V* this instance not with very good judgment.
He says the line-of-battle was highly judicious,
but this may be doubted. The weather was
peculiarly suitable for the gunboats, with their
long, heavy guns ; and yet the line-of-battle
was so arranged as to keep them in the rear,
and let the brunt of the assault fall on the
Lawrence, with her short carronades. Cooper
again praises Perry for steering for the head
of the enemy's line, but he could hardly have
done anything else. In this battle the firing
seems to have been equally skilful on both
sides, the Detroit's long guns being peculiarly
well served ; but the British captains ma-
noeuvred better than their foes at first, and
supported one another better, so that the dis-
parity in damage done on each side was not
equal to the disparity in force. The chief
merit of the American commander and his
followers was indomitable courage, and de-
termination not to be beaten. This is no
slight merit ; but it may well be doubted if it
would have ensured victory had Barclay's
force been as strong as Perry's. Perry made
a headlong attack ; his superior force, whether
through his fault or his misfortune can hardly
be said, being brought into action in such a

326 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

manner that the head of the line was crushed
by the inferior force opposed. Being literally
hammered out of his own ship, Perry brought
up its powerful twin-sister, and the already
shattered hostile squadron was crushed by
sheer weight. The manoeuvres which marked
the close of the battle, and which ensured the
capture of all the opposing ships, were un-
questionably very fine.

The British ships were fought as resolutely
as their antagonists, not being surrendered
till they were crippled and helpless, and almost
all the officers, and a large proportion of the
men placed hors de combat. Captain Barclay
handled his ships like a first-rate seaman. It
was impossible to arrange them so as to l>e
superior to his antagonist, for the latter's force
was of such a nature that in smooth water his
gunboats gave him a great advantage, while
in any sea • his two brigs were more than a
match for the whole British squadron. In
short, our victory was due to our heavy metal.
As regards the honor of the affair, in spite of
the amount of boasting it has given rise to, I
should say it was a battle to be looked upon
as in an equally high degree creditable to
both sides. Indeed, if it were not for the fact
that the victory was so complete, it might be
said that the length of the contest and the
trifling disparity in loss reflected rather the
most credit on the British. Captain Perry
showed indomitable pluck, and readiness to
adapt himself to circumstances ; but his claim
to fame rests much less on his actual victory
than on the way in which he prepared the

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 327

fleet that was to win it. Here his energy and
activity deserve all praise, not only for his
success in collecting sailors and vessels and
in building the two brigs, but above all for the
manner in which he succeeded in getting them
out on the lake. On that occasion he certainly
out-generalled Barclay ; indeed the latter
committed an error that the skill and address
he subsequently showed could not retrieve.
But it will always be a source of surprise that
the American public should have so glorified
Perry's victory over an inferior force, and
have paid comparatively little attention to
Macdonough's victory, which really was won
against decided odds in ships, men, and metal.
There are always men who consider it un-
patriotic to tell the truth, if the truth is not
very flattering ; but, aside from the morality
of the case, we never can learn how to produce
a certain effect unless we know rightly what
the causes were that produced a similar effect
in times past. Lake Erie teaches us the ad-
vantage of having the odds on our side; Lake
Champlain, that, even if they are not, skill
can still counteract them. It is amusing to
read some of the pamphlets written "in reply"
to Cooper's account of this battle, the writers
apparently regarding him as a kind of traitor
for hinting that the victory was not " Nel-
sonic," "unsurpassed," etc. The arguments
are stereotyped : Perry had 9 fewer guns, and
also fewer men than the foe. This last point
is the only one respecting which there is any
doubt. Taking sick and well together, the
Americans unquestionably had the greatest

328 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

number in crew ; but a quarter of them were
sick. Even deducting these they were still,
in all probability, more numerous than their
foes.

But it is really not a point of much conse-
quence, as both sides had enough, as stated,
to serve the guns and handle the ships. In
sea-fights, after there are enough hands for
those purposes additional ones are not of so
much advantage. I have in all my accounts
summed up as accurately as possible the con-
tending forces, because it is so customary with
British writers to follow James' minute and in-
accurate statements, that I thought it best to
give everything exactly ; but it was really
scarcely necessary, and, indeed, it is impossible
to compare forces numerically. Aside from a
few exceptional cases, the number of men,
after a certain point was reached, made little
difference. For example, the/^z^ would fight
just as effectually with 377 men, the number
James gives her, as with 426, the number I
think she really had. Again, my figures make
the Wasp slightly superior in force to the Frolic,
as she had 25 men the most ; but in reality, as
the battle was fought under very short sail, and
decided purely by gunnery, the difference in
number of crew was not of the least conse-
quence. The Hornet had nine men more than
the Penguin, and it would be absurd to say
that this gave her much advantage. In both
the latter cases, the forces were practically
equal, although, numerically expressed, the
odds were in favor of the Americans. The
exact reverse is the case in the last action of

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 329

the Constitution. Here, the Levant and Cyane
had all the men they required, and threw a
heavier broadside than their foe. Expressed
in numbers, the odds against them were not
great, but numbers could not express the fact
that carronades were opposed to long guns,
and two small ships to one big one. Again,
though in the action on Lake Champlain
numbers do show a slight advantage both in
weight metal and number of men on the British
side, they do not make the advantage as great
as it really was, for they do not show that the
British possessed a frigate with a main-deck
battery of 24-pounders, which was equal to
the two chief vessels of the Americans, exactly
as the Constitution was superior to the Cyane
and Levant ' And on the same principles I

1 It must always be remembered that these rules cut
both ways. British writers are very eloquent about the
disadvantage in which carronades placed the Cyaue and
Levant, but do not hint that the Essex suffered from a
precisely similar cause, in addition to her other mis-
fortunes ; either they should give the Constitution
more credit or the Phabe less. So the Confiancey throw*
ing 480 pounds of metal at a broadside, was really
equal to both the EagU and Saratoga, who jointly
threw 678. From her longguns she threw 384 pounds,
from her carronades 96. Their long guns threw 168,
their carronades 510. Now the 32-pound carronade
mounted on the spar-deck of a 38-gun frigate, was cer-
tainly much less formidable than the long 18 on the
main-deck ; indeed, it probably ranked more nearly
with a long 12, in the ordinary chances of war (and it
must be remembered that Downie was the attacking
party and chose his own position, so far as Macdon-
ough's excellent arrangements would let him). So
that in comparing the forces, the carronades should not
be reckoned for more than half the value of the long
guns, and we get, as a mere approximation, 384 -+- 48 =

330 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

think that every fair-minded man must admit
the great superiority of Perry's fleet over Bar-
clay's, though the advantage was greater in
carronades than in long guns.

But to admit this by no means precludes us
from taking credit for the victory. Almost all
the victories gained by the English over the
Dutch in the 17th century were due purely to
great superiority in force. The cases have a
curious analogy to this lake battle. Perry won
with 54 guns against Barclay's 6$ ; but the
odds were largely in his favor. Blake won a
doubtful victory on the 18th of February, 1653,
with 80 ships against Tromp's 70; but the
English vessels were twice the size of the
Dutch, and in number of men and weight of
metal greatly their superior. The English
were excellent fighters, but no better than the
Dutch, and none of their admirals of that
period deserve to rank with De Ruyter. Again,
the great victory of "La Hogue was won over a
very much smaller French fleet, after a day's
hard fighting, which resulted in the capture of
one vessel ! This victory was most exultingly
chronicled, yet it was precisely as if Perry had
fought Barclay all day and only succeeded in
capturing the Little Belt. Most of Lord Nel-
son's successes were certainly won against
heavy odds by his great genius and the daring
skill of the captains who served under him ;

432, against 168 + 255 = 423. At any rate, British
writers, as well as Americans, should remember that if
the Constitution was greatly superior to her two foes,
then the Confiance was certainly equal to the Fagle and
Saratoga ; and vice versa.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 331

but the battle of the Baltic, as far as the fighting
went, reflected as much honor on the defeated
Danes as on the mighty sea-chief who con-
quered them. Many a much-vaunted victory,
both on sea and land, has really reflected less
credit on the victors than the battle of Lake
Erie did on the Americans. And it must al-
ways be remembered that a victory, honorably
won, if even over a weaker foe, does reflect
credit on the nation by whom it is gained. It
was creditable to us as a nation that our ships
were better made and better armed than the
British frigates, exactly as it was creditable to
them that a few years before their vessels had
stood in the same relation to the Dutch ships.1
It was greatly to our credit that we had been
enterprising enough to fit out such an effective
little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry
deserves the highest praise.*

Before leaving the subject it is worth while
making a few observations on the men who
composed the crews. James, who despised a
Canadian as much as he hated an American,
gives as one excuse for the defeat, the fact

1 After Lord Duncan's victory at Camperdown, James
chronicled the fact that all the captured line-of-battle
ships were such poor craft as not to be of as much
value as so many French frigates. This at least
showed that the Dutch sailors must have done well- to
have made such a bloody and obstinate fight as they
did, with the materials they had. According to his
own statements the loss was about proportional to
the forces in action. It was another parallel to
Perry's victory.

2 Some of my countrymen will consider this but
scant approbation, to which the answer must be that a
history is not a panegyric.

332 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

that most of Barclay's crew were Canadians,
whom he considers to be " sorry substitutes."
On each side the regular sailors, from the sea-
board, were not numerous enough to permit
the battle to be fought purely by them. Bar-
clay took a number of soldiers of the regular
army, and Perry a number of militia, aboard ;
the former had a few Indian sharp-shooters,
the latter quite a number of negroes. A great
many men in each fleet were lake sailors, fron-
tiersmen, and these were the especial objects
of James' contempt ; but it may be doubted
if they, thoroughly accustomed to lake naviga-
tion, used to contests with Indians and whites,
naturally forced to be good sailors, and skilful
in the use of rifle and cannon, were not, when
trained by good men and on their own waters,
the very best possible material. Certainly the
battle of Lake Erie, fought mainly by Cana-
dians, was better contested than that of Lake
Champlain, fought mainly by British.

The difference between the American and
British seamen on the Atlantic was small, but
on the lakes what little there was disappeared.
A New Englander and an Old Englander dif-
fered little enough, but they differed more
than a frontiersman born north of the line did
from one born south of it. These last two
resembled one another more nearly than
either did the parent. There had been no
long-established naval school on the lakes,
and the British sailors that came up there
were the best of their kind; so the com-
batants were really so evenly matched in
courage, skill, and all other fighting qualities,

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 333

as to make it impossible to award the palm to
either for these attributes. The dogged ob-
stinacy of the fighting, the skilful firing and
manoeuvring, and the daring and coolness with
which cutting-out expeditions were planned
and executed, were as marked on one side as
the other. The only un-English element in
the contest was the presence among the Cana-
dian English of some of the descendants of
the Latin race from whom they had conquered
the country. Otherwise the men were equally
matched, but the Americans owed their suc-
cess— for the balance of success was largely
on their side — to the fact that their officers
had been trained in the best and most practi-
cal, although the smallest, navy of the day.
The British sailors on the lakes were as good
as our own, bnt no better. None of their
commanders compare with Macdonough.

Perry deserves all praise for the manner
in which he got his fleet ready ; his victory
over Barclay was precisely similar to the
quasi-victories of Blake over the Dutch, which
have given that admiral such renown. Blake's
success in attacking Spanish and Algerian
forts is his true title to fame. In his engage-
ments with the Dutch fleets (as well as in those
of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is no
greater and no less than Perry's. Each made
a headlong attack, with furious, stubborn
courage, and by dint of sheer weight crushed
or disabled a greatly inferior foe. In the fight
that took place on Feb. 18, 1653, De Ruyter's
ship carried but 34 guns,1 and yet with it he

1 " La Vie et Les Actions Memorables de Lt.-Amiral

334 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

captured the Prosperous of 54; which vessel
was stronger than any in the Dutch fleet.
The fact that Blake's battles were generally
so indecisive must be ascribed to the fact
that his opponents were, though inferior in
force, superior in skill. No decisive defeat
was inflicted on the Dutch until Tromp's
death. Perry's operations were on a very
small, and Blake's on a very large, scale ; but
whereas Perry left no antagonists to question
his claim to victory, Blake's successes were
sufficiently doubtful to admit of his antagonists
in almost every instance claiming that they
had won, or else that it was a draw. Of
course it is absurd to put Perry and Blake on
a par, for one worked with a fleet forty times
the strength of the other's flotilla ; but the
way in which the work was done was very
similar. And it must always be remembered
that when Perry fought this battle he was but
27 years old ; and the commanders of his
other vessels were younger still.

CHAMPLAIN.

The commander on this lake at this time
was Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who
had superseded the former commander, Lieu-
tenant Sydney Smith, — whose name was a
curious commentary on the close inter-relation-
ship of the two contesting peoples. The Amer-

Michel De Ruyter " (Amsterdam, 1677), p. 23, By the
way, why is Tromp always called Van Tromp by Eng-
lish writers ? It would be quite as correct for a French-
man to speak of MacNelson.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 335

ican naval force now consisted of two sloops,
the Growler and Eagle, each mounting 11
guns, and six galleys, mounting one gun each.
Lieutenant Smith was sent down with his two
sloops to harass the British gunboats, which
were stationed round the head of Sorel River,
the outlet to Lake Champlain. On June 3d
he chased three gunboats into the river, the
wind being aft, up to within sight of the fort
of Isle-aux-noix. A strong British land-force,
under Major-General Taylor, now came up
both banks of the narrow stream, and joined
the three gunboats in attacking the sloops.
The latter tried to beat up the stream, but the
current was so strong and the wind so light
that no headway could be made. The gun-
boats kept out of range of the sloop's guns,
while keeping up a hot fire from their long
24*s, to which no reply could be made ; but
the galling fire of the infantry who lined the
banks was responded to by showers of grape.
After three hours' conflict, at 12.30, a 24-pound
shot from one of the galleys struck the Eagle
under her starboard quarter, and ripped out a
whole plank under water. She sank at once,
but it was in such shoal water that she did
not settle entirely, and none of the men were
drowned. Soon afterward the Growler had
her forestay and main-boom shot away, and,
becoming unmanageable, ran ashore and was
also captured. The Growler had 1 killed and
8 wounded, the Eagle 11 wounded; their
united crews, including 34 volunteers, amount-
ed to 112 men. The British gunboats suf-
fered no loss ; of the troops on shore three

336 NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

were wounded, one dangerously, by grape.1
Lieutenant Smith had certainly made a very
plucky fight, but it was a great mistake to get
cooped up in a narrow channel, with wind
and current dead against him. It was a very
creditable success to the British, and showed
the effectiveness of well-handled gunboats
under certain circumstances. The possession
of these two sloops gave the command of the
lake to the British. Macdonough at once set
about building others, but with all his energy
the materials at hand were so deficient that he
could not get them finished in time. On July
31st, 1,000 British troops, under Col. J. Mur-
ray, convoyed by Captain Thomas Everard,
with the sloops Chubb and Finch (late Growler
and Eagle) and three gunboats, landed at
Plattsburg and destroyed all the barracks and
stores both there and at Saranac. For some
reason Colonel Murray left so precipitately
that he overlooked a picket of 20 of his men,
who were captured ; then he made descents
on two or three other places, and returned to
the head of the lake by Aug. 3d. Three days
afterward, on Aug. 6th, Macdonough com-
pleted his three sloops, the President, Mont-
gomery, and Preble, of 7 guns each, and also
six gunboats; which force enabled him to
prevent any more plundering expeditions tak-
ing place that summer, and to convoy Hamp-
ton's troops when they made an abortive effort

1 Letter from Major General Taylor (British) to
Major-General Stone, June 3, 18 13. Lossing says the
loss of the British was " probably at least one hun-
dred,"—on what authority, if any, I do not know.

NAVAL WAR OF 1812.

337

to penetrate into Canada by the Sorel River
on Sept. 2 1 st.

BRITISH LOSS ON THE LAKES DURING 1813.

Name.

Tons.

Guns.

Remarks.

Ship,

600

Burnt on stocks.

Gloucester,

180

Taken at York.

Mary,

Burnt.

Drummond,

Captured.

Lady Gore,

Schooner,

Detroit,

490

Queen Charlotte

400

Lady Prevost,

Hunter,

Chippeway,

Little Belt,

90
2,560

3
109

<«

12 vessels,

AMERICAN

LOSS

Name.

Tons.

Guns.

Remarks.

Growler,

112

Captured.

Eagle,

110

2 vessels,

222

1 Excluding the Growler and Julia, which were re-
captured.

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23. The Man of the Family. By Christian Reid.

24. Margot. By Sidney Pickering.

25. The Fall of the Sparrow. By M. C. Balfour.

26. Elementary Jane. By Richard Pryce.

27. The Man of Last Resort. By M. D. Post

28. Stephen Whapshare. By Emma Brooke.

29. Lost Man's Lane. By Anna Katharine Green.

30. Wheat in the Ear. By Alien.

31. As Having Nothing. By Hester C. Oakley.

32. The Chase of an Heiress. By Christian Reid.

33. Final Proof. By R. Ottolengui.

34. The Wheel of God. By George Egerton.

35. John Marmaduke. By S. H. Church.

36. Hannah Thurston. By Bayard Taylor.

37. Yale Yarns. By J. S. Wood.

38. The Untold Half. By Alien.

39. Rosalba. By Olive P. Rayner (Grant Allen).

40. Dr. Berkeley's Discovery. By R. Slee and

C. A. Pratt.

41. Aboard the " American Duchess." By Headon

Hill.

42. The Priest's Marriage. By Nora Vynne.

43. The Things that Count. By E. K. Tompkins.

44. The Leavenworth Case. By Anna Katharine

Green.

45. The Secret of the Crater. By Duffield Osborne.

46. Lone Pine. By R. B. Townshend.

O. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York & London

DETECTIVE STORIES

By Anna Katharine Green

THE LEAVENWORTH CASE

A Lawyer's Story. 100th thousand. Hudson Library,
No. 44. 120; paper, 50 cents; cloth, $1.25.
" She hasproved herself as well able to write an interesting story
of mysterious crime as any man living."— London Academy.

THAT AFFAIR NEXT DOOR

38th thousand. Hudson Library, No. 17. 120; paper,

50 cents; cloth, $1.00.
"The success of 'That Affair Next Door,' Anna Katharine
Green's latest novel, is something almost unprecedented. Of all
the tales since' TheLeavenworth Case,' this has had the greatest
vogue which is saying considerable, for Mrs. Rohlfs enjoys the
distinction of being one of the most widely read authors in this
country. 'That Affair Next Door,' with its startling ingenuity,
its sustained interest and its wonderful plot, shows that the
author's hand has not lost its cunning, but has gained as the
years go by." — Buffalo Inquirer.

LOST MAN'S LANE

24th thousand. Hudson Library, No. 29. 120; paper,

50 cents; cloth, $1.00.
" Miss Green works up a cause ceTebre with a fertility of device
and ingenuity of treatment hardly second to Wilkie Collins 01
Edgar Allan Poe."— The Outlook.

AGATHA WEBB

28th thousand. 120; cloth only, $1.25.
" This is a cleverly concocted detective story, and sustains the
well-earned reputation of the writer. . . . The curiosity of
the reader is excited and sustained to the close." — Brooklyn
Citizen.

Other detective stories by this author, issued in paper at 50
cents; in cloth at $1.00, are:

A STRANGE DISAPPEARANCE

THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES

HAND AND RINO

THE MILL MYSTERY

BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

CYNTHIA WAKEHAM'S MONEY

MARKED "PERSONAL"

MISS HURD
DR. IZARD _____

Q. P. Putnam's Sons ESndw*

Two Powerful Novels

CHILDREN OF THE MIST

By Eden Phillpotts, author of " Down Dart-
moor Way," etc. ijth impression. 8% $1.50

"Knowing nothing of the writer or his works, I was simply
astonished at the beauty and power of this novel. But true as it is
to life and place, full of deep interest and rare humor, and vivid
descriptions, there seemed to be risk of its passing unheeded in
the crowd and rush and ruck of fiction. . . . Literature has
been enriched with a wholesome, genial, and noble tale, the read-
ing of which is a pleasure in store for many." — R. D. Blackmore%
the author 0/ Lorna Doone.

" If I were to name the best novel I have read I should un-
hesitatingly put down 4 Children of the Mist/ It has a touch of
Hardy; it has a touch of Blackmore; and yet it is fresh, and origi-
nal, and powerful." — Edward Fuller \ Literary Editor 0/ the
Providence Journal.

"One of the most consistently and thoroughly worked-out
novels that have appeared for a long time past. It is one of the
truest studies of human nature."— London Post.

*'A work of amazing power which plainly indicates a master
hand."— Boston Herald.

SONS OF THE MORNING

By Eden Phillpotts, author of *' Children of the
Mist," etc. 8° $1.50

Special Autograph Edition. Limited to 1000
copies signed by the author. With portrait.
8° nett $1.50

Little need be said concerning this author's virile work since
the far-reaching success of M Children of the Mist." This is the
first novel he has written since the publication of that powerful
work. The same strength of imagination, couched in the same
vivid English, is characteristic of this new story, which has, per-
haps, more of maturity about it. Mr. Phillpotts has again chosen
Dartmoor, that corner of England which he knows and loves so
well, for the scene of his novel.

Q. P. Putnam's Sons EM"*

IRew fiction.

Agatha Webb.

By Anna Katharine Green, author of " The

Leavenworth Case," " That Affair Next Door,"

etc. 12°, cloth, $1.25.

■• This is a cleverly concocted detective story,

and sustains the well-earned reputation of the writer.

. . . The curiosity of the reader is excited and

sustained to the close." — Brooklyn Citizen.

Children of the Mist.

By Eden Phillpotts, author of " Down Dart-
moor Way," ** Lying Prophets," etc. 8°, $1.50.
"A work of amazing power which plainly in-
dicates a master hand." — Boston Herald.

Miss Cayley's Adventures.

By Grant Allen, author of "Flowers and
Their Pedigrees," etc. With 80 illustrations.
12°, $1.50.
•'A quaint and sparkling story — bright and

entertaining from beginning to end." — Chicago

Times-Herald.

Dr. Berkeley's Discovery.

By Richard Slee and Cornelia Atwood
PRATT. Hudson Library No. 40. 12°, paper,
50 cents ; cloth, $1.00.
Dr. Berkeley's discovery is a liquid which will
"develop" certain memory cells of the human
brain, as a photographer's chemicals "develop" a
sensitised plate. Upon each tiny cell appears a
picture, visible by the microscope. By " develop-
ing" the memory centre of a brain, Dr. Berkeley
can trace the most secret history of the being that
owned the brain ; can see the things the being saw,
in sequence, from infancy to death. With this
foundation, the authors of " Dr. Berkeley's Discov-
ery " have told a thrilling, dramatic story.

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York & London

Historic Towns of New England

Edited by Lyman P. Powell. With introduction
by George P. Morris. With 160 illustrations.
8% $3.50.

CONTENTS:

Portland, by S. T. Pickard ; Rutland, by Edwin D. Mead ;
Salem, by George D. Latimer ; Boston, by T. W. Higginson
and E. E. Hale • Cambridge, by S. A. Eliot ; Concord, by F.
B. Sanborn- Plymouth, by Ellen Watson; Cape Cod
Towns, by Katharine Lee Bates; Deerfield, by George
Sheldon ; Newport, by Susan Coolidge ; Providence, by
Wm. B. Wbeden • Hartford, by Mary K. Talcott ; New
Haven, by F. H. Cogswell.

Historic Towns of the Middle States

Edited by Lyman P. Powell. With introduction by
Albert Shaw. With 135 illustrations. 8°, $3.50.

CONTENTS :

Albany, by W. W. Battershall ; Saratoga, by Ellen H.
Walworth ; Schenectady, by Judson S. Landon ; Newburgh,
by Adelaide Skbel; Tarrytown, by H. W. Mabib; Brook-
lyn, by Harring.on Putnam; New York, by J. B. Gilder;
Buffalo, by Roland B. Mahany; Pittsburgh, by S. H.
Church; Philadelphia, by Talcott Williams; Princeton,
by W. M. Sloane ; Wilmington, by E. N. Vallandigham.

Some Colonial Homesteads

And Their Stories. By Marion Harland. With
86 illustrations. 8°, $3.00.

"A notable book, dealing with early American days. . . .
The name of the author is a guarantee not only of tne greatest
possible accuracy as to facts, but of attractive treatment of themes
absorbingly interesting in themselves, . . . the book is of
rare elegance in paper, typography, and binding."— Rochester
Democrat-Ck ronicle.

More Colonial Homesteads

And Their Stones. By Marion Harland. Fully
illustrated. 8°, $3.00.

Where Ghosts Walk

The Haunts of Familiar Characters in History and
Literature. By Marion Harland, author of
" Some Colonial Homesteads," etc. With 33
illustrations. 8°, $2.50.

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York and London

:&£ Hnna ffuller.

A Literary Courtship.

Under the Auspices of Pike's Peak. With

12 full-page illustrations. 25th edition. 16%

gilt top $1 25

" A delightful little love-story. Like her other books it is
bright and breezy ; its humor is crisp and the general idea
decidedly original." — Boston Times.

A Venetian June.

With n full-page illustrations by George

Sloane. 12th edition. 1 6°, gilt top . $1 25

M * A Venetian June ' bespeaks its materials by its title, and
very full the little story is of the picturesqueness, the noviky,
the beauty, of life in the city of gondolas and gondoliers.*-—
Literary World.

Pratt Portraits.

Sketched in a New England Suburb. 15th

edition. With 13 full-page illustrations by

George Sloane. 120, gilt top . . $1 50

4i The lines the author cuts in her vignette are sharp and
clear, but she has, too, not alone the knack of color, but what
is rarer, the gift of humor." — New York Times.

Peak and Prairie.

From a Colorado Sketch-Book. With 16 full-
page illustrations. 160, gilt top . . $1 25

41 Characters and incidents are traced with a sure hand and
with unerring literary skill." — The Churchman.

One of the Pilgrims.

A Bank Story. 120, gilt top . . $1 25
" The story is graceful, delightful, and full of vivacity."—
The Congregationalist.

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York & London

•Y USE

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